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ABSTRACT 
 
 
REFLECTIONS UPON CONTEMPORARY TURKISH DEMOCRACY: 
A RAWLSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
Yıldız, Necip 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
December 2009 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ is applied to contemporary 
Turkey and used as a framework to reflect upon democratization process in Turkey. In 
order to substantiate how Rawls’ political liberalism and justice as fairness are related to 
democratization process in general, and to Turkish democratization in particular, first, the 
possible relations between Rawls’ conceptualization of ‘constitutional consensus,’ 
‘overlapping consensus,’ and the basic concepts in the democratization literature are 
analyzed. 
 
It is argued that the initial stage of ‘constitutional consensus’ on democratic 
procedures (being only a modus vivendi) corresponds to ‘democratic transition.’ On the 
other hand, it is argued that the finalized stage of constitutional consensus corresponds to 
‘minimalist’ and ‘negative’ democratic consolidation. Finally, it is claimed that 
‘overlapping consensus’ corresponds to ‘maximalist’ and ‘positive’ democratic 
consolidation.  
 
When we apply these concepts to the Turkish case, it is seen that Turkey displays 
certain attitudinal and behavioral deficiencies in terms of meeting all the conditions of a 
‘constitutional consensus’ by which democratic procedures would supposedly be secured; 
however, it is also argued that Turkey is moving closer to a ‘constitutional consensus’ as 
the major groups in Turkey gradually adhere to these procedures.  In this regard, Turkey 
is depicted as a ‘borderline’ case in terms of meeting the conditions of a ‘constitutional 
consensus,’ which is also supported by Turkey’s recent Freedom House ratings that 
denote a borderline situation.  
 
With respect to the possibility of forming an ‘overlapping consensus’ in the 
longer run in Turkey, four major issues are addressed in the study: basic rights and 
liberties, social justice, secularism, and the Kurdish issue. Rawls’ veil of ignorance and 
two principles of justice are applied to these four issues, and their implications are 
 iv
discussed. It is argued that equality, reciprocity, and the use of public reason would be 
crucial in terms of forming an overlapping consensus on these issues. 
 
Another central issue discussed in the dissertation is the issue of socio-economic 
modernization that is taken for granted in Rawls’ writings, and Turkey’s opportunities for 
consolidating its democracy in the coming years with reference to socio-economic 
modernization. Based on the empirical findings of modernization theory, it is argued that 
Turkey’s rising income and human development levels might serve to facilitate 
democratic development in Turkey.  
 
It is claimed that higher levels of socio-economic development, possibly 
enhanced by Turkey’s EU-based reforms, might create a more conducive environment for 
further democratic reforms, as a result of which Rawls’ peculiar political liberalism could 
become gradually more applicable and more likely to be realized in Turkey. It is also 
argued that a more just distribution of income and wealth, which might possibly be 
realized through a ‘property-owning democracy,’ would be more conducive to 
democratic consolidation in Turkey. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Rawls, justice as fairness, social liberalism, social democracy, social 
contract, democracy, Turkey, democratization, modernization, democratic consolidation, 
social justice, secularism, Kurdish issue. 
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ÖZET 
 
GÜNÜMÜZ TÜRK DEMOKRASĐSĐ ÜZERĐNE GÖRÜŞLER: 
RAWLS’CU BĐR PERSPEKTĐF 
 
 
 
Yıldız, Necip 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ergun Özbudun 
 
Aralık 2009 
 
 
 
 
         Bu tezde, John Rawls’un ‘hakkaniyet olarak adalet’ anlayışı, günümüz Türkiye’sine 
uygulanmış olup; bu anlayış, Türkiye’nin demokratikleşme sürecini anlamlandırmak için 
genel bir çerçeve olarak kullanılmıştır. Rawls’un siyasal liberalizminin ve hakkaniyet 
olarak adalet anlayışının, demokratikleşme literatürü içinde nasıl konumlanabileceği ve 
daha spesifik olarak Türkiye’nin demokratikleşmesiyle nasıl ilişkilendirilebileceğinin 
gösterilmesi noktasında; öncelikle, demokratikleşme literatürü ile Rawls’un ‘anayasal 
uzlaşma’ ve ‘örtüşen uzlaşma’ kavramları karşılaştırılmıştır.    
   
         Rawls’un bahsettiği, demokratik prosedürler üzerinde bir ‘anayasal uzlaşma’nın ilk 
aşamasının (ki bu yalnızca bir modus vivendi’dir), literatürdeki ‘demokrasiye geçiş’ 
kavramına karşılık geldiği tesbit edilmiştir. Öte yandan, anayasal uzlaşmanın nihai ve 
sonlandırılmış halinin ‘minimalist’ ve ‘negatif’ demokratik pekişmeye karşılık geldiği; 
‘örtüşen görüş birliği’ kavramının ise ‘maksimalist’ ve ‘pozitif’ demokratik pekişmeye 
karşılık gelmekte olduğu tesbit edilmiştir. 
 
       Bu kavramları Türkiye ile ilişkilendirdiğimizde; Türkiye’nin demokratik 
prosedürlere ilişkin bir ‘anayasal uzlaşma’nın bütün koşullarını yerine getirmede, hem 
tutumlar hem de davranışlar düzeyinde, bazı eksiklik ve kusurları olduğu söylenebilir. Ne 
var ki, Türkiye’nin demokratik prosedürler üzerinde asgari bir uzlaşmaya yaklaşmakta 
olduğu ve Türkiyedeki belli başlı siyasal grupların demokrasiyi benimseme sürecinde 
oldukları da iddia edilebilir. Türkiye’nin; Rawls’un bahsettiği anlamda bir ‘anayasal 
uzlaşma’ konusunda muhtemelen ‘sınır durumu’nda olduğu iddia edilebilir; nitekim 
Türkiye’nin son yıllardaki Freedom House rating’leri de bu durumu destekler niteliktedir. 
 
         Türkiye’de uzun vadede Rawls’un bahsettiği anlamda bir ‘örtüşen uzlaşma’nın 
gerçekleşebilmesine ilişkin olarak tezde dört temel konu ele alınmıştır: Temel hak ve 
özgürlükler, sosyal adalet, sekülarizm ve Kürt meselesi. Rawls’un ‘cehalet perdesi’ ve 
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‘adaletin iki temel prensibi’ kavramlaştırmaları, bu dört meseleye uyarlanmış ve bu 
kavramlaştırmaların Türkiye ile ilgili olası içerim ve uygulanma yolları tartışılmıştır. 
Eşitlik, karşılıklılık ve kamusal aklın etkin şekilde kullanılmasının, bu dört mesele 
üzerinde bir ‘örtüşen uzlaşma’ sağlanmasında oldukça büyük önem arz edeceği 
belirtilmiştir. 
 
         Tezde yer alan bir diğer temel ve önemli konu ise, Rawls’ın metinlerinde 
kanıksanmış ve doğal kabul edilmiş olan sosyo-ekonomik modernleşme meselesidir. 
Türkiyenin sosyo-ekonomik düzeydeki modernleşme düzeyinin, daha uzun vadede bir 
demokratik pekişme yaşanabilmesi ile olan ilişkisi değerlendirildiğinde; Türkiye’nin 
artan milli geliri ve insani kalkınma düzeyinin, Türkiye’de demokratik pekişme için bir 
avantaj olacağı belirtilmiştir. 
 
         Artan modernleşme ve gelişme düzeylerinin; bunlar Türkiye’deki Avrupa Birliği 
süreci ile de desteklenirse, demokratikleşme için uygun bir ortam oluşturacağı; bunun 
sonucunda ise Rawls’un ‘siyasal liberalizm’inin Türkiye için daha elverişli ve 
gerçekleştirilebilir bir olasılık haline gelebileceği iddia edilmiştir. Ayrıca, Türkiye’de 
“sosyal adalet”in sağlanması yoluyla -ki bu hem gelirin daha dengeli dağılması hem de 
mülkiyet sahipliğinin yaygınlaştığı bir demokrasiye geçerlilik kazandırılması ile olabilir- 
demokratik pekişmenin gerçekleşebilme imkanlarının artacağı belirtilmiştir. 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Rawls, hakkaniyet olarak adalet, sosyal liberalizm, sosyal demokrasi, 
toplumsal sözleşme, Türkiye, demokratikleşme, modernleşme, demokratik pekişme, 
sosyal adalet, sekülarizm, Kürt meselesi. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation presents a Rawlsian perspective on contemporary Turkish democracy. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this work is the first study applying John Rawls’ 
two principles of justice to the issues of contemporary Turkish democracy. Being a 
preliminary study, this research builds tentative connections between Rawls’s work and 
Turkish democracy, which aims to lead to further discussions and studies on the issue. 
           Although Rawls’ peculiar ‘political liberalism’ is only partially applicable to 
contemporary Turkey, it can be argued that his political liberalism, which puts forth an 
essentially egalitarian and social democratic approach, becomes increasingly more 
relevant as Turkey moves closer to norms and values of liberal democracy by virtue of 
EU-Turkey relations that foster social, economic, and political reforms.  
This study applies the two principles of justice put forth by Rawls to four major 
issues in contemporary Turkish democracy. These four issues are basic political rights 
and liberties, social justice, secularism, and the Kurdish issue. Each of these issues is 
dealt with in a separate chapter throughout the dissertation with reference to Rawls’s 
basic ideas and concepts.  
It is a fact that Rawls’ two principles of justice and their implications have been 
extensively debated in different contexts in many countries over the world, and it can be 
argued that these principles become increasingly more relevant for contemporary Turkey 
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where both liberty and equality are issues that need to be addressed. Rawls’ two 
principles of justice, which bring together liberty and equality, follow as: 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all; and 
 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle)1  
 
These two principles are applied in this dissertation to the aforementioned four issues in 
contemporary Turkey, and the possibility of forming an overlapping consensus on these 
issues is discussed. It needs to be acknowledged that some illiberal values that are 
explicit or implicit in Turkish political culture might possibly hinder the formation of an 
overlapping consensus on these issues in Turkey; however, it is also a fact that 
historically speaking, cultural pluralism, tolerance, (republican) equality, and social state 
are values that are more or less embedded in Turkish political practices. These values 
may be systematized and politicized within the liberalizing scheme of contemporary 
Turkish democracy. This study, in this regard, is an attempt to make a modest 
contribution to the debates concerning the recently transforming and soul-searching 
Turkish democracy by bringing in the Rawlsian principles and their implications for 
Turkey. 
           As to my position concerning the overall Rawlsian legacy, I would like to note that 
while I am convinced of the contemporary relevance of Rawls’ justice as fairness for 
contemporary societies, I am not necessarily committed to every aspect of Rawls’s 
                                                  
 
1
 Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness— A Restatement (ed. by Erin Kelly). Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, p.42. 
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political system, and diverge from Rawls, especially on the issue of global justice. While 
Rawls applies the veil of ignorance first within nation-states and then globally to 
‘peoples’ living in nation-states, I believe that the opposite should be done. That is to say, 
the veil of ignorance should first be applied globally and then possibly at the national or 
local levels. Such a revision in priority would secure justice for all individuals, regardless 
of which nation-states they live in.  
Such a global and cosmopolitan view would not negate the reality of nation-
states; in fact, it would acknowledge their existence and great influence in international 
relations, yet would argue that the national borders, although politically relevant, are 
morally irrelevant in terms of justice. In this regard, the author is close to the views of 
Thomas Pogge on global justice and reads Rawls and his legacy in a revisionist manner 
as does Pogge.2 Thus, the author acknowledges the urgency of global justice and the 
pressing need for new global institutions in order to secure global justice. However, this 
issue is not the main topic of this dissertation. Here, it would suffice to say that the author 
is convinced that the veil of ignorance and justice as fairness should be applied first to the 
basic structure of the world system, and only after the justness of the global institutions is 
secured, justice as fairness could possibly be applied to smaller scales such as states, 
cities, municipalities, etc. This likely would require working back and forth until some 
equilibrium is reached. A reflective equilibrium needs to be sought between global and 
local. 
In this regard, the author considers his ethical and political reflections on Turkish 
politics as part of a more general political reasoning and tries to develop his arguments in 
a way that would not be contrary to the possible implications of a veil of ignorance at a 
                                                  
2
 See Pogge, Thomas. 1989. Realizing Rawls. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
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global level. The issue of global justice is problematized at a general level in Chapter 2 
where Rawls is contrasted with cosmopolitans like Pogge. 
As for adding to the literature base, this study makes three main contributions. 
The first one is that this study makes a modest theoretical contribution to the literature on 
Rawls by analyzing Rawls’ conceptions of constitutional consensus and overlapping 
consensus as to how these two conceptions could possibly be compared to the central 
concepts in the democratization literature. The issue of democratization in Rawls’ 
writings is an unstudied area within the literature, which requires building connections 
between political philosophy and political science. In this regard, Chapter 3 is a 
preliminary attempt to make connections between Rawls’ constitutional consensus and 
overlapping consensus and the relevant concepts in the democratization literature. 
The second contribution of this study is that it applies the major Rawlsian 
concepts, including constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus, to Turkish 
democracy. The relevance of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus for 
Turkey are discussed within the context of democratization and a possible democratic 
consolidation in this country (Chapter 4). On the other hand, the possibility of forming an 
overlapping consensus in Turkey on issues of social justice, secularism, and the Kurdish 
issue are discussed, respectively, in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.  
The third contribution of this study is that following certain interconnections 
between Rawls and modernization (theory), this study presents Turkey’s recent socio-
economic and political development and discusses the possibility of democratic 
consolidation in Turkey in the coming years with reference to Turkey’s current GNI per 
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capita, Gini coefficient (income distribution), HDI (Human Development Index), and 
Freedom House ratings (Chapter 8). 
A more detailed account of the three specific contributions of this study is 
presented below. Concerning each of the three contributions of this study, initially some 
background information is given and later the major conclusions reached in the study are 
presented. 
Concerning the first contribution of this study, it needs to be mentioned that 
Rawls puts forth two successive stages in Political Liberalism in order to form a possible 
overlapping consensus on a particular conception of justice. The first stage would be a 
constitutional consensus and the second stage would be an overlapping consensus. He 
argues that a constitutional consensus could first start as a ‘modus vivendi,’ and then turn 
into a finalized and internalized constitutional consensus in time. Rawls presents the 
following critical question concerning how a modus vivendi could possibly turn into a 
constitutional consensus within time: 
How might a constitutional consensus come about? Suppose that at a certain 
time, because of various historical events and contingencies, some liberal 
principles of justice are accepted as a mere modus vivendi, and are incorporated 
into existing political institutions. This acceptance has come about, let us say, in 
much the same way as the acceptance of the principle of toleration came about as 
a modus vivendi following the Reformation: at first reluctantly, but nevertheless 
as providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil strife. 
Our question then is this: how might it happen that over time the initial 
acquiescence in a constitution satisfying these liberal principles of justice 
develops into a constitutional consensus in which those principles themselves are 
affirmed? 3 
 
In relation to a finalized constitutional consensus, Rawls notes that in order for a 
constitutional consensus to be complete, three conditions need to be met: 
                                                  
3
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.159. 
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• A clear definition of the basic political rights and liberties in the constitution 
• The common and effective use of public reason in political matters 
• The prevalence of cooperative virtues in political life4 
Rawls states that a constitutional consensus would be neither deep nor wide in 
content and would be confined to the basic political rights and liberties. He notes that a 
constitutional consensus would not cover all basic rights and liberties but only those that 
are related to the procedures of democratic government, such as elections, voting, the 
right to form political associations, etc.5 On the other hand, Rawls notes that an 
overlapping consensus on a conception of justice would be both deep and wide in its 
implications, and would imply the existence of a popular consensus on the justness of the 
basic structure of a society. Rawls notes that when an overlapping consensus in a country 
is achieved, this would denote that the majority of the citizens in that country are 
convinced that the political and social institutions in their country are just and fair, and 
that they can participate in the polity without any major inequality that could possibly 
undermine their self-efficacy or self-respect as citizens.6 
In relation to Rawls’ depiction of the initial stage of constitutional consensus, 
finalized constitutional consensus, and the eventual overlapping consensus, three 
conclusions are presented in the dissertation. The first one is that the initial stage of 
constitutional consensus (being only a modus vivendi) conceptually corresponds to 
‘democratic transition’ in the democratization literature. The second conclusion is that 
                                                  
4
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.161-164. 
5
 Ibid. p.159. 
6
 Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness— A Restatement (ed. by Erin Kelly). Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, pp.139-140. 
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finalized constitutional consensus conceptually corresponds to ‘minimalist’ and 
‘negative’ democratic consolidation. The third conclusion is that overlapping consensus 
conceptually corresponds to ‘maximalist’ and ‘positive’ democratic consolidation. It 
should be noted that Rawls’ emphasis on social justice and popular participation in order 
to secure long-run stability in a polity can be considered as a relatively maximalist 
aspiration. In fact, it can be argued that there exists a dynamic tension within the 
Rawlsian project between Rawls’ emphasis on minimalist democratic procedures, which 
he praises as part of the liberty principle, and Rawls’ more maximalist aspirations that 
stem from the difference principle, as well as his overall concern for long-run stability. 
Below is shown the findings of this dissertation concerning Rawls’ conceptions of 
‘constitutional consensus’ and ‘overlapping consensus’ and what they correspond to in 
the democratization literature. 
 
 
RAWLS’ CONCEPTIONS 
 
 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
WHAT THEY CORRESPOND 
TO IN THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
LITERATURE 
 
Initial Stage of 
Constitutional Consensus → 
Democratic procedures and 
institutions incorporated into the 
political system as a 
‘modus vivendi’ = 
 
 
Democratic Transition 
 
Finalized 
Constitutional Consensus → 
Popular consensus on democratic 
procedures and institutions, 
which is secured by civic 
political culture = 
 
 
Minimalist / Negative Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
 
Overlapping Consensus → 
Popular consensus on a political 
conception of justice, and thus 
prevalence of deep political 
legitimacy and long-run stability 
within the polity = 
 
 
Maximalist / Positive 
Democratic Consolidation 
 
Table 1: ‘Constitutional Consensus’ and ‘Overlapping Consensus’ Compared with the 
Democratization Literature 
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Regarding the second contribution of this study, it needs to be stated that except 
for some causal references on the relevance of Rawls for Turkish democracy in the 
literature such as those made by Hünler (1997) and Keyman (2003), books or 
dissertations that specifically problematize or propose connections between Rawls and 
Turkish democracy have not been published thus far. This study, in this regard, is a 
preliminary attempt that may contribute to further studies in the coming years as Turkish 
democracy possibly develops further and moves closer to the norms of liberal democracy.    
           Concerning the relevance of Rawls’ conceptions of modus vivendi, constitutional 
consensus, and overlapping consensus to Turkish democracy, the following three 
conclusions are presented in Chapter 4: 
 
I. Turkish democracy started as a ‘modus vivendi’ among rival groups during the 
transition to multi-party democracy in 1946. That is to say, democracy depended on the 
balance of power among the political groups. The rivalry between the DP (Democratic 
Party) and the CHP (Republican People’s Party), as well as between civil authority and 
the military, made the democratic regime a matter of the relative conditions of the time; 
and thus, the transitional period was rather fragile.  
 
II. After Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership, the governments 
carried out the EU harmonization reforms mostly by broad consensus, and met the 
political requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria as of 2004, and thus moved closer to 
meeting the requirements of a constitutional consensus. Turkey gained further ground in 
securing the basic political rights and liberties (especially during 2001-2004), the better 
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use of public reason in public discussions, as well as a general increase in cooperative 
virtues in political forums. Despite these relative improvements, it can be argued that due 
to the continuing problems related to rule of law, the military influence in politics which 
will be discussed especially in Chapter 4, and the unconsolidated nature of cooperative 
virtues among the political groups in Turkey, it seems that Turkey as of 2009 is probably 
a ‘borderline case’ in terms of constitutional consensus. It can be argued that the next few 
years will provide a better opportunity for observers of Turkish politics to decide whether 
Turkey has passed the threshold in terms of meeting the three criteria of constitutional 
consensus. 
Before discussing the conclusions reached in this study concerning the relevance 
of overlapping consensus to Turkish democracy, one point should be clarified here, 
which is that Rawls puts forth overlapping consensus as a stage that would normally 
follow a finalized constitutional consensus; however, it seems that these two stages in 
certain countries might possibly progress in a simultaneous manner. This might be 
considered as a non-ideal or perhaps even an anomalous situation; however, it can 
roughly be compared to the fact that certain developing countries face issues of post-
modernity while they are still modernizing. 
It can be argued that in a country in which a constitutional consensus does not yet 
fully exist, there could possibly be certain issues on which an overlapping consensus 
prevails among the major social and political groups. For instance, a country that is still 
trying to settle basic political rights and liberties might possibly have a consensus on 
issues such as distribution of wealth, gender, or religious matters as a result of certain 
political values in that country that might principally not contradict or negate the basic 
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principles of liberal democracy. In this regard, it can be argued that although Turkey 
might not yet have a full constitutional consensus, this factor should not prevent the 
citizens from discussing the possibility of an (overlapping) consensus pertaining to just 
institutions concerning distribution of wealth, secularism, or ethnic relations. 
Another issue that needs to be clarified is related to the operationalization of 
Rawls’ conception of overlapping consensus. Although Rawls puts forth overlapping 
consensus as a single concept, it can be argued that it practically implies multiple issues. 
That is to say, the formation of an overlapping consensus would require a consensus on 
many diverse issues. In this regard, there could be an overlapping consensus on 
distribution of justice in a certain country, but this would not necessarily guarantee an 
overlapping consensus on ethnic relations, or other issues. Therefore, an overlapping 
consensus needs to be thought of as an issue with multiple and possibly uneven 
components. At a given time, every component or issue relevant to forming an 
overlapping consensus might possibly be at a different and unequal level of discursive, 
legal, or practical development. 
 
III. Concerning overlapping consensus, it is argued in this dissertation that Turkish 
democracy needs to have a consensus on four major issues to be a just state. These issues 
are basic rights and liberties, social justice, relations between state and religion (the issue 
of secularism), and just institutions and practices concerning ethnic relations in Turkey, 
especially the democratic solution of the Kurdish issue.7  It is argued in this dissertation 
                                                  
7
 It needs to be noted that according to Rawls, while basic political rights and liberties are the subject 
matter of ‘constitutional consensus,’ substantive rights and liberties pertaining to the political and social 
realm are the subject matter of  ‘overlapping consensus’ (an overlapping consensus, if it can be achieved, is 
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that the political legacy in Turkey is not devoid of deep-seated values such as cultural 
pluralism, toleration, (republican) equality, and social state. I argue that these already 
existing values, along with values that are being internalized by virtue of the EU-Turkey 
relations, could possibly be utilized while forming an overlapping consensus on a 
conception of justice in contemporary Turkey. 
           Concerning the third contribution of this study, a chapter is devoted to an analysis 
of the relation between socio-economic development and democratic consolidation in 
light of the findings and insights of modernization theory (Chapter 8).8 It is argued in that 
chapter that Turkey is becoming closer to meeting the minimal requisites of socio-
economic modernization, thus increasing its chances of having a sustainable democracy. 
Based on the World Bank, UN, and Freedom House criteria, it is noted that Turkey today 
is in fact very close to reaching the threshold of the following four: 
• ‘High’ GNI per capita (Gross National Income per capita), 
•  Relatively lower inequality of income (possibly low-middle inequality), 
• ‘High’ HDI (Human Development Index), 
• ‘Free’ rating in the Freedom House report . 
Turkey’s recent scores in these four areas present a very interesting picture. They lead 
one to think that Turkey might possibly be at the threshold of making a leap to high 
socio-economic and political development. Overall, it seems that Turkey is quite close to 
meeting the minimal requisites of becoming a country with ‘high income per capita,’ 
‘low-middle level of income inequality,’ ‘high human development,’ and a ‘free’ political 
regime. What we mean by this can be seen more clearly in the following table. 
                                                                                                                                                  
depicted by Rawls as a process to follow constitutional consensus). Rawls, John. 1996. Political 
Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.159-164. 
8
 The relation between Rawls’ writings and modernization is discussed in Chapter 8.  
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 GNP per capita9 Gini coefficient10 HDI11 Freedom Rating 
Threshold 
 
High ≥ $11,906 
(World Bank) 
Low ≤ 0.30 
 
High ≥  80 
   (UN) 
Free ≤  2.5 
(Freedom House) 
Turkey 
 
$9,340 (2008) 
 
  0.38 (2005)  79.98 (2008)   3.0 (2008) 
 
Table 2: Turkey’s recent socio-economic and political ratings 
 
In relation to the fourth factor mentioned in the table above, Turkey’s Freedom 
House ratings over the years is presented in Chapter 8. In that chapter, it is noted that 
Turkey’s prospective EU membership and the legal harmonization process in this country 
has enabled Turkey to sustain a score of 3.0 for the last five consecutive years: 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. This score is only 0.5 point away from 2.5, the threshold 
score for obtaining a free score, as can be seen on the scale shown below. 
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 
Free Free Free Free Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
             
                                     ←                                                          → 
                            Democratization                                   Authoritarianization 
 
Table 3:  Freedom House’s Scale of Freedom  
                                                  
9
 Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
The groups are: low income, $975 or less; lower middle income, $976-$3,855; upper middle income, 
$3,856-$11,905; and high income, $11,906 or more (World Bank, country classification, 2008, 
http://www.worldbank.org.) Turkey’s GNI per capita is taken from  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 
 
10
 Gini Coefficient Index: Although there is not a strict criteria for the categorization of countries according 
to the Gini coefficient, we can say, based on the common economic view that a low level of inequality is 
considered to be between 0.00-0.30, middle level of inequality between 0.30-0.45, and high level of 
inequality between 0.45-1.00. 
 
11
 Human Development Index: Low Human Development 0-49, Middle Human Development 50-79, High 
Human Development 80-100  (http://www.un.org). Turkey’s 2008 HDI is taken from the UNDP data. 
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 In view of Turkey’s recent ratings and the possibility of a democratic 
consolidation in Turkey, it is argued in Chapter 8 that if a democratic constitution that 
relies on wide popular support and legitimacy can be successfully passed in the coming 
years in Turkey, it might possibly move Turkey closer to a ‘free’ rating (≤ 2.5). It is also 
noted that Turkey’s achieving and, more importantly, sustaining such a rating for a 
couple of years, especially with the EU’s active support and inclusive policies, can signal 
the beginning of Turkey’s transcending the ‘partly-free’ authoritarian regime and 
eventually reaching a genuine and ‘free’ democracy. 
One can argue that the countries that are within the 2.0-3.0 range in terms of the 
Freedom House rating are countries which have a certain acquaintance with liberal 
democracy and are trying to become rooted in this regime type.  These countries are the 
ones that most need clarification of the underlying principles that regulate their political 
and social institutions.  They need continuous discursive practices in order to reach 
reflective equilibrium on different issues pertaining to the basic political structure. In this 
regard, this particular study is an attempt to contribute to political and ethical debates 
concerning the basic political structure of Turkey and Turkish democracy from a 
Rawlsian perspective. In order to be able to follow the basic arguments in this study, 
some basic knowledge of Rawls’s work is necessary, which is presented in the chapter 
that follows. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
RAWLS’ BASIC CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
John Rawls (1921-2002) was an American political philosopher who has been quite 
influential, especially in the Anglo-American world after he published A Theory of 
Justice in 1971. This book revitalized the concept of ‘social contract’ within the liberal 
tradition with reference to both liberty and equality. Rawls’ second book Political 
Liberalism, which he published in 1993, also provoked many discussions on democracy 
and liberalism. In that book, Rawls’ basic concern was to formulate a political system 
that could accomodate pluralism in modern societies. The major concepts Rawls used in 
Political Liberalism are social contract, justice, justice as fairness, public use of reason, 
the priority of the right over the good, pluralism, toleration, well-ordered society, 
constitutional consensus, and overlapping consensus. 
Rawls’ ‘political liberalism,’ which in substance presents a social democratic 
approach, has been influential not only in English-speaking countries, but also in various 
democratizing countries, including China and Eastern European countries. Rawls is 
increasingly read also in Turkey, where some of his books have recently been translated 
into Turkish.12 It can be argued that Rawls’ ideas about prioritizing justice (making the 
worst off better) and his arguments for pluralism and toleration are quite relevant for 
Turkish democracy.  
                                                  
12
 Rawls, John. 2003. Halkların Yasası ve “Kamusal Akıl Düşüncesinin Yeniden Ele Alınması.” Istanbul: 
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, and Rawls, John. 2007. Siyasal Liberalizm. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları.  To the best of my knowledge, A Theory of Justice has not yet been translated into Turkish. 
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References to Rawls could be quite relevant and beneficial for the establishment 
of a just, legitimate, and contract-based state in Turkey. The issue of social contract, 
which is central to Rawls’ writings, is especially critical for Turkish democracy since it 
can be argued that the legitimacy of a state is directly related to whether or not it has a 
contractual character in the eyes of its citizens.13 The basic institutions of a state, in order 
to be taken as just and legitimate, need to be structured in such a way that the citizens 
consider them as such. Rawls’ statement that society should be a ‘fair system of 
cooperation’ refers to the reciprocal and contractual basis of a well-ordered, liberal state.      
It can be said that Rawls’ foremost political interest is justice, and his political 
proposal in order to secure justice is a system termed ‘justice as fairness,’ which will be 
explained below. 
 
2.1 Justice as Fairness 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls asks the question of what is the best conception of justice 
and inquires about possible answers to this question. Several answers were given to this 
question at the time Rawls was writing this book. The major attitude within the liberal 
tradition was the utilitarian approach.14 In the book, Rawls inquires into the implications 
of utilitarianism and points to the flaws of this approach, and eventually puts forth his 
own conception of justice that he calls “justice as fairness.” In the coming section, how 
Rawls views utilitarianism will be briefly mentioned, and then his understanding of 
justice as put forth in A Theory of Justice will be explained.  
 
                                                  
13
 This is no doubt a liberal view. 
14
 Talisse, Robert B. 2001. On Rawls. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, p.24. 
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2.1.1 The Utilitarian Approach versus Rawls 
While Rawls was writing A Theory of Justice, the dominant conception of justice within 
liberalism was the utilitarian approach. Historical figures such as John Stuart Mill and 
Bentham were the main figures of this trend. According to this approach, the aim of a 
conception of justice is to “maximize satisfaction (and minimize dissatisfaction) for the 
greatest number of persons possible.”15 Rawls puts the aim of utilitarianism as such: 
 
The main idea [of utilitarianism] is that society is rightly ordered, and 
therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve 
the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals 
belonging to it.16 
 
Utilitarianism relies on the theory of value known as “hedonism.”17 According to 
hedonism, the only intrinsic value to be pursued is to increase pleasure and to decrease 
pain. Utilitarianism aims for the application of hedonism to the most possible number of 
people in the society in an aggregate manner. It is interested in aggregate satisfaction 
among the population without considering how it is allocated among the individuals. It 
may possibly be interested in allocation problems as long as this issue is related to 
general utility. However, in this manner, Rawls argues that “utilitarianism does not take 
seriously the distinction between persons.”18  
In this regard,  Rawls argues that the priority of certain basic rights is also not 
taken seriously by utilitarians. In fact, according to utilitarians, certain rights should be 
protected to the extent that they serve social utility, which implies they can be negotiated 
or conceded whenever it is appropriate for the social benefit. Rawls says this is 
                                                  
15
 Ibid., p.25. 
16
 Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.20. 
17
 Ibid., p.24-25. 
18
 Ibid., p.24. 
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unacceptable since certain basic rights and liberties are valuable in themselves and they 
should not be contingent upon social conditions or any calculus of social utility. For 
Rawls, liberty, individuality, and freedom are to be secured in their own right and should 
not be violated for social concerns. To provide an example, according to utilitarianism, a 
minority within a country can be deprived of its rights if it would increase the aggregate 
utility within that country. Against such a possibility, Rawls would argue that the rights 
of the minority is inviolable and needs to be fully protected by the state. This is where 
Rawls radically differs from the utilitarians. 
 
2.1.2 The Social Contract Approach and Rawls 
The idea of the social contract is supported by figures such as Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant. In their political writings, these authors try to explain and justify the conditions of 
how the state, as a political association, emerged. They argue that people were living in a 
‘state of nature’ before the states emerged, and every person was in a position to protect 
his/her life and property by his/her own power. This used to cause a lot of inconvenience 
for the individuals, so they thought that a political association to whom they would give 
up their individual power would protect their life and property more conveniently. In this 
regard, Locke argued: 
 
To avoid this state of war...is one great reason of men’s putting 
themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature, for where there is 
an authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, 
there the continuance of the state of war is excluded...19 
 
                                                  
19
  Locke, John. 1988. Two Treaties on the Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.21. 
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The contract theory is criticized by some authors arguing that, in history, no such 
contract ever took place. As a response to this, contract theorists argue that social 
contract need not necessarily be an anthropological reality, but it is rather a hypothetical 
contract, which refers to the consent of the people for the existence of their state. In this 
regard, it is “a way of thinking about politics.”20 It can be said that Rawls revived the 
contractual way of thinking about politics. However, it should be noted that Rawls’ use 
of the idea of a social contract in his writings is different from the above mentioned 
writers in some important respects.  
First of all, Rawls does not use the idea of contract to explain or justify the 
emergence of political association, but he seeks a conception of justice that is implicit in 
liberal democracies and which “best approximates our considered judgments of justice 
and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.”21 Rawls uses 
the idea of a social contract (which he substantiates by a mechanism called ‘veil of 
ignorance’) as a ‘device of representation’ to expose his conception of justice.22 Rawls’ 
concept of ‘original position,’ it can be argued, corresponds to the ‘state of nature’ in the 
contractual tradition.23 However, Rawls’ ‘state of nature’ is in no way a model of the 
natural condition of the people at some distant anthropological time but rather it is a way 
to think about justice for today. It gives people the chance to think and reflect upon how 
justice should ideally be realized in a democratic society. Rawls notes every one can 
possibly expose himself/herself to the ‘original position’ at any time in order to be able 
                                                  
20
 Talisse, Robert B. 2001. On Rawls. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, p.31. 
21
 Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.xviii. 
22
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.25. 
23
 Talisse, Robert B. 2001. On Rawls. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, p.32. 
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to think more clearly and systematically about how institutions in contemporary societies 
should be arranged in a just way. 
 
2.1.3 The ‘Original Position’ and the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ 
According to Rawls, a fair conception of justice can only be reached  when one is 
exposed to the ‘original position,’ which is a hypothetical situation where “no one knows 
his place in society, his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune 
in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”24 
Rawls states that no one in such a position knows about his/her particular “conception of 
the good.” 
The aim of the ‘veil of ignorance’ is to get rid of social contingencies that are 
‘morally arbitrary’ and to give people a chance of ‘impartial’ understanding of a fair 
conception of justice. Under such conditions, no one will know what kind of particular 
advantages or disadvantages they will have; therefore, Rawls assumes parties will choose 
a conception of justice in a rational manner. For example, under such conditions, a 
statement such as ‘only the most intelligent should rule,’ or ‘only the richest people 
should rule’ would most probably be rejected by individuals simply because individuals 
do not know their own level of intelligence or wealth under the ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
An objection to the very possibility of such a ‘veil of ignorance’ problematizes 
what exactly will motivate the parties in the veil of ignorance if they are devoid of all 
their contingent social identities. To put it another way, if individuals in the veil of 
ignorance are devoid of all features that make them a particular person, then how will 
they know that they affirm or do not affirm a particular conception of justice. To this 
                                                  
24
 Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.11. 
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objection, Rawls puts forth the ‘thin theory of the good’ according to which there are 
certain ‘primary goods’ which “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of 
life.”25 Primary goods are things that everyone would normally want. These are things 
like rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income, and wealth,” and “self-respect.”26 
The parties in the original position “assume that they normally prefer more primary 
goods than less.”27 In the original position, people would choose as much of the primary 
goods as possible to reach their basic life goals. It could be said that the ‘thin theory of 
the good’ clarifies the basis of the parties’ motivations and choices, and contextualizes 
the parties under the ‘veil of ignorance’ as rational actors who have some natural 
interests. Here, an important point that needs to be pointed out is that Rawls assumes 
people who are under the veil of ignorance have no envy or feelings of comparing 
oneself with others which could distract them from rational and fair judgment. 
 
2.1.4 The Principles of Justice 
It is Rawls’ conviction that the parties who are exposed to the original position, as 
rational actors, would choose two principles of justice for themselves. These would be: 
The First Principle of Justice: 
“Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all [the 
liberty principle]; and 
The Second Principle of Justice: 
                                                  
25
 Ibid., p.54. 
26
 Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.54. 
27
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.123.  
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“Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity [equal opportunity principle]; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society [the difference principle].”28 
Rawls puts forth two lexical priorities concerning the two principles. The first is 
that the liberty principle has a lexical priority over the second principle of justice, which 
practically means that “liberty guaranteed by the first principle cannot be sacrificed for 
social and economic gains.”29 The second priority rule ensures that the equal opportunity 
principle has priority over the difference principle. Rawls’ liberty principle, equal 
opportunity principle, and difference principle are explained below. 
 
The Liberty Principle: 
According to this principle, people should have as many basic liberties as possible. As to 
what these basic liberties would be, Rawls notes: 
Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public 
office) and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom 
of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological 
oppression and physical assault; the right to hold personal property and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure...30 
 
The Equal Opportunity Principle: 
This principle argues that offices and positions, which are the basis of economic and 
social status, should be open to all. This should not be in a formal and merely procedural 
                                                  
28
  Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness— A Restatement (ed. by Erin Kelly). Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, pp.42-43. 
29
 Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.55. 
30
 Ibid. p.123. 
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sense but in such a way that “equal life prospects [are secured] in all sectors of society 
for those similarly endowed and motivated.”31 Rawls also says that the political 
institutions should be structured in such a way that people have equality of opportunity 
in terms of education and culture which would allow them into offices in a fair and 
egalitarian way.32 
 
The Difference Principle: 
 
 
ALLOCATIONAL 
POSSIBILITIES 
 
PERSONS 
 
I II III IV V 
A 20 40 40 30 30 
B 20 10 20 40 36 
C 20 10 20 25 28 
 
Let’s assume that there are 60 primary goods to be allocated.33 It could be either 
allocated equally as in Option I, in which everyone gets 20, or unequally as in options II, 
III, IV, V, as seen in the above table.  
Rawls argues that while some unequal options such as option II, could produce 
results that might yield less than 20 goods for some parties (namely B and C), and 
therefore be unacceptable since it is against the difference principle, some unequal 
options such as Option IV and V might eventually yield more than 20 goods for all 
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parties.34 If one is to choose between Option IV and V, according to the difference 
principle Option V needs to be chosen, because the least advantaged person in Option V 
is better off than the least off person in Option IV. 
In this regard, Rawls argues that certain unequal allocational options, as long as 
they are beneficial for the least advantaged people of the society, might be preferable to 
simply allocating everthing in a strictly equal manner. This social democratic approach is 
the core of the difference principle. 
Rawls argues in Justice as Fairness, A Restatement that a welfare state could not 
possibly meet the two principles of justice because it redistributes resources only ex 
poste, and does not meet the conditions of fairness. Rawls notes in Justice as Fairness, A 
Restatement that only a property-owning democracy or a liberal (market) socialism can 
possibly meet the two principles of justice. Rawls’ attitude on property-owning 
democracy, liberal (market) socialism, and other economic regimes will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5 which is on social justice. The next section discusses Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism. 
 
2.2 Rawls’ Political Liberalism 
Whereas in A Theory of Justice, Rawls defends his egalitarian liberalism as a universal 
and comprehensive world view, in Political Liberalism, he defends liberalism without 
making reference to liberalism’s philosophical roots.35 He argues that comprehensive 
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liberal theories like those of Locke, Jefferson or Mill justify liberal principles by 
reference to a deep “philosophical” background like theology or utilitarianism. Rawls 
argues his political liberalism, however, does not rely on any deep philosophical 
foundation, but it simply affirms the “tradition of democratic thought” (in a pragmatist 
manner).36 “It delibaretely stays on the surface, philosophically speaking,” it tries to 
“leave aside philosophy’s longstanding problems”37 (which are controversial).  
 
2.2.1 Rawls and the Political 
According to Rawls, “the political values” have a priority and superiority to private, 
associational, and familial values. Since politics determines the basic structure of the 
society, the ‘political’ overrides the other realms of value systems, and that other value 
systems, he argues, need to compromise when it is politically necessary. Rawls makes the 
distinction between the political and non-political as such:  
The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the 
political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are 
affectional, again in ways the political is not. (The associational, the personal, and 
the familial are simply three examples of the non-political; there are others).38 
 
Rawls argues that the comprehensive doctrines in a modern society are so profoundly 
different from each other in their basic philosophical, religious, and epistemological 
premises that they cannot be easily reconciled; therefore, while designing the basic 
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institutions of a society, these deep differences should be put aside, and priority should be 
given to the common political values.39 
 
2.2.2 The Issue of Pragmatism 
It can be argued that Rawls in Political Liberalism takes a ‘pragmatist’ position. He states 
that he presents his liberal position not by reference to deep philosophical references on 
human nature and self, but to the political practices of contemporary democratic 
countries.40  
Rawls argues that since many people are living in societies that are very diverse in 
terms of religious, philosophical, or moral views (which he calls comprehensive 
doctrines), there could be no comprehensive doctrine to which all or the majority of the 
people would give consent to. Therefore, he concludes that there is a need to find a 
practical solution in such a pluralist society that would enable all these different people to 
live peacefully under a political system. Rawls argues this quest could only be realized 
through a politically liberal state where citizens see each other as free and equal citizens 
and decide together on issues of basic structure. In such a political system, people would 
be expected to bring forth their arguments relying on common sense and public reason, 
and in the public forums they would be expected to express their arguments in a way that 
others can reasonably accept.  
Rawls says a liberal conception of justice can be accepted by people from 
different comprehensive views in such a way that every one views and justifies this 
                                                  
39
 Rawls states: “By avoiding comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion and philosophy’s 
profoundest controversies so as to have some hope of uncovering a basis of a stable overlapping 
consensus.” (Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.152.) 
40
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.8. 
 26
principle of justice from within his/her own comprehensive doctrine. He notes that in 
order for this to be relevant, comprehensive doctrines need to become liberalized over 
time to such an extent that these comprehensive doctrines would somehow allow for a 
politically liberal conception of justice. Rawls notes that in a liberally democratic state, 
all comprehensive doctrines, which respect and tolerate the existence of others and 
acknowledge reciprocity, could be considered as ‘reasonable’ comprehensive doctrines. 
He argues that as the majority of the comprehensive doctrines in a society become 
reasonable, a ‘constitutional consensus’ among the people can possibly be reached. The 
concept of ‘constitutional consensus’, along with the concept of ‘overlapping consensus,’ 
will be explained in the coming pages. 
The next section deals with Rawls’ views on international relations and global 
justice, which have led to many debates and controversies. Throughout the section, 
Rawls’ views on global justice are contrasted with those of cosmopolitans such as Pogge. 
 
2.3 Rawls’ Views on International Relations 
In Law of Peoples, Rawls extends ‘justice as fairness’ to the international order. In that 
book, Rawls proposes to apply the original position to the international relations. In fact, 
in Law of Peoples, Rawls proposes two original positions. The first one is domestic, in 
which individuals within a self-enclosed society go under a veil of ignorance and decide 
for themselves the just principles for arranging the institutions of their society.  The 
second original position comes after the domestic one and it is international. The parties 
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in the second original position are representatives of “peoples” who would go under the 
original position and decide just and fair rules for the relations between the “peoples.”41  
In Law of Peoples, Rawls sorts out five kinds of domestic societies (‘peoples”): 
1. Reasonable liberal peoples, 
2. Decent peoples (they are not aggressive, and they have a “decent consultation 
hierarchy” or are generally decent by virtue of some other political 
mechanisms),42 
3. Outlaw states, 
4. Societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, 
5. Benevolent absolutisms (which Rawls says “honor human rights; but, because 
their members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions, they 
are not well-ordered”).43 
Rawls calls the first and second category of societies, namely liberal peoples and decent 
peoples as “well-ordered societies.” Rawls argues that we need to aim at a Society of 
Peoples44 consisting of both liberal and decent peoples who “follow the reasonably just 
Law of Peoples in their mutual relations” by virtue of an overlapping consensus (instead 
of a mere modus vivendi).45  Rawls suggests that the Society of Peoples need to use 
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public reason in justifying their actions to other members of the Society, and behave in 
reasonable ways.46 
Rawls suggests that the basic rules of just and fair relations between peoples 
would be close to the following rules that are part of “traditional principles of justice 
among free and democratic peoples”: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. People are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons 
other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 47 
Rawls notes that the decent peoples need to be tolerated, and they should not be coerced 
to liberalism but be allowed to continue in their own political ways as long as they abide 
the rules of the Society of Peoples. On the other hand, Rawls notes that in relations with 
outlaw states or in cases of grave violations of human rights, the fourth principle, non-
intervention, has to be qualified in favor of intervention.48  
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Rawls argues that the long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies is 
somehow to bring the outlaw states, as well as burdened societies, into the Society of 
well-ordered Peoples.49 Rawls defines burdened societies as such, and formulates the 
conditions of assistance to them as such: 
Burdened societies, while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack the political 
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and often, the material 
and technological resources needed to be well-ordered (…) Well-ordered peoples 
have a duty to assist burdened societies. It does not follow, however, that the only 
way, or the best way, to carry out this duty of assistance is by following a 
principle of distributive justice to regulate economic and social inequalities 
among societies. Most such principles do not have a defined goal, aim, or cut-off 
point, beyond which aid may cease. 
The levels of wealth and welfare among societies may vary, and presumably do 
so; but adjusting those levels is not the object of the duty of assistance. Only 
burdened societies need help.50 
 
  It can be seen that Rawls limits the global redistribution to assisting peoples until a point 
at which they can domestically establish just institutions and sustain themselves as liberal 
or decent peoples. Rawls argues there needs to be a certain cut-off point regarding the 
assistance, and this cut-off point would be the level where a people can stand on their 
own feet and sustain just institutions as liberal or decent societies. Rawls contrasts this 
minimal view of assistance with cosmopolitans who argue that the difference principle 
should be applied globally and that the well being of the globally worst-off people need 
to be improved.51 Rawls notes his view differs from such a position and it is limited to 
assistance for allowing burdened societies to stand on their own as liberal or decent 
societies.  
Rawls’ views in Law of Peoples disappointed many of his readers due to their 
relatively conservative implications in international relations. Some cosmopolitans such 
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as Pogge criticized Rawls’ suggestion of two original positions and instead suggested a 
‘single, global original position.’52 Pogge argues that economies of contemporary 
societies are not enclosed or self-sufficient but are interdependent. He argues that Rawls 
overlooks this interdependence in relation to the establishing just background institutions. 
In the next part, the issue of global justice is discussed, which is based on the 
contrasting views of Rawls and Pogge on the issue.  
 
2.3.1 Global Justice 
In a world economy, national conditions are basically determined within the international 
economic order and the global institutions are decisive in people’s lives wherever they 
live. In this regard, it is important to reflect upon global justice and how the basic 
structure at the global level could possibly be made more just.  
Concerning global justice, Rawls in Law of Peoples, as mentioned in the previous 
section, argues that veil of ignorance and ‘justice as fairness’ should be applied first at the 
domestic level, and then at the global level.53 However, this position is challenged by 
Pogge arguing that this is against the individualist nature of Rawls’ project and it would 
require that the veil of ignorance be applied in a “single, global, original position.”54 
Pogge’s position is apparently a cosmopolitan and individualist defense of justice 
that strives for global background justice for all individuals wherever they live. As noted 
in the Introduction, the author of this dissertation is convinced that such a cosmopolitan 
approach to global justice would be morally more coherent and persuasive and better 
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aligned with the individualist nature of Rawls’ search for justice, in which contingencies 
in terms of territorial borders need to be considered morally irrelevant. 
Pogge argues that the wealthy nations have a negative duty, rather than a positive 
duty towards the poor people in the world, which means that rather than doing something 
for them, they should just refrain from continuing the international mechanisms that lead 
to further inequalities.55 Pogge argues that the global institutions need to be reformed to 
alleviate the problems of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, etc.  
Pogge devises a modest proposal, the Global Resource Dividend (GRD), 
according to which “those who make more extensive use of our planet’s resources should 
compensate those who, involuntarily, use very little.”56 Pogge suggests that GRD should 
be paid to an international fund. Pogge argues that “1% of the global product, may be 
needed so that it does not take all too long until severe poverty is erased and an 
acceptable distributional profile is reached.”57 Pogge notes that this is only a modest 
starting point and is an option among many possible options. He says it is a multi-
disciplinary task to work out the institutional mechanisms for a globally just world. It is 
observed that Pogge’s search for global justice receives much attention from people 
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interested in global justice all over the world, including Turkey.58 Overall, it could be 
argued that Pogge’s proposal to apply the veil of ignorance to individuals in a global way 
is a revisionist reading of the Rawlsian project.59  
Unlike Rawls, who favored applying the veil of ignorance at the national level 
first and then at the global level, a revisionist global position might imply the vice versa, 
which is applying the veil of ignorance first globally, and only after global justice is 
secured, applying it to the national level.  
The next section deals with some other criticisms against Rawls’ political 
philosophy. 
       
2.4 Criticisms of Rawls’ Political Philosophy 
Within political philosophy, Rawls’ contribution to the liberal democratic theory has 
received both positive and negative reactions. First some positive criticisms and then  
negative criticisms will be discussed. A positive criticism noted that Rawls’ theory 
accomplishes the following three issues: 
a-) Justice is the constitutive value which is among all values. 
b-) The priority of right over the good guarantees certain basic liberties. 
c-) Economic and political liberty are succesfully differentiated in his theory, which has 
positive connotations for social justice.60 
The negative reactions to Rawls’ theory come from the communitarian circles, 
radical democrats, civic republicans, and left participatory democrats. Here, the two most 
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relevant criticisms will be mentioned which are the communitarian and the radical 
democrat criticisms. 
The so-called communitarians criticize what they see as the ‘unencumbered self’ 
in Rawls. They argue that Rawls’ system denies the societal basis of the individual and 
how the society is prior to and constitutive of the individual. Some of the communitarians 
who make such criticisms are M. Sandel, C. Taylor, A. MacIntyre, M. Walzer, A. Etziani, 
R. Bellah, B. Barber, P. Selznick, and the like. These people have the conviction that the 
liberal self in Rawls’ theory is not other-regarding enough but is atomistic and egoistic. 
Some civic communitarians such as W. Galston and S. Macedo argue that the Rawlsian 
project does not give enough reference to civic, republican, communitarian values. 
Sandel, as the most typical communitarian critic of Rawls, criticizes Rawls 
arguing that: 
 – The argument of ‘neutral state’ is meaningless since it cannot devoid itself of all 
values. 
– His understanding of individuality is atomistic, egoistic. 
– Democracy can only be founded around embedded and inherited democratic/ 
      societal values. 
– De-ontological liberalism is from the very onset a constitutive impossibility. 
– Universalism (of liberalism) is problematic.61 
 
On the other hand, the radical democrats, and some left participatory democrats 
such as Mouffe, Laclau, Bobbio, and D. Held argue that Rawls’ theory is not based on the 
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identity/difference principle, and that it is not inclusive enough of the so-far excluded 
“others.”62 For example Mouffe argues that the liberal democratic society should rather 
adopt an ‘agonistic’ liberalism, which opens the way to a more conflictual, non-
essentialist, civil-societal revitalizations and contingencies. However, Mouffe leaves it 
open as to how the ‘rules of the democratic game’ will possibly be preserved under 
conditions of extreme agonistic liberalism. 
Rawls actually incorporated certain elements of communitarianism and radical 
democracy to his Political Liberalism, probably as a result of the criticisms. It can be 
argued that the two strains of criticisms that are dealt above, namely the communitarian 
and the radical democratic criticisms, have already contributed to and in some regards 
transformed the Rawlsian theory, and we will see what sort of a route the contemporary 
debates on Rawlsian theory will take in the near future. 
The last section of this chapter deals with a specific issue mentioned in the Fourth 
Lecture of Political Liberalism, namely the two successive stages of forming an 
overlapping consensus, which is a critical issue for the overall purpose of this 
dissertation. These two stages, constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus, are 
discussed at length in the next section. 
 
2.5 The Stages of Forming an Overlapping Consensus 
Rawls notes that forming an overlapping consensus on a conception of justice would 
require going through two successive stages. The first one is a constitutional consensus 
and the second stage is an overlapping consensus. 
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The initial stage of a constitutional consensus Rawls argues might start as a 
modus vivendi during which a constitution guaranteeing democratic procedures of 
government and basic political rights and liberties is introduced (through a pact) into the 
political system. A modus vivendi emerges at a certain time period and under certain 
historical conditions as a solution to endless social strife, and is accepted by interest 
groups generally reluctantly as a matter of concession. Loyalty to democratic procedures 
in this stage is conditional at best, and depends on self or group interests and balance of 
power. In this regard, it can be argued that the initial stage of constitutional consensus 
implies the introduction of democratic institutions into a political system without being 
consolidated yet.  
Rawls notes that a constitutional consensus in principle secures that the political 
rivalries in a country are ‘moderated through democratic electoral procedures.’ Rawls 
points out that the habituation of people within time to a liberal constitution creates a 
civil, democratic, and pluralist culture.  In a country where constitutional consensus 
exists, loyalty to democratic procedures would not depend on self or group interests, but 
would rely on a principled acceptance of the democratic rules.  
Rawls notes that a constitutional consensus, as seen in many historical cases, 
might first start as a modus vivendi. The modus vivendi is depicted by Rawls to be the 
result of a pact agreed upon by two or more parties within a country after serious internal 
conflicts or possibly internal wars, on some principles of a liberal conception of justice 
without the parties necessarily being liberal or internalizing the liberal principles to which 
they have diplomatically consented. Most of the time, the situation is such that no party 
can gain superiority over the others; therefore, they eventually consent to the so-called 
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modus vivendi which is in fact nothing more than a ‘cease-fire’ through which the elites 
are “...providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil 
problems.”63  
One can say ‘modus vivendi’ emerges as a pragmatist solution in the midst of 
harsh conflicts among irreconcilable parties, in which concessions such as the toleration 
principle, possibly along with some other liberal principles, are agreed upon by the 
parties for the sake of mere survival and co-existence without necessarily internalizing 
the principles that lie at the core of the consented pact. As such, modus vivendi is a 
strategic agreement at the base of which lies no principally accepted and long-lasting 
procedures for conflict resolution but only the ‘balance of power’ which keeps the parties 
from transgressing the principles they have consented to. It should be noted that the 
parties agreeing to modus vivendi see it not as their first-best but as a compromise 
(second-best option).  
As an example of modus vivendi, Rawls states that the agreement between 
Catholics and Protestants on the principle of tolerance in the 16th century was an 
example of a modus vivendi situation. Historically, the Catholics and the Protestants 
killed each other in the long-lasting religious wars, yet at some point they realized that 
they had to compromise and accept the principle of “religious toleration.” This principle 
came about as a way to live together without killing each other. Initially, neither the 
Catholics nor the Protestants accepted the toleration principle willingly, but they accepted 
it only in a diplomatic sense. To put it theologically however, neither party saw the 
toleration principle as the acceptance of the other party’s doctrine being true. Rather, it 
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was only a political and diplomatic acceptance of the other party’s existence and the 
necessity to tolerate them. Rawls depicts it as such: 
Both faiths held that it was the duty of the ruler to uphold the true religion and to 
repress the spread of heresy and false doctrine. In such a case the acceptance of 
the principle of toleration would indeed be a mere modus vivendi, because if 
either faith becomes dominant, the principle of toleration would no longer be 
followed.64 
 
It is historically true that the toleration principle became legitimized and internalized only 
through the next centuries. In its initiation, it was a fragile principle that depended upon 
the balance of power amongst the two opposing parties. It was such that had there been 
any change in the balance of power to the benefit of either the Catholics or the 
Protestants, this could have undermined the toleration principle.65 However, the historical 
contingencies unfolded in such a way that the parties observed the principle due to 
balance of power; and through time, the principle of toleration took its place in the 
constitutions of the European states and has been internalized by larger segments of the 
European societies through time. Thus, as a historical model, Rawls takes 16th century 
Europe and the status of the toleration principle in that time period as an example of a 
modus vivendi situation.  
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2.5.1 Constitutional Consensus 
2.5.1.1 The Fragility of Modus Vivendi and the Problem of Stability in the Long 
Run 
As a political condition, modus vivendi is fragile in the sense that it is dependent upon 
the balance of power among the parties in a country. It is such that as one of the parties 
possibly gains asymetrical power vis-a-vis others and convinced that the breaching of the 
modus vivendi condition would be more favorable for themselves, the pact convention 
may be breached any time by that overwhelming party. Rawls argues that a modus 
vivendi condition creates not a ‘reasonable pluralism’ but merely a ‘simple pluralism.’ A 
‘simple pluralism’ implies that  “the elites agree to refrain from things like waging war 
on each other, agreeing on some fair principles endorsable from within both doctrines,”66 
thus a plurality of opposing comprehensive doctrines can somehow continue living 
together. It should be noted, however, that in ‘simple pluralism,’ there exists no binding 
“procedures of conflict resolution.” Therefore, the opposing parties do not have any 
guarantees for reciprocal trust and political cooperation. No binding procedure or any 
sort of established custom precludes the parties from destroying the other(s). 
The fact that modus vivendi is not a principled acceptance of some liberal 
procedures, but relies on a mere diplomatic consent and balance of power, makes modus 
vivendi a vulnerable and unstable status quo. In a modus vivendi, persons accept the 
status quo as a concession. In this regard, Talisse characterizes persons accepting 
liberalism as a modus vivendi as follows:  
We may imagine persons holding diverse and incompatible reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines agreeing to a liberal political arrangement as a matter of 
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concession; such persons would endorse the political conception of justice as a 
second-best, less than ideal arrangement. When a citizen endorses a liberal 
conception of justice as a modus vivendi, he accepts the liberal regime as a 
passable compromise between what he sees as the best political arrangement (i.e., 
a conception of justice based solely upon his own comprehensive doctrine) and 
the worst (i.e., a conception of justice based solely upon a comprehensive doctrine 
that is incompatible with his own).67 
 
Rawls says that acquiescence in a liberal constitution that starts merely as a modus 
vivendi might in time turn into a constitutional consensus. Rawls contrasts a modus 
vivendi with constitutional consensus arguing that a modus vivendi owes its existence to 
the balance of power within the country, while a constitutional consensus is secured by a 
constitution which is consented by an overwhelming majority in a country. 
For a constitutional consensus to be complete, Rawls puts forth three conditions 
to be met: 
• A clear definition of the basic rights and freedoms, which places them beyond 
political conflict, 
• The acceptance of a form of public reason, coherent with common sense, and 
necessary to apply these principles, 
• The rise of cooperative virtues in politics- such as the sense of moderation and 
equity, and the spirit of compromise- which are themselves encouraged by the 
existence of the institutions and their practice. 68 
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endorsing public and political matters in the political arena). For all these to be possible, it is of course 
necessary, as also Rawls put openly, that the comprehensive doctrines within the country become 
liberalized, through time, to a level where these doctrines somehow become in congruent, or at least not in 
conflict with the basic requirements of a liberal constitution and the basic codes of a civil republican ethos. 
Rawls notes that as the comprehensive doctrines within a country become liberal enough at the 
procedural level and become all ‘reasonable’ doctrines through time, the ‘simple pluralism’ within the 
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Rawls says that a constitutional consensus is supposed to be initiated by the elites, 
ideally democratically elected representatives, gathering in a constitutional convention.69 
Menno Sijtsma, with reference to Rawls, expresses very well how the constitutional 
convention at the elite level proceeds: 
In the convention, the elites deduce more and more specific regulations from 
some general principles of justice, which they develop by engaging in the original 
position. This way they formulate a constitution containing ‘bare essentials,’ 
‘thin’ goods or basic rights. Once a ‘constitutional consensus’ is established, ever 
more precise laws can be deduced from the constitution, until a societal system, 
containing laws and institutions is created. Over time also more and more 
institutions may start working increasingly according to the principles of the 
constitution. Ultimately the whole societal basic structure may become logically 
coherent with the adopted principles of justice.70 
 
However, for a constitutional consensus to take place in a country, the constitution made 
by the elites has to be to be backed by mass support through time.71 
Concerning the scope of constitutional consensus, a constitutional consensus is 
limited to “procedures of democratic government” which moderate political rivalry 
within the country. The “procedures of democratic government,” which consist of the 
basic political rights and liberties constitute the basis of a constitutional consensus.     
                                                                                                                                                  
country turns into a ‘reasonable pluralism’ and thus the constitutional consensus is finally achieved (See 
Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.161-164.) 
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Rawls notes that “the constitutional consensus is not deep and it is also not wide: 
it is narrow in scope, not including the basic structure but only the political procedures of 
democratic government.”72 What Rawls is pointing out here is that while constitutional 
consensus specifies the basic political rights and liberties as bare essentials, it does not 
extend to economic or social issues. These issues, Rawls says, need to be regulated by 
laws that are supposed to be inspired by a certain conception of justice that needs to gain 
the overwhelming support of the citizens. Such an overwhelming support, if realized, 
would denote the existence of an ‘overlapping consensus’ within a certain country. 
 
2.5.2 Overlapping Consensus 
Overlapping Consensus is depicted by Rawls as a consensus among the majority of a 
people on a democratic conception of justice that would regulate the basic structure and 
institutions of a society in a just and legitimate way.73 Rawls says that while the 
constitutional consensus is limited to only procedures of democratic government and 
basic ‘political’ rights, overlapping consensus extends to substantive rights and liberties, 
ranging from freedom of speech to freedom of conscience, various social rights, the civil 
code, and regulations in the society.74 Thus, an overlapping consensus is deep and broad 
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 A conception of justice, according to Rawls, would be the subject matter of an overlapping consensus: 
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Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.159-164, 340-348.) 
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in content, and supposedly secures, when achieved, a deep legitimacy and stability in the 
democratic polity.  
It is noted by Rawls that an overlapping consensus, when achieved, secures that 
the overall structure and the institutions of the society would be in accordance with the 
“political ideals of a genuine liberal democracy” (ideals like fredom, equality, and 
fairnes).75 It can be argued that pursuing such a normative overlapping consensus on 
political and economic matters including social justice can conceptually be compared to 
substantive notions of democracy and democratic consolidation, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
The existence of an overlapping consensus in a democratic society would imply 
that the majority of the citizens in that country affirm the basic structure and the 
institutions of their society as being just and fair. At a practical level, an overlapping 
consensus would simply imply that the majority in the country, would find the education 
system, health system, the social insurance system, the tax system, or the level of 
minimum wage as just and legitimate.  Or they find the civil laws as legitimate; they find 
the civil-military relations as just and legitimate; the definitions of crimes and the 
relevant punishments as just and legitimate; the environmental policies as just and 
legitimate, etc. These are only some examples, and anything that one can think as being 
relevant to the basic structure of a country would all be considered as potential subject 
matters of overlapping consensus. In this regard, an overlapping consensus can be 
considered to have an enormous width and depth, as Rawls formulated it.  
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 Related to the democratic ideal, Rawls says: “Justice as fairness works from the fundamental ideas of 
society as a fair system of cooperation together with the conception of the person[s] as free and equal. 
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Rawls states that forming an overlapping consensus is a matter of a relatively long 
negotiation and deliberation process among the citizens as to how the basic structure and 
institutions in their society have to be designed. During the negotiation process, different 
political groups propose alternative ‘conceptions of justice’ in the public forums by 
appealing to public reason within the general parameters of liberal democracy. That is to 
say, they propose consistent, coherent, and reasonable ‘political programs’ to the basic 
issues of the society, and these programs are deliberated among the citizens. After a 
reasonable rivalry among these conceptions of justice, a particular conception of justice is 
preferred by the majority as the best possible option that could create just and legitimate 
institutions within the society, thus an overlapping consensus around that particular 
conception of justice emerges at the public level.76 Such a consensus formation on the 
basics is what, according to Rawls, can provide the long-run legitimacy and stability in a 
country. This type of a consensus is supposedly the only way, according to Rawls, as to 
how different and irreconcilable (yet reasonable) political groups can live in a fair and 
peaceful way over generations in a country.77  
 
2.5.2.1 Doctrinal Differences, Class Preferences, and the Possibility of an 
Overlapping Consensus 
With regard to the doctrinal differences, Rawls notes that the doctrinal differences need 
to be moderated while forming a constitutional consensus and that all comprehensive 
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doctrines need to become ‘reasonable’ through the process of constitutional consensus, if 
they were not so before the process.78 
With regard to the issue of economic class and its influence on overlapping 
consensus, Rawls says different conceptions of justice would rely on different 
conceptions of person and society and would all reflect somewhat divergent preferences 
and interests of the different strata within the society. In this manner, how would it be 
possible that people from different class backgrounds and different comprehensive 
doctrines would come to agree on a particular conception of justice? To this question, 
Rawls straightforwardly asserts that unless the class conflicts within a society are 
deliberated and resolved in a peaceful and satisfactory manner, forming an overlapping 
consensus would simply be impossible.  
After having explained constitutional consensus, overlapping consensus, and the 
relevant major conceptualizations of Rawls, the next chapter deals with Rawls’ 
conceptions of ‘constitutional consensus’and ‘overlapping consensus’ in more detail and 
compares these two conceptions with the basic terms and concepts in the democratization 
literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
RAWLS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS AND 
OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS IN VIEW OF THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURE 79 
 
 
 
In this chapter, Rawls’ concepts of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus 
are compared with the democratization literature. Although Rawls, who writes as a 
political philosopher, does not make explicit references to the democratization literature 
in his writings, one can discern a parallel between the democratization literature and 
Rawls’ depiction of the stages for reaching an overlapping consensus.  
As mentioned before, to the best of my knowledge, there has not thus far emerged 
articles or books that have specifically problematized Rawls’ writings in terms of their 
relation to the democratization literature.80 And I aim to do that here. In this chapter, 
Rawls’ above mentioned two conceptions are compared and contrasted with the concepts 
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democratic institutions, and that consensus on norms create these institutions. Excluding these two authors, 
who make only casual references on the relation of Rawls’ writings to the democratization literature, 
Rawls’ relation to the democratization literature has actually not been specifically analyzed thus far, which 
is done in this chapter. 
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in the democratization literature, and analyzed as to how they converge or diverge from 
one another. 
As a political philosopher within the analytical tradition, Rawls writes on issues 
of democracy by abstracting from the concrete cases. His views on modus vivendi and 
constitutional consensus, as he also notes, are informed by the experiences of the Western 
democracies, and in this regard, they rely on a historical (empirical) basis. This basis 
makes it possible to analyze the modus vivendi and constitutional consensus with 
reference to the democratization literature. However, the overlapping consensus in terms 
of its relation to empirical cases is somewhat a different story since it does not 
necessarily rely on historical cases but rather points to the ideal democracy and is thus 
more normative than descriptive.81  
Regarding the possible connections between democratization literature and 
Rawls’ conceptions of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus, three 
arguments are put forth in this chapter. The first argument is that Rawls’ conception of 
the initial stage of constitutional consensus, which is practically a modus vivendi, 
corresponds to ‘democratic transition.’ The second argument is that Rawls’ conception of 
(finalized) constitutional consensus corresponds to ‘minimalist’ and ‘negative’ 
democratic consolidation. The third argument is that Rawls’ conception of overlapping 
consensus corresponds to ‘maximalist’ and ‘positive’ democratic consolidation. The 
arguments are summarized below: 
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RAWLS’ CONCEPTIONS 
 
 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
 
WHAT THEY CORRESPOND 
TO IN THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
LITERATURE 
 
Initial Stage of 
Constitutional Consensus → 
Democratic procedures and 
institutions incorporated into 
the political system as a 
‘modus vivendi’ = 
 
 
Democratic Transition 
 
Finalized 
Constitutional Consensus → 
Popular consensus on 
democratic procedures and 
institutions, which is secured 
by civic political culture = 
 
 
Minimalist / Negative 
Democratic Consolidation 
 
 
Overlapping Consensus → 
Popular consensus on a 
political conception of justice, 
and thus prevalence of deep 
political legitimacy and long-
run stability 
within the polity = 
 
 
Maximalist / Positive 
Democratic Consolidation 
 
Table 1: ‘Constitutional Consensus’ and ‘Overlapping Consensus’ Compared with the 
Democratization Literature 
 
In order to be able to substantiate these arguments, first some general information on the 
basic concepts in the democratization literature is given below. 
 
3.1 Basic Concepts in the Democratization Literature 
There is an enormous and continuously growing literature on democratization and 
democratic consolidation, and it is technically not possible to cover all of the theories or 
theorists here. Therefore, a general account of the literature is provided with and the most 
relevant concepts and approaches discussed.  
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The first term to define is democratization. Potter defines democratization as 
“political changes moving in a democratic direction.”82 It can be argued that 
democratization in general entails a “transition to relatively more democratic regime from 
undemocratic one, and a process of consolidation on the way to a consolidated 
democracy.”83 
The initiation of democratic institutions in a country is called ‘democratic 
transition’ in the literature. As to when a transition is complete, Linz and Stepan argue:  
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government 
comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this 
government de facto has the authority to generate new policies and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does 
not have to share power with other bodies de jure. (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 3) 
 
On the other hand, O’Donnell has a conception of democratic transition that entails two 
stages: 
 
The first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation 
of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the 
consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a 
democratic regime... The second transition will not be any less arduous nor any 
less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government to a democratic 
regime are uncertain and complex, and the possibilities of authoritarian regression 
are numerous.
84
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Another issue is how democratic regimes come into being in a country. On this 
issue, there exist three main approaches in the literature: modernization approach, 
structural approach, and transition approach. 
 
3.1.1 Theories on Democratization 
3.1.1.1 Modernization approach 
This approach is originated in the study of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959). According to 
Lipset, a certain level of industrialization and modernization leads to democratization. He 
argues that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.”85 This approach is affirmed by many follow-up studies; however, it is 
generally criticized with reference to two examples: Germany and India. It is argued that 
Germany enjoyed a high level of modernization, yet became a fascist regime under 
Hitler; India on the other hand has enjoyed democracy although it is not modernized.86 In 
this regard, it should be noted that according to Lipset, socio-economic correlations are 
only associational and do not necessarily indicate cause but they point to probabilities.87 
Let us note that modernization approach is used in this study in Chapter 8 to assess 
Turkey’s level of socio-economic modernization and its chances of democratic 
consolidation in the coming years. In that chapter, a more comprehensive and detailed 
information on modernization theory will be provided. 
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3.1.1.2 Structural Approach 
This approach is rooted in the work of Barrington Moore (1966) and places explanatory 
primacy on the shifts in the structures of class and power within various societies. The 
structural approach analyzes long-term processes of historical change. Moore, in his 
study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
Modern World (1966), analyzes the relations between state, peasantry, landed upper 
class, and urban bourgeoisie in England, the US, Japan, Germany, Russia, China, and 
India. He concludes that different class structures and social changes in in these societies 
led to different political outcomes; democracy in some of them and fascism in others.  
Moore argues that there are five general conditions for democratic development: 
1. The development of a balance to avoid too strong a state or too independent a 
landed aristocracy, 
2. A turn towards an appropriate form of commercial agriculture 
3. The weakening of the landed aristocracy, 
4. The prevention of an aristocratic- bourgeoisie coalition against the peasants and 
workers, 
5. ‘A revolutionary break from the past’ led by bourgeoisie.88 
 
On the other hand, the conditions, according to Moore, of a communist revolution are: 
1. Bourgeoisie and working class are weak, 
2. State is powerful, 
3. The relationship between the peasants and the landlords is weak, 
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4. The landlords do not commercialize agriculture, 
5. Peasants are in unity and in touch with groups which have organizational 
capabilities.89 
 
3.1.1.3 Transition Approach 
This approach is originated in the works of Dankwart Rustow (1970) and is developed by 
others particularly those with a special interest in Latin America. This approach 
emphasizes the role of elite choices, bargaining, and negotiation as central to the political 
processes of transition to democracy.  
It can be said that while the structural approach emphasizes economic factors and 
social change from a macro perspective, the transition approach emphasizes from a micro 
perspective the role of human agency in democratic transitions.  
Rustow, criticizing Lipset, argued that Lipset had merely a ‘functional curiosity’ 
as to what factors can best preserve or enhance the health and stability of a democracy. 
Rustow himself, on the other hand, had an interest in the developing countries and tried 
to understand “how a democracy comes into being in the first place.” Rustow analyzed 
Turkey and Sweden in order to understand the historical course of democracy in these 
countries and concluded that these countries went through four main phases: 
1. National unity, 
2. Inclusive political struggle , 
3. Decision phase (for making a transition to democracy), 
4. Habituation phase.90 
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As to the possible modes of making a democratic transition in a country, there 
exist two major modes in the literature: raptura and pactada. While raptura implies “a 
sudden break with existing institutional arrangements,” pactada implies “a transition led 
and controlled by the power holders of the previous authoritarian regime.”91 In order for a 
transition to be successful, Huntington argues, based on the historical cases, that 
transformation only occurred: 
if reformers were stronger than standpatters, if the government was stronger than 
the opposition, and if the moderates were stronger than the extremists [in both 
camps].92  
 
It is noted by various authors that the success of a transition to democracy in a country 
depends on many internal as well as external factors, including the international 
environment and relations.93 
 
3.1.2 Democratic Consolidation 
Pridham argues that democratic consolidation is still a ‘nebulous’ term as a theoretical 
construct and means different things to different people.94 There are different and 
competing conceptions of democratic consolidation within the literature. Each conception 
relies on a different understanding of what ‘democracy’ is and what comprises the 
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minimum requisites of democratic consolidation. In this regard, the minimalist and 
maximalist conceptions, as well as negative and positive conceptions, compete with each 
other to define democratic consolidation. Before embarking on these diverse conceptions 
and their differences, how different authors define democratic consolidation is mentioned 
below.  
Adam Przeworski’s definition is the best known. According to him, a democracy 
is consolidated when “democracy becomes the only game in the town.” On the other 
hand,  Larry Diamond defines democratic consolidation as “achieving broad and deep 
legitimation, such that all significant political actors at both elite and mass levels believe 
that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than 
any realistic alternative they imagine.”95 
 
3.1.2.1 Minimalist versus Maximalist Definitions of Democratic Consolidation 
The difference between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democratic 
consolidation is that “a [minimalist] procedural understanding of democracy... constitutes 
a basic institutional understanding of democracy, which includes the right to suffrage, 
majority rule, or political freedom in general.”96 A maximalist understanding of 
democracy on the other hand, means the flourishing of a broad democratic culture among 
the citizens, and according to some other authors, it means direct citizenship participation 
into political decisions especially on issues concerning social justice and social rights. 
Gamba Ganbat notes that a substantive (maximalist) understanding goes beyond a 
                                                  
95
 Diamond, Larry.1996. “Is the Third Wave Over?,” Journal of Democracy 7(3 ), p.33. 
96
 Ganbat, Gamba. 2004. “The Mass Public and Democratic Politics in Mongolia.” Working Paper Series 
No:29, Asian Barometer Office, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica, p.8. 
 54
procedural definition and deals with social justice, socio-economic equity, civil liberties 
and quality of life.97 
 
3.1.2.1.1 Minimalist Democratic Consolidation 
Minimalist democratic consolidation refers to the consolidation of procedural or formal 
democracy, and is best characterized and examplified by Schumpeter’s understanding of 
democracy, which highly influenced Lipset, Linz, Stepan, and Diamond.98 Schumpeter 
defined democratic consolidation as “institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote.” 99 
Another minimalist theorist, Schmitter defines the minimalist conception of a 
consolidated democratic regime as “the process of transforming the accidental 
arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the 
transition into relations of cooperation that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and 
voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities that participate in democratic 
governance.”100 
Dahl, a paradigmatic author for minimalists, defined polyarchies (democracies) in 
relation to whether or not they have civil and political rights as well as fair competitive 
and inclusive elections. Dahl stated that polyarchies display the following characteristics: 
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1. Elected officials 
2. Free and fair election 
3. Inclusive suffrage 
4. Right to run for office 
5. Freedom of expression 
6. Alternative information 
7. Associational autonomy101  
According to Dahl, these are the “procedural minimal” conditions of democracy which 
have had much influence on the consolidation literature. Some authors expand Dahl’s 
minimum criteria by adding rule of law, civil rule and control over military, minority 
rights, and accountability.102 
      Linz and Stepan, although being closer to the procedural approaches in general, try to 
find, as noted by Özbudun (2000:4), a mid-way between minimalist and maximalist 
approaches and explain democratic consolidation by a tri-partite criteria: behavioral, 
attitudinal, and constitutional consolidation. Linz and Stepan define these three 
dimensions of consolidation as follows: 
Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no 
significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend 
significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a non-
democratic regime or by seceding from the state.  
 
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of 
public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep 
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dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and 
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when 
support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from 
pro-democratic forces.  
 
Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and 
nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution 
of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions 
sanctioned by the new democratic process.103 
 
Following Linz and Stepan, another author, Merkel, argues that there are four 
levels of consolidation: constitutional consolidation, representative consolidation, 
behavioral consolidation, and the consolidation of civic culture. Regarding constitutional 
consolidation which parallels Rawls’ constitutional consensus, Merkel argues that 
“existence of a constitution would reduce the contingency in the political life. Mutual 
distrust within the political elites would be prevented by it. The constitutional set of 
meta-rules defines the norms and procedures of conflict mediation.”104  
At another level of analysis, Easton makes a distinction between what he calls 
specific support and diffuse support. Whereas specific support is the support of the public 
for certain government policies and outcome, diffuse support is the ‘long-term support’ 
for the entire political system without specific performance or output of the system. It is 
support that underlines the regime as a whole and the political community.”105   
What now follows is an examination of maximalist conceptions argue and how 
they view democratic consolidation. 
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3.1.2.1.2 Maximalist Democratic Consolidation 
There are two alternative notions of maximalist democratic consolidation. According to 
the first and more well known view, democratic consolidation involves the “inculcation 
of democratic culture among the citizens through a long socialization process.”106 The 
second one, which actually suits the purpose of this chapter better, depicts maximalist 
democratic consolidation in relation to attaining democratic legitimacy, especially on 
issues of social justice and social rights. Since Rawls as a theorist refers to the need for 
social justice and social rights, it is argued here that his notion of overlapping consensus 
approaches the maximalist and substantive conceptions of democratic consolidation. 
Regarding what substantive democracy entails, Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda 
propose the following: 
we consider substantive democracy as a process that has to be continuously 
reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way to maximize the 
opportunities for individuals to influnce the conditions in which they live, to 
participate in and influence debates about the key decisions which effect 
society.107 
 
Another author,  William I. Miller notes that maximalist notions of democracy emphasize 
the need for economic and social rights to secure everyone’s ability to exercise 
civil/political rights and thereby secure the quality of democracy. As a general notion, it 
can be argued that proponents of radical democracy, deliberative democracy, economic 
democracy, democratic socialism, and property-owning democracy are closer to 
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maximalist notions of democracy and democratic consolidation.108 It can also be argued 
that T.H. Marshall’s conception of democracy and democratic citizenship also 
approaches the ‘substantive’ notions of democracy and citizenship rather than the formal 
and procedural definition of these concepts. 
 
3.1.2.2 Negative versus Positive Consolidation 
There are alternative definitions of negative and positive consolidation in the writings of 
scholars working on this issue. I will focus on the views of Linz, Pridham, and Schedler. 
Linz explains negative consolidation in terms of doing away with disloyalties. He 
writes: 
democratic consolidation in term of avoiding democratic breakdown involves 
doing away all disloyalties: an explicit rejection of democratic regime and/or its 
instruments such as political parties, a willingness of political elites to resort to 
violence, force, fraud, or other unacceptable means to get the power; and 
“knocking at the barracks door.”109 
 
On the other hand, democratic consolidation in the positive sense is related to the 
question of “how and/or through which institutions consolidation can be achieved.”110 
Possible ways for this aim, as noted, are: 
drafting, revising, and ratifying a new democratic constitution, ensuring the rule 
of law, establishing democratic representative, legislative and executive 
institutions; eliminting all human rights violations, and all kinds of discrimination, 
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abolishing tutelary power, and ‘reserved domains’, formation of an autonomous 
and robust civil society; and ensuring a reanably fair electoral system.111  
 
           According to Pridham, negative and positive democratic consolidation are as 
follows:  
Negative consolidation includes the solution of any problems remaining from the 
transition process and, in general, the containment or reduction, if not removal, of 
any serious challanges to democratization. The latter usually take the forms of 
groups or individuals characterized as anti-system. Negative consolidation is 
achieved when their presence or impact becomes numerically or politically 
insignificant, for example they either become neutralized and opt out of the 
political game or they may become converted to democratic politics. 
 
Positive consolidation places more emphasis on attitudinal patterns, and it refers 
especially to wider or deeper levels of the overall process. It includes the 
inculcation of democratic values at both elite and mass levels, and, therefore, it 
involves some remaking of the political culture in a direction that is system-
supportive for a new democracy. Positive consolidation refers to longer-term 
change, while negative consolidation may be achieved in a shorter time span.112 
 
           Andreas Schedler offers an alternative definition of negative and positive 
consolidation, which he declares to be different than Pridham’s conceptualization. 
Schedler classifies regimes into four categories: authoritarianism, semi-democracy, 
liberal democracy, and advanced democracy. Schedler defines negative and positive 
consolidation as such: 
We may call ‘negative’ those two concepts of democratic consolidation that are 
concerned with democratic stability and try to avoid regressions to either non-
democratic or semi-democratic regimes. And we may call ‘positive’ those two 
notions of democratic consolidation that are concerned with democratic advances 
and try to attain progress towards either minimal or high-quality democracy.113 
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After having explained negative and positive consolidation, the influence of political 
culture on democratic consolidation is discussed in the next section. 
 
3.1.2.3 The Influence of Political Culture on Democratic Consolidation 
Almond and Verba, the two key figures of political culture studies, point out that civil 
society and civic culture is quite crucial for democracy and democratic consolidation. 
According to Almond and Verba, the civic characters of political culture involve 
interpersonal trust, tolerance towards differences, and lack of support for revolutionary 
change.114 These elements of political culture are considered as neo-Tocquevillian values, 
and it is widely assumed in the democratization literature that these values directly 
influenced theorists such as Putnam, Schmitter, and Diamond.115 In fact, they influenced 
Diamond to such an extent that regarding the importance of political culture on 
democratic consolidation, he argues that “democratic consolidation can... only be fully 
understood as encompassing shift in political culture.”116   
Regarding the relation between institutionalization and civic values, Diamond 
notes: 
Strengthening the formal representative, and governmental structures of 
democracy so that they become more coherent, complex, autonomous, and 
adaptable and thus more capable, effective, valued, and binding... 
institutionalization enhances trust and cooperation among political actors... Thus 
it helps to draw reliable boundaries around the uncertainty of politics and to 
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facilitate trust, tolerance, and moderation, civility, and loyalty to the democratic 
system.117  
 
In the next section, Rawls’ constitutitional consensus will be analyzed in view of 
the above mentioned concepts in the democratization literature. 
 
3.2 Constitutional Consensus in View of the Democratization Literature  
Before reflecting upon constitutional consensus in further detail in light of the 
democratization literature, Rawls’ relation to the three theories of democratization need 
to be discussed here. Concerning Rawls' relation to these theories, it can be argued that in 
terms of his depiction of the initial stage of constitutional consensus (modus vivendi), 
Rawls is close to the transitional approach, since a modus vivendi is based on a pact 
among elites and is a result of deliberations. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
Rawls’ notion of finalized constitutional consensus can be related also to the 
modernization approach since a finalized constitutional consensus seems to pre-require a 
relatively developed urban setting (This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8 
under the section titled “Rawls and Modernization.”) 
Rawls' reference to elite pacts in the context of modus vivendi might explain 
democratic transitions, but it can be argued that human choices or their interactions 
cannot on its own explain everything about how democracies endure. The literature, in 
fact, suggests that income level and higher development makes it more likely for 
established democracies to endure. Thus, it can be argued that veil of ignorance and 
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rational choices will more likely be applicable and relevant where structural factors, like 
income and literacy, would support the flourishing of 'rational citizens’ in the first place. 
(That's also directly connected to Rawls' emphasis on property-owning democracy and 
social justice, which he sees as central to democracy.) 
It can be argued that democratic survival might require both a sufficient level of 
rational human choice, as well as a reasonable level of human development (HDI, 
income, urbanism, etc.)  Development might be more conducive to having more space for 
pro-democratic choices in the public forums, individual and collective, that might 
enhance democratic survival in the long run, which is supported by empirical evidence in 
the modernization literature.118 
In order to be able to further elaborate on the relation between constitutional 
consensus and the democratization literature, first it is explained how Rawls devised the 
notion of constitutional consensus. Rawls states that he borrowed the term ‘constitutional 
consensus’ from Kurt Baier.119 Rawls made out of it a more specific and elaborate term. 
In Rawls’ usage, a ‘constitutional consensus,’ when achieved, guarantees the basic 
political rights and liberties. Reflecting upon the content of these rights, Rawls writes: 
Basic political rights and liberties are the right to vote and freedom of political 
speech and association, and whatever else is required for the electoral and 
legislative procedures of democracy—there is disagreement among those holding 
liberal principles as to the more exact content and boundaries of these rights and 
liberties, as well as on what further rights and liberties are to be counted as basic 
and so merit legal if not constitutional protection. The constitutional consensus is 
not deep and it is also not wide: it is narrow in scope, not including the basic 
structure but only the political procedures of democratic government.120  
 
                                                  
118
 See Chapter 8, which is related to this issue. 
119
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, p.158. 
120
 Ibid., p.159. 
 63
Defining the constitutional consensus as a consensus on procedural matters of 
democracy, Rawls points out that a constitutional consensus needs to meet three basic 
requirements, which were mentioned in the previous chapter. 
As to how a constitutional consensus comes about, Rawls, relying on the 
historical experiences of Western democracies, argues that a constitution satisfying the 
basic political rights and liberties could possibly be accepted first as a modus vivendi, 
and then affirmed and internalized by the people as citizens’ democratic practices mature 
within time. That is to say, the democratic institutions according to Rawls would first be 
introduced into the system and then institutionalization would hopefully generate certain 
democratic attitudes and virtues among the citizens. The following quotation on 
constitutional consensus reflects Rawls’ approach to the issue of how a democratic 
regime comes into being: 
 
Suppose that at a certain time, because of various historical events and 
contingencies, some liberal principles of justice are accepted as a mere modus 
vivendi, and are incorporated into existing political institutions. This acceptance 
has come about, let us say, in much the same way as the acceptance of the 
principle of toleration came about as a modus vivendi following the Reformation: 
at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as providing the only workable alternative to 
endless and destructive civil strife. Our question then is this: how might it happen 
that over time the initial acquiescence in a constitution satisfying these liberal 
principles of justice develops into a constitutional consensus in which those 
principles themselves are affirmed? 121 
 
This quotation, when read along with some other references in Political Liberalism, 
demonstrates that Rawls sees the source of constitutional rule in the ‘endless and 
destructive civil strife’ and as a possible way that the citizens find their way out of it.  He 
suggests that the groups in civil strife somehow agree on a constitution (first as a modus 
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vivendi) and incorporate the democratic institutions into the system in order to moderate 
the harsh political rivalry among themselves. This reminds one of Rustow’s famous 
sayings which is, “a people who are not in conflict about some rather fundamental 
matters would have little need to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflict 
resolution.”122 
Rawls points out that a constitution guaranteeing basic political rights and 
liberties is made by a constitutional convention. On this issue, he notes: 
 
Delegates to such a convention (still regarded as representatives of citizens as free 
and equal persons but now assigned a different task) are to adopt, from among the 
just constitutions that are both just and workable the one that seems most likely to 
lead to just and effective legislation. (Which constitutions and legislations are just 
is settled by the principles of justice already agreed to in the original position).123 
 
Thus, it follows that a liberal constitution, according to Rawls, would be created out of a 
social need to end the strife by the political elites (delegates), and accepted by them 
through some sort of a pact-making, which he says could possibly be accepted first as a 
mere “modus vivendi.”124 
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Having clarified the status of the initial stage of constitutional consensus (modus 
vivendi) as such, it can be argued that this initial stage implies a ‘democratic transition’ 
(through pact-making). As Rawls acknowledges, this transitional stage is quite fragile 
and its success and consolidation is contingent upon long-term civil and political 
development. The mere fact that democratic institutions are incorporated into the 
constitutional structure of a country would not guarantee the longevity and consolidation 
of these institutions.  
However, Rawls seems to think that the modus vivendi stage is critical as the 
initial stage of a long chain of events that are supposed to lead to an overlapping 
consensus. It is a fact that many European states started first under conditions that can be 
compared to modus vivendi, but now they have a constitutional consensus on certain 
political rights and liberties and basic design of government.125 
It is crucial to restate that acquiescence in the constitution during the modus 
vivendi stage is not a principled and unconditional acceptance of the democratic rules of 
the game, but a “circumstantial equilibrium in military political and economic power 
among feuding camps”126 What Rawls calls modus vivendi can be considered as a pact 
made by warring groups which are almost equal in power and therefore cannot dominate 
over the rival.127 Rawls’ modus vivendi can also be compared to O’Donnell’s notion of 
“two transitions.” It can be argued that Rawls’ initial stage of constitutional consensus 
(i.e. modus vivendi) corresponds to what O’Donnell calls the ‘first transition.’ It can also 
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be argued that the finalized constitutional consensus corresponds to what O’Donnell calls 
the ‘second transition.’ Because it is through modus vivendi that democratic government 
is initiated, it is through constitutional consensus that the democratic regime is 
consolidated.  
As was stated before, Rawls’ conception of ‘constitutional consensus’ 
corresponds to minimalist and negative democratic consolidation. In order to substantiate 
this argument, constitutional consensus will first be compared with minimalist and then 
negative conceptions of democratic consolidation. The following section is devoted to a 
comparison of Rawls’s constitutional consensus with the minimalist conceptions put forth 
by authors such as Dahl, Schumpeter, Schmitter, O’Donnell, and some other authors who 
are more or less close to the minimalist notions of democratic consolidation. 
 
3.2.1 Constitutional Consensus and Minimalist Democratic Consolidation  
When comparing Rawls and his conception of ‘constitutional consensus’ with 
minimalists, it would be appropriate to compare first with Robert Dahl. Dahl argues that a 
polyarchy would be defined in relation to having civil and political rights plus fair 
competitive and inclusive elections. Thus, Rawls’ constitutional consensus is close to 
Dahl’s definition if subtracting civil rights from the equation, the civil rights that are not 
directly related to political rights, and if adding the cultivation of civic culture to the 
equation, which Rawls deems necessary for a functioning democracy.128 In this regard, it 
can be said that Rawls’ constitutional consensus would be very close to Merkel’s 
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definition of democratic consolidation, which is comprised of four levels: consolidation 
of civic culture, and constitutional, representative, and behavioral consolidation. 
Among minimalist approaches, Rawls’ constitutional consensus approximates 
Schmitter’s definition of democratic consolidation. According to Schmitter, democratic 
consolidation is: 
the process of transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and 
contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition into relations of 
cooperation that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted 
by those persons or collectivities that participate in democratic governance.129  
 
This definition of Schmitter’s is very close to what Rawls intends to convey by his 
conception of constitutional consensus. 
Diamond’s comments on the transitional approach actually best summarizes and 
approaches the concept of constitutional consensus. Diamond argues that the transitional 
approaches consider that: 
 
 Democratic consolidation occurs once there emerges a “consensually unified 
elite” that shares a common commitment to the rules of the democratic game, 
abroader set of norms about the rules of political conduct, and a dense structure of 
interaction that fosters personal familiarity and trust.130 
 
With reference to Linz and Stepan’s tripartite criteria of democratic consolidation, 
namely behavioral, attutudinal, and constitutional consolidation, it can be argued that 
Rawls’ constitutional consensus implies elements of all three criteria. When a 
constitutional consensus is realized, the citizens are habituated to the resolution of 
conflict “within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned 
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by the new democratic process” (constitutional consolidation). The citizens attitudinally 
accept democracy and consider it the most appropriate regime for their society 
(attitudinal consolidation), and behaviorally they do not engage in violence, or anti-
system activities (behavioral consolidation). Thus, constituitional consensus in Rawlsian 
terms implies all three of behavioral, attudinal, and constitutional consolidation in Linz 
and Stepan’s terms.  
In relation to a comparison between Rawls’ concepts and  “extended procedural 
minimum” of democratic consolidation, it needs to be emphasized that Rawls does not 
mention minority rights, human rights, or accountability as the requisites of a 
constitutional consensus, and regards these issues as ‘substantive,’ and therefore, the 
subject matter of ‘overlapping consensus.’ However, rule of law and civil control over 
the military can be considered within the limits of constitutional consensus since these 
two are directly related to the “electoral and legislative procedures of democracy,” which 
Rawls says is necessary for constitutional consensus.131 
The regime support that is depicted as part of a constitutional consensus by Rawls 
parallels what Easton calls “diffuse support.” Whereas the continuation of a democratic 
regime (as modus vivendi) would be dependent upon “specific support,” the continuation 
of a constitutional consensus would be independent of government performance, and 
would rather be a function of ‘diffuse support.’ 
Comparing Rawls with Lipset, it can be argued that what Rawls puts forth as 
important pillars of democratic consensus, namely mutual respect, toleration, and 
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moderation are also emphasized by Lipset as the legitimacy dimension of democracy. 
Lipset argues “a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among the 
contending political forces. And political moderation is facilitated by the capacity of a 
system to resolve key dividing issues before new ones arise.”132  
In comparing Rawls and Rustow, it can be said that Rustow’s four stages that he 
noted Sweden and Turkey went through in establishing democracies are parallel to modus 
vivendi and constitutional consensus. According to Rustow, these two countries went 
through these stages: 
1. National unity,  
2. Inclusive political struggle,  
3. Decision phase (for making a transition to democracy),  
4. Habituation phase. 
It can be argued that phase 2 and 3 (inconclusive political struggle and decision phase) 
can be compared to the struggles of modus vivendi and phase 4 (habituation phase) can 
be compared to the constitutional consensus (habituation to the democratic constitution). 
Overall, it can be argued that constitutional consensus corresponds to ‘minimalist’ 
democratic consolidation, and that ‘constitutional consensus’ is quite parallel with the 
way Dahl, Schumpeter, O’Donnell, or Schmitter define democratic consolidation.  
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3.2.2 Constitutional Consensus and Negative Democratic Consolidation 
Rawls’ constitutional consensus can primarily be read as a theory on ‘negative’ 
democratic consolidation since constitutional consensus implies the relative 
democratization of anti-system groups and the disappearance of systemic challenges. A 
constitutional consensus, unlike overlapping consensus, is limited and does not go as far 
as enhancing all the democratic values or norms but only the political norms pertaining to 
democratic government.  
In a country where constitutional consensus exists,  there would just be respect for 
the political rights and liberties pertaining to democratic procedures, and people would be 
civil and tolerant, however not democratic in terms of the values that go beyond basic 
political procedures. What this refers to is that in a country where constitutional 
consensus exists, the regime would not yet incorporate democratic values such as 
freedom of conscience, freedom of speech,133 or equality of opportunity, which require an 
overlapping consensus to be built. Put differently, people would not be socialized into 
these values during a constitutional consensus. However, as an overlapping consensus is 
being built, people would be socialized into these democratic values as a result of a long 
socialization and deliberation process. 
An overlapping consensus implies the socialization of people into a broad and 
wide range of (liberal) democratic values, and thus guarantees the active participation of 
the citizens into the democratic culture and democratic values. In this regard, it can be 
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argued that while a constitutional consensus implies a ‘negative’ consolidation, an 
overlapping consensus implies a ‘positive’ consolidation.’134 
 
 
3.3 Overlapping Consensus in View of the Democratization Literature  
It can be argued that overlapping consensus goes beyond the minimal requisites of 
procedural democracy and aims for a deeper democratic culture and a broader base of 
economic democracy. It is clear from Rawls’ writings that he does not consider 
constitutional consensus enough for long run stability and genuine democratic 
consolidation in a country for reaching an enduring and secure democratic regime.135 He 
therefore strives for a deeper societal consensus, which he terms ‘overlapping consensus.’ 
Rawls presupposes that unless the basic structure of a society is affirmed by an 
overlapping consensus, that democratic polity will not be totally consolidated. In this 
regard, Rawls naturally finds constitutional consensus insufficient when compared to 
overlapping consensus. Regarding this issue, Rawls says: 
A purely political and procedural constitutional consensus will prove too narrow. 
For unless a democratic people is sufficiently unified and cohesive, it will not 
enact the legislation necessary to cover the remaining constitutional essentials and 
basic matters of justice, and conflict will arise about these. There must be 
fundamental legislation assuring freedom of association and freedom of 
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movement; and beyond this measures are required to assure that the basic needs 
of all citizens can be met so that they can take part in political and social life.136 
Rawls goes as far to say that a constitutional consensus is only a literal consensus: 
A constitutional consensus at the level of principles viewed apart from any 
underlying conception of society and citizen—each group having its own 
reasons—is a consensus taken literally. It lacks the conceptual resources to guide 
how the constitution should be amended and interpreted.137   
 
What this implies is that Rawls sees constitutional consensus as generally more favorable 
than modus vivendi, but not as good and preferable as overlapping consensus. One can 
interpret Rawls’ emphasis on the need for an overlapping consensus as a striving towards 
a maximalist democratic consolidation. 
 
3.3.1 Overlapping Consensus and Maximalist Democratic Consolidation  
While Rawls relates minimal and procedural issues to ‘constitutional consensus,’ he 
relates the substantive issues, such as political and economic issues, as well as long-run 
legitimacy to the stage of  ‘overlapping consensus.’  As it was noted, whereas a 
constitutional consensus is confined to only democratic procedures of government, an 
overlapping consensus takes place around a conception of justice which supposedly 
arranges the whole structure of a society in a just and legitimate way. An overlapping 
consensus, according to Rawls, would yield deep legitimacy regarding economic and 
social matters. In this regard, it can be argued that an overlapping consensus is potentially 
quite broad, deep, and maximalistic. 
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When an overlapping consensus is possibly reached in a country, that would 
imply that citizens do not just passively accept and are content with a generic liberalism, 
but rather they actively affirm (liberal) democracy and its substantive values with a moral 
justification derived from within their own comprehensive doctrines. What this means is 
that different groups like the religious conservatives, nationalists, social democrats, and 
other groups may actively affirm the substantive values of (liberal) democracy from 
within their own world-views. Each might accept certain liberal democratic values for 
quite different reasons, but they might somehow reach a consensus eventually. For 
example, ‘equality of opportunity’ could possibly be justified on quite different grounds, 
say by a social democrat and a religious conservative; or by a businessman and a worker. 
However, Rawls assumes that such differences would not be a problem, as long as people 
reach a consensus on the value of equality of opportunity at a certain level of generality.   
 
3.3.1.1 Overlapping Consensus and Interest Struggles 
Rawls, as a political theorist, is aware of the interest struggles within society while 
establishing a well-ordered democratic society and in this regard, he points out the 
necessity of finding an equilibrium among the conflicting economic and political 
interests.138 He notes that unless a solution is reached to moderate the economic rivalry, 
an overlapping consensus would practically be impossible. He notes: 
 
 If the liberal conceptions correctly framed from fundamental ideas of a 
democratic political culture are supported by and encourage deeply conflicting 
political and economic interests, and if there be no way of designing a 
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constitutional regime so as to overcome that, a full overlapping consensus cannot, 
it seems, be achieved.139  
 
3.3.1.2 Overlapping Consensus and Economic Democracy 
Rawls maintains that the focus of an overlapping consensus is a ‘class of liberal 
conceptions that vary within a certain more or less narrow range.’ Rawls’ liberal 
alternative in this regard is ‘justice as fairness’ which he says is based on the two 
principles of justice.  
Rawls argues that the two principles of justice would normally be compatible with 
either a property-owning democracy or a liberal (market) socialism. In this regard, 
Rawls’ understanding of justice as fairness to provide political and economic justice 
approaches the maximalist notions of democracy such as ‘economic democracy’ which 
takes democracy not only as merely a ‘form’ but also as a positive mechanism to 
empower people as ‘citizens.’ It could be argued that such a social democratic conception 
of citizenship would in general be parallel to T.H. Marshall’s notion of democracy and 
citizenship.140 
 
3.3.2 Overlapping Consensus and Positive Consolidation 
Regarding negative and positive consolidation, it can be said that whereas a constitutional 
consensus primarily guarantees ‘negative’ consolidation, an overlapping consensus goes 
beyond this and  strives for the active affirmation by the citizens of a wide range of 
democratic norms and values (including equality) by virtue of a long socialization and 
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deliberation process, and thus overlapping consensus conceptually approaches positive 
and maximalist notions of democratic consolidation.141 According to Rawls, a democratic 
regime, reaching such a consensus, would not only be institutionally consolidated, but 
also it would enjoy deep political and economic legitimacy and long-run stability. 
 
3.3.3 Some Criticisms against Rawls’ Insistence on Overlapping Consensus as the 
Basis of Political Stability 
Rawls’ insistence on forming an overlapping consensus and his depiction of modus 
vivendi and constitutional consensus as insufficient for providing stability in the society 
is criticized by some authors such as Baier and Dauenhauer. Baier, from whom Rawls 
borrows the concept of constitutional consensus, argues that a constitutional consensus is 
enough for securing stability; therefore, an overlapping consensus, as Rawls suggests, is 
not needed. Dauenhauer, on the other hand, argues that a stable democracy does not 
require a constitutional consensus or overlapping consensus to be stable, but instead a 
modus vivendi, the initial rules of which are well established. He argues that a democracy 
would sufficiently be secured by an appropriate design of government and separation of 
powers and that is quite sufficient for stability and there is no need for any normative 
consensus such as constitutional consensus or overlapping consensus, which he argues 
would harm stability itself.  
In this regard, from these discussions and criticisms, it can be concluded that 
while Baier and Dauenhauer side with a relatively minimalistic conception of democratic 
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consolidation, Rawls sides with a more maximalistic conception of democratic 
consolidation. 
 
3.3.4 Constitutional Consensus, Overlapping Consensus, and Linearity 
Although Rawls considers overlapping consensus as a single concept, such a consensus 
cannot possibly happen once and for all in all matters. That is to say, it requires a 
consensus on many diverse issues. For example, there could be an overlapping consensus 
on distribution of justice, but this would not necessarily guarantee an overlapping 
consensus on ethnic relations, or vice versa. Therefore, an overlapping consensus should 
be thought as an issue with multi-components. Furthermore, each component might be at 
a different and unequal level of development. 
In a country in which a constitutional consensus does not exist yet, there could 
well be certain issues on which an overlapping consensus prevails among social and 
political groups. For example, in a country that is still trying to settle basic political rights 
and liberties (i.e. constitutional consensus), might well have a consensus on issues of 
distribution of wealth, gender issues, or religious matters, in ways that may principally be 
not incompatible with liberal democracy. In this regard, in the Turkish case, although 
Turkey, as a borderline case, is still trying to consolidate constitutional consensus, this 
factor should not prevent the Turkish citizens from discussing the possibility of a 
(overlapping) consensus on certain issues such as distribution of wealth, secularism, or 
ethnicity.  
In this regard, although Turkey is still coping with issues of constitutional 
consensus, it does not have the luxury of giving up the quest for a possible overlapping 
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consensus on certain issues. Turkey is in a position to carry out both of them 
simultaneously. On the one hand, Turkey should try to secure constitutional consensus 
and, on the other hand, it should look for ways to secure a possible overlapping 
consensus on various political issues, such as the distribution of wealth, secularism, or the 
Kurdish issue. 
In the next chapter, the relevance of constitutional consensus and overlapping 
consensus for contemporary Turkish democracy is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH DEMOCRACY: 
REFLECTIONS UPON CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS AND 
OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the relevance of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus for 
contemporary Turkish democracy is discussed. It can be argued that as Turkey moves 
closer to norms of liberal democracy, constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus 
become increasingly more relevant in this country.  
As regards to form of government, Turkey made a transition from an authoritarian 
single-party regime to a multi-party democracy in 1946 and the first governmental 
change through an election took place in 1950. Since then, Turkey has been acquainted 
with the procedures of democratic government.142 
Turkey’s transition to democracy, which aimed to moderate political rivalries 
within the country through democratic electoral procedures, was an attempt to form a 
‘constitutional consensus’ among the political parties in Turkey. However, during the 
years of the transition, the major political actors’ allegiance to democracy was not 
unconditional, nor was there a sufficient level of trust or civic loyalty among the political 
groups in the country. It could be argued that the political tension in the late 1950s and 
the following coup d’etat in 1960 proved that the transition to democracy in Turkey was 
a mere ‘modus vivendi.’ In fact, democracy in those years was not immune to changes in 
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the balance of power among the groups. The DP’s (Democratic Party) majoritarian 
attitudes and the CHP’s militaristic and pro-coup attitudes in the late 1950s were signs of 
a conditional and partialistic understanding of democracy in those years. 
It could be argued that the modus vivendi conditions in Turkey generally 
continued during the 1960s and 1970s, as two more coups took place in 1971 and 1980. 
The political polarization and political terror in the country, and the non-conciliatory 
attitudes of the Demirel and Ecevit governments in the 1970s were quite unconducive to 
the emergence of a ‘constitutional consensus’ in Turkey. However, there was relatively 
high level of political freedom in the 1970s, as the Freedom House scores also affirm, 
which rendered Turkey a politically free, if not a secure or stable country in the 1970s. 143    
It can be said that the 1980 coup caused a high level of authoritarianization in 
Turkey and harmed democracy. However, the constitutional amendments and democratic 
reforms in the next decades somewhat reversed the authoritarianization and liberalized 
the country. The authoritarian 1982 Constitution was amended twice in 1999, once in 
2001, 2002, and 2004. These amendments along with the previous amendments in 1987, 
1993, and 1995 have, as noted by Özbudun, “changed about one third of the 1982 
Constitution,” which was made under the authoritarian conditions of the 1980 coup.144  
It can be argued that the EU-based reforms in contemporary Turkey, especially 
the ones carried out during 2001-2004 created an unprecedented opportunity and hope for 
further democratization and civilianization in Turkey. The formation of a ‘constitutional 
consensus’ in Turkey has become more likely than in the past. The EU-Turkey relations 
are especially crucial in this regard. The EU-Turkey relations, despite the slowing down 
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of the relations in the last few years, is a strong driving force in the democratization of 
Turkey. 
Since Turkey’s declared candidacy in the Helsinki Summit (1999), Turkey has 
carried out many political reforms.145 The Turkish Parliament has passed nine reform 
packages that have significantly improved the political and civil liberties in Turkey. 
Among the legal reforms are the abolishing of death penalty; the freedom of education 
and broadcasting in local languages such as Kurdish; increased freedom of speech, 
assembly and association; abolishing the State Security Courts; and decreased military 
influence in politics.  
As a result of the reforms, in December 2004, the EU decided that Turkey 
‘sufficiently met’ the Copenhagen Criteria; thus, in October 2005, the negotiations with 
the EU started. As of mid-2008, out of 34 chapters of the EU acquis, 10 have been 
opened, and one has been closed. (Eight chapters were frozen in late 2006 due to Turkey 
rejecting to open its ports to Cypriot planes and vessels. Provided that a peaceful solution 
can be created in the coming years among the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and 
the Republic of Cyprus, the issue of Turkey’s opening the ports to Cyprus can possibly be 
resolved.) 
Regarding the overall reform process and its repercussions in Turkey, the legal 
and institutional reforms after the EU candidacy have caused much controversy, and they 
have been a source of differentiation and even polarization within the Turkish polity. The 
differentiation is to such an extent that it can be considered a critical and defining line of 
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contemporary Turkish politics. On one side of the line, there are the nation-state 
supporters with more nationalist and communitarian tendencies; on the other side of the 
line, there are pro-EU groups with more supra-national and liberal leanings.146 
In general, the EU’s democratic support of Turkey is quite important in terms of 
keeping Turkey within the limits of liberal democracy. The EU’s influence is especially 
crucial in relation to party closure cases. For instance, in the recent closure case against 
the AKP (Justice and Development Party), the EU’s diplomatic influence on the verdict 
has been quite critical. Had there not been such pressure from the EU and the 
international community, the Court, considering its internal structure, could have closed 
this political party that is in government. In this regard, the EU’s and the international 
community’s influence, along with internal dynamics, has been decisive.  
In the next part, the issue of ‘constitutional consensus’ is discussed in the context 
of Turkish democracy. 
 
4.1 Contemporary Turkish Democracy and ‘Constitutional Consensus’  
As discussed in the previous chapters, Rawls notes that as long as a liberal regime in a 
country relies on conditions for its existence and depends upon the balance of power 
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among competing groups, then it can be called a ‘modus vivendi.’ In a modus vivendi, 
Rawls says, loyalty to democratic procedures is conditional at best and depends on self or 
group interests and balance of power among groups.147 
On the other hand, if democracy in a country relies on a popular democratic 
consensus and political rivalry is handled through procedural mechanisms and by virtue 
of the existence of moderation and cooperation, then it can be said that there exists a 
‘constitutional consensus’ (democratic consensus). Rawls notes that in countries where 
constitutional consensus prevails, loyalty to democratic procedures does not depend on 
self or group interests, but relies on a principled acceptance of the democratic rules (as 
the ‘only game in the town’). 
Concerning the possibility of forming a constitutional consensus in Turkey, it can 
be argued that Turkey has some advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are: 
1. Holding elections is internalized and taken for granted by the citizens. 
2. There has been relative constitutional liberalization in recent years. 
3. The EU is a motivating factor for further political reforms. 
4. Civil society organizations are increasing in number and most of them are 
contributing to democracy. 
5. Socio-economic development makes the conditions more conducive to 
democracy. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages are: 
1. Problems with the practice of basic rights and liberties 
2. Political autonomy and influence of the Turkish military in politics 
3. Deficiencies in the rule of law 
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4. The controversial and illiberal practices of the judiciary 
5. Ethnic and political polarization 
As noted in previous chapters, Rawls notes that in order for a constitutional consensus to 
be complete, three conditions need to be met. Regarding the question of whether these 
three criteria are met in contemporary Turkey, each of these three criteria will be 
analyzed in the next pages. 
 
4.1.1 A Clear Definition of the Basic Political Rights and Liberties in the 
Constitution 
It has been reported by the EU that Turkey met the political criteria of the EU’s 
Copenhagen Criteria as of late 2004; thus, it could be argued that Turkey met the first 
criteria of a constitutional consensus, namely a clear definition of the basic political rights 
and liberties. Below, the recent democratic reforms pertaining to political rights and 
liberties will be mentioned based on Özbudun and Yazıcı (2004), and Aydın and Keyman 
(2004). 
 
4.1.1.1 Democratic Reforms Pertaining to Political Rights and Liberties in 
Contemporary Turkey 
 
• Death penalty has been abolished (2004). 
• Broadcasting and education in local languages, such as Kurdish, have been 
allowed (third reform package, August 2002). 
•  The State Security Courts have been abolished (16 July 2004). 
 84
• The State monopoly on broadcasting has been removed by an amendment to the 
constitution in 1993, and private TV channels and radios have started 
broadcasting since then. 
• The expression “language prohibited by law” in Article 26 is repealed in 1991. 
(The ban on speaking Kurdish is removed). 
• The members of a party, which was closed down by the Constitutional Court were 
forbidden from politics forever (Article 69); however, with the 1995 amendment, 
the ban from politics was limited to a period of five years. 
• The individuals who were convicted of “ideological and anarchistic actions” were 
not eligible for Parliament (Article 76), however by an amendment on 26 
December 2002, the expression “ideological and anarchistic actions” were 
replaced by “terror actions.” 
• Voting age was lowered to 18 (1995). 
• University students and university teaching staff were allowed to be members of 
political parties, which had been forbidden after the 1980 coup (1995). 
• Political parties were allowed to have political and economic connections with 
trade unions, associations, foundations, cooperatives, and public professional 
organizations, which was banned by Article 14 of the 1982 Constitution (this 
amendment was made in 1995).  
• The associations, foundations, labor unions, and public professional organizations 
were allowed to carry out (political) activities, which were previously banned as 
being out of their defined scope (Article 34 amended in 2001). 
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• The amendments in 1995 and 2001 made it more difficult to prohibit political 
parties (Constitutional Court can only prohibit a party by the three-fifth majority 
of its members instead of a simple majority). 
•  Transitional Article 15 (third paragraph) of the constitution that barred the review 
of constitutionality over the laws and ordinances passed during the National 
Security council regime was eliminated (2001 amendment). 
• The seventh harmonization package: Monthly meetings of the NSC was made 
once every two months, and a civil general secretariat could possibly be appointed 
to the NSC, and the number of the civilian members in the Council has been 
increased (30 July 2003). 
• International treaties were made precedent over domestic laws (2004). 
•  The amendment in 2001 stipulates that the “essence of the fundamental rights 
and liberties” are to be protected while making legal amendments. 
•  Clauses 141, 142, 163 of the penal code, which punished communist and anti-
secular activity, were removed in 1991. 
• The Law on Associations was liberalized by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th reform 
packages.148 With a recent law passed on July 17 2004, a few important changes 
have been made. Accordingly, associations are no longer required to obtain prior 
authorization for foreign funding, partnership, or activities. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are permitted to open representative offices for federations 
and confederations internationally. NGOs will be able to form temporary 
platforms/initiatives to pursue common objectives. 
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• Article 68, which stipulates “political parties cannot organize and function abroad, 
cannot form discriminatory auxiliary bodies such as women’s or youth branches, 
nor can they establish foundations,” was repealed (1995). 
• Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (propaganda against the indivisible unity of the 
state) was repealed with the sixth reform package. This reform was crucial, as it 
was a very broad clause that was commonly referred to in prosecutions149 (19 July 
2003). 
• The minimum sentence under Article 159 of the Penal Code (insulting the state 
and the state institutions and threats to the indivisible unity of the Turkish 
Republic) has been reduced. Expression of opinions intended only to criticize and 
not intended to insult or deride these institutions were kept exempt from 
punishment (August 2002). 
• The sanction of depriving a political party from state financial assistance was 
introduced alongside dissolution. Dissolution decisions that required a simple 
majority in the Constitutional Court now require a three-fifths majority, making it 
more difficult to close down political parties (Article 149, 2001 amendment). 
• The Press Law was amended to repeal prison sentences for criminal offences 
related to the press, thereby further extending the freedom of expression (9 
August 2002). 
• The age limit for organizing demonstrations has been reduced from 21 to 18 
(2004). 
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• The ability of governors to postpone meetings has been restricted. Meetings can 
now be banned only in cases where there is a clear and imminent threat of a 
criminal offence being committed. The number of meetings that were postponed 
or prohibited was reduced from 141 in 2001 to 95 in 2002. 
 
These reforms, along with past reforms, have more or less secured basic political 
rights and liberties in Turkey. However, the issue of ‘practice’ creates question marks. 
Although the basic political rights and liberties exist in the constitution, there are still 
problems concerning the role of the military in Turkish politics, problems related to 
freedom of speech, and problems concerning the free functioning of political parties. It 
should be especially emphasized that the extraordinary role of the Turkish military in 
politics, despite the decreased military influence in recent years, creates problems in 
terms of rule of law and effective civilian rule, which will be discussed in the coming 
pages of this chapter. In the following section, the second criteria of a constitutional 
consensus, namely ‘the common and effective use of public reason in political matters,’ 
is discussed in relation to Turkey. 
 
4.1.2 The Common and Effective Use of Public Reason in Political Matters 
The constitutional amendment in 1993, which abolished the state monopoly on radio and 
television broadcasting in Turkey, opened new channels for the political and social 
groups in Turkey to voice their opinions. This development has caused immense changes 
in the political and social landscape of the country. Many issues that had been a taboo 
until then started to be discussed in a pluralist manner. As a result, in the 1990s and 
2000s, different political and social groups started to increasingly recognize the fact that 
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‘others’ who are completely different from them live in the same country. They realized 
that there are people who have very different political, moral, religious, and philosophical 
outlooks in life. This prompted them to recognize the ‘fact of plurality’ and the 
indispensable need for reciprocity. That is to say, people realized the fact that they owe 
reciprocity to others who live in the same country. 
The plural and reciprocal experiences of people gradually enabled them to realize 
that they are in a position to explain their arguments to the larger public through 
arguments in a way that is communicable to them. As an example, in the 1980s, the 
people engaged in the headscarf issue used to justify their position with reference to 
‘religious values’ and as a ‘truth claim’ that applied to all. However, starting from the late 
1990s they started to voice their demands not as a ‘religious issue’ but as a ‘political’ 
issue that has to be dealt at the level of ‘rights and liberties.’ This should be considered as 
a shift from a unilateral politics to an interactional politics, in which people persuade 
others by using public arguments.150 
Besides the transforming Islamist movement in Turkey after the late 1990s, also 
the Kurdish groups after Turkey’s EU candidacy started to express themselves more and 
more from within a democratic and rights-based language. Contrary to this general trend, 
the political violence of the PKK is apparently against the use of public reason since it 
does not rely on civility or persuasion, but only terror. 
As a conclusion, it can be argued that there has been much improvement in 
Turkey recently in terms of common and effective use of public reason, and it can be said 
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that despite the existence of some uncivil and unreasonable groups, Turkey more or less 
meets Rawls’ second condition of a constitutional consensus. 
 
4.1.3 The Prevalence of Cooperative Virtues in Political Life 
It can be argued that there has been relative improvement in terms of cooperative virtues 
in Turkey recently. A few examples of this improvement are as follows. The first one is 
that the political parties cooperated during the constitutional amendments made in 1987, 
1993, 1995, 1999 (twice), 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2007.151 Secondly, the Ecevit-Yilmaz-
Bahceli coalition and their cooperative attitude for passing some harmonization packages 
for the EU was another example of political cooperation.152 The relatively cooperative 
attitudes of the political parties on the issue of the EU are generally a positive 
development in terms of consensual and cooperative politics in Turkey. However, it 
should be noted that the CHP’s (Republican People’s Party) and MHP’s (Nationalist 
Action Party) reluctance for cooperation on EU-based issues creates certain problems in 
EU-Turkey relations. 
In terms of prevalence of cooperative values in political life, there are still major 
and unresolved issues in Turkey. Distrust, fear, and negativity are major isssues in the 
relations among political groups in Turkey. In fact, Turkey’s being torn between 
modernity and tradition, and to some extent between center and periphery, cause 
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problems in this regard. Most people still think in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ which is a 
problem in terms of having a well-functioning democracy in Turkey.  
It is observed that the AKP and CHP as the two major parties in the Parliament 
cannot easily cooperate with each other due to distrust.153 The political basis of this 
distrust goes deep into the political polarizations of Turkish political history, which have 
to be relieved for a better functioning democracy in Turkey. However, when compared 
with the 1970s (Ecevit vs Demirel) or 1990s (Yılmaz versus Çiller), the recent relations 
between politicians, despite some problems between Baykal and Erdoğan, seem relatively 
better in terms of cooperative virtues. 
In relation to the issue of cooperative virtues, which is the third criteria of a 
constitutional consensus, it could be said that Turkey has gained much ground in this 
regard, however, the improvements are not at a sufficient level yet. There are still 
incidents of intolerance, distrust, narrow-mindedness, fanaticism, and sectarian behaviors 
in Turkish politics. These are definitely against civility and cooperation in politics. 
However, it should be noted that despite incidents of such negativities, the majority of 
citizens in Turkey are becoming more ‘reasonable’ and ‘cooperative’ in recent years, as 
they recognize that Turkey needs more civility and democracy. 
Addressing the issue of whether Turkey meets the three conditions of 
‘constitutional consensus,’ it can be argued that although Turkey has made much 
progress in recent years in terms of meeting the Copenhagen criteria and achieving a 
relatively civil political culture, it has still not reached ‘constitutional consensus.’ This is 
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because unconditional allegiance to democracy by all major parties and sufficient 
cooperative virtues in political life does not yet exist among certain major political actors 
in the country, including certain sections of the military, judiciary, and the political 
parties.  
Regarding Turkey’s current course of democratization and where exactly it is 
headed, it is useful to refer to Andreas Schedler’s classification of regime types: 
authoriatrianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy.154 In 
reference to this categorization, it can be said that Turkey is an electoral democracy, 
which is yet trying to become a liberal democracy, for Turkey today is struggling with 
issues of democratic consolidation (both negative and positive consolidation).  
In sum, it can be argued that although there have been significant political 
improvements in Turkey in recent years, there are still certain deficiencies, especially in 
terms of rule of law and the practice of basic political rights and liberties. Thus, Turkey 
gives the impression of being a ‘borderline case’ in terms of meeting the conditions of a 
constitutional consensus. However, in the coming years, if Turkey can possibly produce 
elite convergence on the problematic political issues, as well as create a more liberal 
constitution and enjoy some further cooperation among major groups, there might be 
more space for a consolidated constitutional consensus in Turkey.  
In the next section, the extraordinary and anti-democratic status of the Turkish 
military within Turkish politics, is discussed. 
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4.1.4 The Controversial Status of the Turkish Military in Turkish Politics 
Any analysis of Turkish politics or democracy would be incomplete without reference to 
the unusual, controversial, and undemocratic status of the Turkish military in the overall 
structure of the Turkish polity. It is a fact that since the Ottoman times and the foundation 
of the Turkish Republic, the military, along with the civil bureaucracy, have dominated 
the political regime of Turkey in direct and indirect ways.155 It needs to be noted that due 
to the deficiencies of the civil governments and the interferences of the Turkish military 
into daily politics, Turkey’s regime is mostly considered to be a “hybrid regime” in 
which political power is de facto shared by the civil governments with the military.156 
The Turkish military assumes a role of “protecting and safeguarding” the Turkish 
Republic from “internal” as well as “external” enemies, the implications and boundaries 
of which is open to much controversy. The expression “protecting and safeguarding” was 
included into the Military Internal Service Code adopted in 1961 (Article 35), which has 
sometimes been used to justify anti-democratic interventions in Turkey. In Turkey, the 
military carried out three coups (1960, 1971, 1980) and a soft coup, or postmodern coup 
(1997). Recently, it issued an ‘e-memorandum’ in April 2007 during the presidential 
election process (This e-memorandum and other recent major authoritarian events in 
Turkey will be analyzed in the next section.) 
The Turkish military mostly interferes into politics on two major issues. The first 
one is the issue of secularism, and the second issue is (Kurdish) nationalism. The Turkish 
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military considers the supporters of religious fundamentalism and ethnic Kurdish 
nationalism as internal enemies, and makes its interventions into politics especially on 
these two issues. It needs to be noted that the internal enemy in the 1970s was the 
socialist left, which was repressed by the military coup in 1980. 
It is sometimes claimed by some authors that the military interventions in Turkey 
are different in nature from the interventions in some other countries, such as the ones in 
Latin America where the militaries stay in power for long periods of time. It is argued 
that the Turkish military carries out ‘moderating coups’ and leaves the government to 
civil authorities when it thinks it has sufficiently re-organized the political 
environment.157 Despite the partial truth of this argument, a critical and crucial fact needs 
to be brought into attention here, which is that, although the Turkish army does not stay 
in government for long years in government, it is routine for the Turkish military to 
control and manipulate politics through the National Security Council.158 Although some 
relative civilianization has been achieved by the EU reforms in Turkey in recent years 
regarding the National Security Council, the Turkish military still has an anti-democratic 
status within Turkish polity when compared to its Western counterparts.159 
In order to normalize the civil-military relations in Turkey, Turkish citizens and 
the political elite need to show a very strong and persistent will power and take initiative 
to curb the anti-democratic and unaccountable political power of the Turkish military. 
Unless the electorate and the political elites show a unified and strong will against the 
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military interventions in Turkey, consolidation of democracy would be highly unlikely in 
this country.  
In the next section, recent developments in Turkish democracy (2007-2008), 
which have been highly influenced by military and judicial interferences, are covered and 
their political implications and especially the negative effects on the healthy functioning 
of democracy are discussed from a liberal democratic point of view. 
 
4.1.5 Recent Developments in Contemporary Turkish Democracy (2007-2008) 
It can be argued that Turkey went through a spectacular period of democratization during 
2001-2004, a period of political stagnation during 2005-2006, relative 
authoritarianization during 2007-2008 (and some relative democratization in 2009160). It 
can be argued that the presidential election in April 2007 triggered some controversial 
events, which culminated in the e-memorandum of the Turkish Armed Forces and then 
the closure cases against the AKP, as well as the DTP (Democratic Society Party).  
Below is presented the major controversial and authoritarian events during 2007-2008. 
 
The Major Controversial and Authoritarian Events in Turkey during 2007-2008: 
During 2007-2008 as a result of the judiciary’s and the military’s meddling into politics, 
some authoritarian events, including closure cases against political parties, took place. 
The three major events are as follows: 
• The e-memorandum related to the presidential election process, published on 
the web page of the Chief of General Staff on 27 April 2007. 
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• The Constitutional Court’s controversial decision annulling the first round of 
the presidential election arguing for the necessity of 367 parliamentarians to be 
present (quorum) during the election process (1 May 2007). 
• The closure cases filed against two political parties, the first one against the pro-
Kurdish and allegedly separatist DTP (Democratic Society Party) on 16 
November 2007, and the second one against the party in government, the AKP, 
being accused of anti-secularism, on 14 March 2008. 
 
These events caused some relative authoritarianization during 2007-2008. It can be 
argued that one of the reasons for this authoritarianization is the AKP’s slowing down of 
the political reforms.  It is a fact that the AKP, after receiving a date for starting the 
negotiations with the EU in 2005, and then increasingly after the landslide election 
victory in 2007, has started to slow down the democratic reforms and somewhat started to 
compromise with the authoritarian political regime in the country. In this regard, it has 
been argued by authors such as Cizre (2007) and Aktar (2009) that the recent 
authoritarian backlash has been possible due to the fact that the AKP has somehow given 
up pursuing the reforms as perseveringly in the last couple of years.  
Regarding the democratizing reforms and their slowing down, it can be argued 
that the EU’s negative stance towards Turkey in the last couple of years has been an 
influential decelerating factor. Especially France’s and Germany’s negative attitudes 
towards Turkey have decreased the rate of support in Turkey for joining the EU as well 
as the rate of support for the democratic reforms the EU demands from Turkey. All these 
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negative factors might be true. However, from the government’s perspective, this is not to 
be a reason for slowing down the democratic reforms. 
For a better understanding of the hurdles in relation to the transition to a more 
functional democracy in Turkey, it is useful to refer to the two stages that O’Donnell puts 
forth. O’Donnell, as mentioned in the previous chapter, argues that ‘democratic 
transition’ entails these two stages: 
The first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation 
of a democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the 
consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a 
democratic regime. . . The second transition will not be any less arduous nor any 
less lengthy; the paths that lead from a democratic government to a democratic 
regime are uncertain and complex, and the possibilities of authoritarian regression 
are numerous.
161
 
 
It can be argued that Turkey is currently attempting to make the transition from a formal 
democratic government to a democratic regime, and experiencing the hurdles of such a 
transition. 
Related to the controversial events mentioned above, it can be said that the civil 
and military bureaucracy’s clash of interests with the ruling AKP has been a crucial 
factor in the background of these events, and this clash of interests has some potential to 
create further tension in the coming years. This tension between two opposing foci of 
power has definitely a ‘class’ dimension as well.  
One of the most dramatic changes taking place in today’s Turkey is the changing 
class structure and the transforming center-periphery relations. The traditional lower 
classes are becoming more of a middle class in today’s Turkey and starting to assert 
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themselves as a new power center; in response to this, the traditional center (civil and 
military bureaucracy) tries to stop the ongoing social and political change. 162 
It is observed that the changing class patterns in Turkey today dislocate many 
things at the socio-political level. It is seen that the political competition arising out of the 
changing class patterns in Turkey is expressed via ‘religiosity’ versus ‘secularity.’ It can 
be argued that these two categories are used in reference to ‘class’ position as much as 
‘religious’ positions. Interestingly, it is observed recently that the AKP, as the 
representative of the ascending conservative classes, is going through a peculiar and 
difficult process of adopting capitalism, secularization, and democratization, which 
creates controversial events and tension in Turkey.  
When considering the AKP’s political character and its relation to democracy, a 
crucial fact that needs to be noted is that the AKP is an offshoot of previous religiously-
oriented parties (such as the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party) which were anti-
modernist, anti-EU, and anti-secular; however, the AKP has recently undergone a 
political transformation and has become more or less a moderate party that seems to take 
democracy seriously. One can say it has gained some ground in terms of liberalizing 
itself as well as Turkey via the EU-Turkey relations. However, it is observed that the 
state elite in Turkey sees the AKP’s relation to democracy and secularism with some 
reserve and suspicion. In this regard, based on the AKP’s practice and some empirical 
data, it seems that democracy and secularism are values that the AKP is still in the 
process of learning, as in the case of many other segments of the society. It seems that the 
AKP is trying to adapt itself to democratic values and secularism while blending them 
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with some religious and conservative values, which might sometimes clash with Western 
norms of liberalism.163 
Regarding the relations between the political center and periphery in Turkey, one 
can argue that although the gap between the center and the periphery is narrowing, there 
are still daily evidences of this dichotomy in today’s Turkey. The fervent debates, 
conflicts, and events around the presidential election in 2007 were immediate evidence of 
this dichotomy. It is a well-known fact that the presidency in Turkey is seen as one of the 
most critical bastions of the regime in Turkey. Therefore, the military, which sees itself 
as the guardian of the secularist regime, was very uneasy about the possibility of a 
parliamentarian coming from the background of political Islam to be elected as the 
President (be this R. Tayyip Erdoğan or Abdullah Gül, both of whose wives wear the 
Islamic headscarf). After Gül’s candidacy was announced, the tension in the country rose 
to a climax, and then three controversial and authoritarian events took place during 2007-
2008. In the next pages, these three events are discussed. 
 
I. The e-memorandum related to the presidential election process, published on the web 
page of the Chief of General Staff on 27 April 2007: 
The presidential election in April 2007 caused great political polarization in Turkey and 
precipitated a political crisis in this country, which culminated in the e-memorandum 
published by the Chief of General Staff on 27 April 2007. It can be argued that the e-
memorandum and the events in its aftermath led to some authoritarianization in Turkey. 
It actually started in relation to the presidential election. The AKP, which won the 
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election in 2002 by gaining 34.28 percent of the votes, had an intention to nominate 
Tayyip Erdoğan for the presidential election in 2007. However, there were many 
reactions to this from the military as well as civil society, which organized a huge rally in 
Ankara’s Tandoğan Square on 14 April 2007 against the candidacy of Erdoğan, or any 
other possible ex-Islamist candidate from the AKP.164 The AKP eventually renounced 
Erdoğan’s candidacy and instead decided upon the candidacy of Abdullah Gül, the 
Foreign Minister at the time. As a reaction to this, another rally was organized against 
Gül’s candidacy on 29 April 2007 in Istanbul’s Çağlayan Square. About one million 
people attended this rally.165 The series of rallies then continued in various cities of 
Turkey. 
A controversial and anti-democratic event during the presidential election was 
that, on 27 April 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces published the following statement on 
its website: 
The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on 
arguments over secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the 
recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a 
party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish 
Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. 
It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary. 
Those who are opposed to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's 
understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk' are enemies of the 
Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their 
sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the 
unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this 
determination is absolute.166 
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This statement has been interpreted as a memorandum (electronic memorandum or e-
memorandum) by most commentators. Many people in Turkey have the conviction that 
such interventions into politics by the military is against the constitution and the legally 
confined duties of the military. It is a fact that neither according to the Turkish 
Constitution nor according to the Turkish laws does the military have a duty or any legal 
authority to make political statements such as the one above, which implies a threat of 
staging a coup d’etat. It is needless to say that in a democratic regime, attempting to 
overthrow the government or threatening to do so would be a political crime against the 
democratic regime.167 
On the same day of this e-memorandum, the first round of the presidential 
election took place in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. However, the 
parliamentarians from the CHP, DYP (True Path Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), SHP 
(Social Democratic People’s Party), HYP (People’s Ascent Party), GP (Youth Party), and 
some independent parliamentarians boycotted the election. Yet, the AKP 
parliamentarians as well as five independent parliamentarians, two parliamentarians from 
ANAP, two from DYP and one from CHP attended the election session.168 In the 
election, Abdullah Gül, received 357 votes out of 361 parliamentarians being present 
during the election.169 
Abdullah Gül could not receive two-thirds of the votes necessary for being elected 
in the first round. Therefore, another round was required. However, a controversial event 
took place. The CHP applied to the Constitutional Court for an annulment of the first 
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round by putting forth the argument that in order for the election to be valid, two-thirds of 
the members (367), which the CHP argued to be the quorum, needed to be present during 
the election.170 On 1 May 2007, the Constitutional Court announced that it had accepted 
the CHP’s application and nullified the first round of the election (nine out of eleven 
members voted for nullifying the first round while only two members voted against it). 
As a result, on 2 May 2007, the second round of the election could not take place since 
the first round was already nullified.171  
On 6 May 2007, the first round of the election was carried out again. The 
opposition parties’ boycott continued and practically no election could be carried out in 
the Parliament. The repeated round resulted in Abdullah Gül’s withdraw as the claimed 
367 quorum was not met in the Parliament once again.172 On 9 May 2007, the presidential 
election process was postponed because there was no other candidate after the withdrawal 
of Gül. One day later, Prime Minister Erdoğan called for an early national election. In the 
election on 22 July 2007, the AKP received 46.6 percent of the votes; and after the 
election, Gül was elected President of the Turkish Republic in the third round of the 
election by the new Parliament.173 
 
II. The Constitutional Court’s controversial decision of annulling the first round of the 
presidential election arguing for the necessity of 367 parliamentarians to be present 
(quorum) during the election process (1 May 2007): 
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The Constitutional Court announced on 1 May 2007 that in order for the presidential 
election to be valid, there needed to be 367 parliamentarians present during the election 
in the Parliament.174 This interpretation adopted by the Constitutional Court surprised the 
public, since according to the 1982 constitution, the quorum of meeting for parliamentary 
sessions is one-third of the total number of MPs, which is 184.175  
Presenting the ‘quorum of decision’ (367) as if it was ‘quorum of meeting’ (184) 
was perceived by many people as a politically motivated decision. It was assumed, not 
unjustifiably, that the 367 decision was taken somehow under the influence of the 
military’s e-memorandum that had taken place just a few days prior (on 27 April 2007). 
 
III. The filing of two closure cases against political parties, the first one against the DTP 
(16 November 2007), and the second one against the AKP (14 March 2008):  
On 16 November 2007, the Chief Prosecutor of Turkey's Supreme Court of Appeals, 
Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, applied to the Constitutional Court asking for the closure of 
the DTP arguing that this party has been the hotbed of Kurdish separatist activities.176 On 
14 March 2008, Yalçınkaya applied to the Constitutional Court asking for the closure of 
the AKP and banning 71 AKP parliamentarians from politics for five years, arguing that 
this party has become the hotbed of anti-secular activities. On 31 March 2008, the 
Constitutional Court agreed to hear the AKP case.177 
On 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court finally announced its decision, which 
was not to close down the AKP or ban any party officials, but to punish the party by 
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cutting half of the state aid to the party. Out of 11 members, six members voted for the 
closure of the party. Four members, on the other hand, voted for the cutting by half the 
treasury aid to the party; and one member voted for the full acquittal of the party. The 
President of the Constitutional Court announced to the public that 10 out of 11 members 
of the Court expressed their conviction that the party has become a focal point of anti-
secular activities.178 Yet, he added that the Court came to the conclusion that the quality 
of being the focal point of anti-secular activities has not been grave enough to close down 
the party and had chosen to confine itself with punishing the party merely by reducing the 
state aid received by the AKP to half.179  
The other closure case, the one against the DTP, has not been finalized yet, and is 
still continuing at the time of the writing of this chapter. If this party would be closed, it 
would probably cause problems in terms of the democratic solution of the Kurdish issue. 
It is true that there are certain anti-democratic elements within this party; however, a 
possible closure would strengthen the faction that supports anti-democratic methods and 
violence.   
Another recent issue in Turkey that needs to be mentioned here is the Ergenekon 
case, which is still continuing and regarded as highly important for further 
democratization and transparency in Turkey. This case started as a relatively modest one 
in 2007 but became a sensational and critical case with some arrests in July 2008, which 
were followed by some other arrests. 
The Ergenekon case started in 2007 after some weapons and hand grenades were 
found in a shanty house in Ümraniye, Istanbul, that were allegedly planned to be used for 
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plotting a coup against the AKP government.180 Since 2007, a number of waves of 
detentions have taken place among people including active and retired top military 
officers, bureaucrats, academicians, journalists, artists, NGO leaders, and many other 
prominent political and social figures.  
As part of the Ergenekon investigation, on 1 July 2008 some high-standing public 
figures were detained, and two retired generals, Şener Eruygur and Hurşit Tolon, were 
soon arrested for the alleged coup attempts in 2004.181 Veli Küçük, a retired general and 
an influential figure within the Ergenokon organization, was detained and then arrested 
on 22 January 2008.182 The so-called Ergenekon Organization, although not verified by 
the court yet, is alleged to have made plans to topple the AKP government through 
agitation and a military coup. The government’s initiative and will power to inquire into 
such alleged coup attempts is an important and positive development in terms of 
protecting democracy and liberal values in Turkey. However, a critical issue needs to be 
mentioned here which is that, although it can be argued that the Ergenekon case is an 
opportunity for further democratization and civilianization, the AKP’s using the 
Ergenekon trial in order to suppress its opponents presents a dangerous situation in terms 
of democracy. It can be argued that the government needs to be more careful in keeping 
the trial within legal limits and not politicize it to suppress its opponents. It is also crucial 
to note that the AKP government’s policies toward some secular media and NGOs, as 
well some unjustified detentions as part of the Ergenekon case, are seen by many people 
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in Turkey as politically biased and that it sometimes seems to turn into a form of political 
vengeance. 
After discussing the recent controversial developments in today’s Turkey, the 
next section discusses the issue of a possible overlapping consensus in Turkey. 
 
4.2 Contemporary Turkish Democracy and Overlapping Consensus 
Although overlapping consensus is depicted by Rawls as a stage to follow a finalized 
constitutional consensus, in practice there could be co-existence of efforts in a country for 
forming a constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus within the same time 
period. Thus, advances in different components of constitutional consensus and 
overlapping consensus in a country might possibly co-exist, and might mutually enhance 
each other. Different dimensions of constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus, 
in practice, might develop together, along with each other in a simultaneous manner, just 
like advancements and manifestations of modernity and post-modernity might co-exist in 
certain developing countries.   
The operationalization of overlapping consensus as a concept is a relevant issue 
that has to be mentioned here. Although Rawls puts forth overlapping consensus without 
operationalizing it, overlapping consensus does need to be operationalized and its 
components need to be outlined in order to have empirical applicability. Institutional and 
social issues that would be the subject matter of justice, thus an overlapping consensus, 
might differ from country to country. In the Turkish case, one can observe that a few 
basic issues dominate the perceptions of the Turkish citizens in relation to justice.  
Although alternative issues might be contested, four major issues are mentioned in this 
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dissertation in relation to the possibility of forming an overlapping consensus. These are 
basic rights and liberties, social justice, secularism, and the Kurdish issue.183 
It could be argued that the recent reforms in Turkey relating to political rights and 
liberties, that makes a constitutional consensus more likely, also feed the likelihood of an 
overlapping consensus on certain issues such as the Kurdish issue. For example, the 
provision of freedom of speech and broadcasting in Kurdish not only contributes to 
political rights and a possible constitutional consensus, but also contributes to the chances 
of forming a social consensus on ‘just’ institutions in terms of ethnic relations, including 
better socio-economic infrastructure as well as cultural recognition of the Kurdish 
citizens living in the Turkish Republic.  
Concerning democratic consolidation in Turkey, it was noted by Özbudun (2000) 
that the two issues that make democratic consolidation in Turkey difficult and less likely 
are political Islam and rising Kurdish nationalism. As of 2008, it could be argued that the 
Kurdish issue continues to be a major issue. Especially the terror of PKK in 2007 and 
2008 makes an overlapping consensus on the Kurdish issue an urgent matter. The 
implications of “justice as fairnesss” might be quite relevant for this issue in Turkey. In 
this regard, the possibility of forming an overlapping consensus on the Kurdish issue is 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Concerning the issue of peaceful co-existence of different ethnicities, it should be 
noted that Turkey has a long history of multi-cultural co-existence and toleration. 
Especially the Ottoman experience in terms of toleration for differences might be noted. 
Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that the Ottoman experience had its own shortcomings 
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in terms of the unequal relations between the religious denominations, therefore the 
Ottoman experience cannot possibly be a reference point in today’s republican Turkey, 
which takes secularism as a basic principle. A contemporary factor, nationalism (both 
Turkish and Kurdish), also makes it anachronistic. However, the values of 
multiculturalism could possibly be revitalized in Turkey with reference to contemporary 
notions of liberal values and ‘constitutional citizenship.’ 
The other issue mentioned by Özbudun, namely political Islam, is not as relevant 
today as it was in 2000, considering the fact that the AKP, which comes from an Islamist 
political background, has turned more or less into a moderate conservative party; and the 
AKP, to a great extent, marginalized the Felicity Party (SP), which continues the radical 
National Outlook tradition.184 However, one can see that the issue of secularism is still a 
relevant and controversial issue in contemporary Turkey. The headscarf issue and the 
disadvantaged status of the religious minorities, especially the Alewites, wait to be solved 
by social and political consensus. These and some other relevant issues of Turkish 
secularism will be mentioned in Chapter 6 in relation to forming an overlapping 
consensus on secularism in Turkey. 
Another critical issue discussed in this dissertation in relation to democratic 
consolidation is the issue of ‘social justice’ and the possibility of forming an overlapping 
consensus on this issue in Turkey. The issue of social justice is not mentioned as a 
condition of democratic consolidation by minimalist consolidationalists, but is taken 
more seriously by more maximalist theoreticians. Especially Rawls takes the issues of 
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social justice and distribution of wealth quite seriously and depicts his difference 
principle as the condition of long-run stability within a democracy.  
Concerning a possible overlapping consensus on social justice in Turkey, it needs 
to be noted that in Turkey, despite a relative amelioration in the distribution of income in 
recent years, Turkey’s Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, is still relatively 
higher than most stable democracies.185 Assuming that stable democracies enjoy a lower 
inequality, it would be reasonable for Turkish governments to lower the current level of 
inequality in the coming years. Another related and important issue is that the larger 
proportion of economic inequality stems not from distribution of income but rather from 
distribution of wealth.186 In this regard, a property-owning democracy, which Rawls puts 
forth, could be a relevant remedy for Turkey. A consensus on a more equal distribution of 
wealth and also income can form the basis of the citizens’ perception of justice, which is 
important for having a social contract in Turkey.  
In this regard, a possible overlapping consensus on social justice in Turkey might 
rely upon the already existing values within the Turkish state structure such as the ‘social 
state’ mentioned in the Constitution. That is to say, an overlapping consensus on social 
justice in Turkey could possibly stem from and reflect the deeply seated values of 
Turkish political culture. The next chapter discusses ‘social justice’ in Turkey and the 
possibility of forming an overlapping consensus on this issue. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS ON THE 
ISSUE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions,  
as truth is of systems of thought” 
 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.3 
 
 
 
5.1 The Issue of Social Justice 
Social justice can be defined as the condition or quality of a social structure by virtue of 
which all individuals have a certain level of minimum welfare and in which wealth is 
distributed in a just and fair way.187 On the other hand, social justice is sometimes also 
defined in a broader sense that would imply the existence of justice among various 
groups in social life.188 Although this broader approach is a legitimate one, emphasis will 
be given to the economic dimension of social justice in Turkey within this chapter; and 
the social dimension of social justice in Turkey such as freedom of conscience or ethnic 
equality will be dealt in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
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It is a fact that there are different and competing conceptions of social justice in 
today’s modern societies ranging from socialism to social liberalism, each of which 
suggests different conceptions to provide ‘social justice.’ Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ is 
one of these conceptions of social justice, and Rawls’ conception offers valuable insights 
into discussions on social justice in Turkey. It can be argued that realizing social justice 
in Turkey is one of the most critical endeavors to consolidate Turkish democracy. 
Considering the fact that Turkey today, despite a relative improvement in recent years, 
suffers from an unjust distribution of wealth and income, it is critically important to 
reflect upon social justice, and make it the subject of public political discussions in 
Turkey. In this regard, I have proposed Rawls’ property-owning democracy as a way to 
secure social justice in Turkey, which is covered in the last part of this chapter.  
A fact to be emphasized about social justice in Turkey is that Turkish people have 
a widespread culture of ‘charity,’ yet a public and rights-based notion of social justice 
with reference to ‘reciprocity’ is still not much developed in this country. Therefore, it is 
important to defend social justice as a ‘political’ rather than a merely ‘ethical’ issue or a 
matter of charity. Such a political defense might proceed with reference to the fact that 
social state is an important dimension of this country’s public culture and part of the 
citizens’ considered judgments about justice. 
Concerning the relation between social justice and democracy, it can be argued 
that, a working and consolidated democracy can only be founded when and where 
citizens have the necessary means and capabilities to participate in the polity as full 
citizens. It is a fact that under conditions of economic deprivation, citizens simply would 
not have the chances to sustain themselves or their families, and they simply would not 
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be able to influence society or politics at large. In this regard, possession of a decent level 
of capital and productive assets are absolutely necessary. Access to basic services such as 
health, education, accommodation, and the like are quite critical. Without these assets and 
services, neither life sustenance nor active citizenship would be possible. The 
disadvantaged members of most societies in the world today practically lack the basic 
means for being active citizens at either the national or the global level.189 They cannot 
easily articulate or voice their discontent about their life conditions at the public level, 
and this leads to high levels of suffering and alienation for these people.  
In recent times of neo-liberal policies at the global level, the lot of the lower 
classes out of the national income in most countries is shrinking and the distribution of 
wealth is getting worse in many parts of the world.190 Due to the diversification and 
scattering of the working class and the relative weakening of the trade unions, it is 
becoming increasingly more difficult to secure a just economic structure in most 
countries, including Turkey. Cheap labor, flexible waging, and unstable employment 
continuously worsen the economic conditions of the disadvantaged people all around the 
world, and it is becoming more and more difficult for labor unions to influence the 
national policies due to the fact that they are primarily determined by the global 
economic institutions and the transnational companies.191   
 Two or three decades ago the national governments were more responsive to the 
popular expectations and labor unions. However, following the further globalization of 
the world economy by the mid-1970s, the actors of the global economy have become 
much more autonomous in their choices vis-a-vis the national governments and the labor 
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movements.192 This has particularly caused many problems, such as a high level of 
insecurity for the working class and the lower classes that live on limited resources and 
insufficient social security services.193   
It is reported that today a significant portion of the world’s population still lives 
on  $1 or less per day without having sufficient food, clean water or health care. It is 
today a fact that most of the Third World is without any social safety net provided by the 
state, and it is a fact that “the family and community are the only providers of social 
welfare in the Third World.”194  
The condition of the Turkish society at large is not immune from the global 
conditions. A 1987 survey identified 52.4% of the Turkish population to be living on 4,30 
$ per day or less, and 15.9 % living on 2.15 $ or less.195 The latest survey in 2000 found 
that 39.1% lived on $ 4.30 per day and 10.3 % lived on 2.15 per day (World Bank 
2005).196 It is also noted that the 20% percentile of the Turkish population that makes 
13.925.731 people live on $2.5 or less.197 In 2002 Euro-stat reported that 25% of the 
population in Turkey lives in relative poverty, below the “risk-of-poverty threshold set at 
60% of the national median equalized disposable income (after social transfers).”198  
Under such unfavorable conditions regarding economic justice, it is becoming 
particularly important today, in ethical and political terms, to defend the rights and 
liberties of the social groups who are relatively disadvantaged on the social ladder. In 
order to make things better for these people, it is particularly important that the global 
                                                  
192
  Koray, Meryem. 2005. Sosyal Politika (Social Policy), Ankara: Imge, p.14-15. 
193
 It is mostly noted that while globalization influences the qualified and the white-collar labor in positive 
ways, it influences the unqualified labor negatively. 
194
 Chatterjee, Pranab. 1999. Repackaging the Welfare State, Washington DC: Nasw Press, p.3. 
195
 http://www.worldbank.org (Turkey World Bank Reports, 1987). 
196
 http:// www.worldbank.org (Turkey World Bank Reports, 2005). 
197
 Koray, Meryem. 2005. Sosyal Politika (Social Policy), Ankara: Imge, p.360.  
198
 http://www.euro.who.int/eprise/main/who/progs/chhtur/demographic/20050131_1 - 36k 
 113 
agents, international organizations, civil society, and labor unions act in a concerted and 
solidarist manner and thus have the best of their chances to influence the economic 
policies at the global and domestic levels.  
In the next section, Rawls’ distributive justice, which proposes justice at the 
national and global level is discussed. 
 
5.2 Rawls’ Distributive Justice: Justice as Fairness 
Rawls argues that people who are under the “veil of ignorance” would not know their 
background or life conditions, whether they come from a wealthy family or a poor 
family, whether they would have more talents or less talents, etc. Rawls argues that under 
such conditions, persons would come out with two principles of justice. His justice as 
fairness relies on these two principles of justice that follow as: 
a-) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all; and 
 
b-) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:  
 
b1- they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and 
 
b2- they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society (‘the difference principle’).199 
 
Rawls maintains that a social system needs to meet these two criteria in order to be 
considered as a just system. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls sorts out five 
kinds of regime types as social systems. These are: 
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a-) Laissez-faire capitalism 
b-) Welfare-state capitalism 
c-) State socialism with a command economy 
d-) Property-owning democracy 
e-) Liberal (democratic) socialism200 
Rawls argues that the first three kinds of regimes “violate the two principles of justice”201 
He says that only property-owning democracy and liberal (democratic) socialism (i.e. 
market socialism) can possibly meet the two principles of justice. Rawls rules out the first 
three alternatives on the following grounds. Regarding laissez-faire capitalism he says: 
 
 a-) Laissez-faire capitalism (the system of natural liberty) secures only formal 
equality and rejects both the fair value of the equal political liberties and fair 
equality of opportunity. It aims for economic efficiency and growth constrained 
only by a rather low social minimum.202  
 
Regarding welfare state capitalism, with which most authors wrongly associate Rawls 
with, Rawls puts forth the following evaluation: 
b-) Welfare state capitalism also rejects the fair value of the political liberties, and 
while it has some concern for equality of opportunity, the policies necessary to 
achieve that are not followed. It permits very large inequalities in the ownership 
of real property (productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the 
economy and much of the political life rests in few hands. And although, as the 
name “welfare-state capitalism” suggests, welfare provisions may be quite 
generous and guarantee a decent social minimum covering the basic needs, a 
principle of reciprocity to regulate economic and social inequalities is not 
recognized.203 
 
As for state socialism, Rawls states his reservations as such: 
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c-) State socialism with a command economy supervised by a one-party regime 
violates the equal basic rights and liberties, not to mention the fair value of these 
liberties. A command economy is one that is guided by a general economic plan 
adopted from the center and makes relatively little use of democratic procedures 
or of markets (except as rationing devices).204 
 
Ruling out the first three alternatives as unjust, Rawls says that the remaining 
alternatives are only (d) and (e), property-owning democracy and liberal (market) 
socialism, which he claims satisfy the two principles of justice.”205 He puts these two as 
possible alternatives arguing that “both a property-owning democracy and a liberal 
socialist regime set up a constitutional framework for democratic politics, guarantee the 
basic liberties with the fair value of the political liberties and fair equality of opportunity, 
and regulate economic and social inequalities by a principle of mutuality, if not by the 
difference principle.”206  
Rawls makes distinctions between a socialist command economy and a liberal 
socialist economy on the one hand; and welfare-state capitalism and property-owning 
democracy on the other. He notes that under liberal (democratic) socialism, the means of 
production are owned by society, and political and economic power is shared among 
democratic political parties and firms.207 Rawls, comparing and contrasting a command 
economy with a liberal socialist economy, states that, in contrast with a command 
economy, firms under liberal socialism would “carry on their activities within a system of 
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free and workably competitive markets, [and] free choice of occupation [would be] 
assured.”208 
Before explaining how Rawls distinguishes between a welfare-state capitalism 
and a property-owning democracy, first is explained what property-owning democracy 
implies. This term was first used by British economist James Meade in his important 
work Efficiency, Equality, and the Ownership of Property.209 In a property-owning 
democracy, Rawls suggests that a widespread ownership of productive assets and human 
capital would be ensured. This would be done by trying out different kinds of property 
ownership and progressive taxation and property ownership would be pooled through 
insurance firms, investment trusts and the like, so that each citizen receives a part of his 
or her income from property.210 Rawls elaborates the basic institutions of a property-
owning democracy as the following: 
i-) Provisions for securing the fair value of the political liberties, 
ii-) Provisions for realizing fair equality of opportunity in education and training, 
iii-) A basic level of health care provided for all.211 
 
Rawls distinguishes a property-owning democracy in some important ways from a 
welfare-state capitalism. Noting that both of them allow private property, he says that 
they are different in some critical ways. He puts forth the major differences between the 
two systems as such:  
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The background institutions of property-owning democracy work to disperse the 
ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from 
controlling the economy, and indirectly political life as well. By contrast, welfare-
state capitalism permits a small class to have a near monopoly of the means of 
production.  
 
Property-owning democracy avoids this, not by the redistribution of income to 
those with less at the end of each period, so to speak, but rather by ensuring the 
widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education 
and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this against a fair 
background of fair equality of opportunity.212  
 
Having put the difference of mentality as such between the two systems, Rawls notes that 
there exists a critical difference in the underlying intention of the two systems. In a 
property-owning democracy the intent, as Rawls put, is not 
 
simply to assist those who lose out through accident or misfortune (although that 
must be done), but rather to put all citizens in a position to manage their own 
affairs on a footing of a suitable degree of social and economic equality.213  
 
In terms of distribution policies, it is noted that whereas policies under a property-owning 
democracy involve “altering the underlying ex ante distribution of property and 
marketable skills rather than simply accepting these as given and undertaking only ex 
post income distribution through the welfare system.”214 Rawls elaborates this difference 
noting that the two systems have difference in their basic aims: 
In welfare state capitalism the aim is that none should fall below a decent 
minimum standard of life, one in which their basic needs are met, and all should 
receive certain protections against accident and misfortune, for example 
unemployment compensation and medical care. The redistribution of income 
serves this purpose when, at the end of each period, those who need assistance 
can be identified. Yet given the lack of background justice and inequalities in 
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income and wealth, there may develop a discouraged and depressed underclass 
many of whose members are chronically dependent on welfare. This underclass 
feels left out and does not participate in the public political culture.215  
 
Respect, reciprocity and equality among the citizens, Rawls asserts, are very 
important issues in a democratic regime. In what way the state views the citizens, and 
how the citizens view one another all have important political implications. There are 
some important differences in this regard between a welfare state and a property-owning 
democracy. While a welfare-state simply “helps” the disadvantaged people out of 
“human sympathy” or “compassion,” it does not honor the full equality and reciprocity 
between the citizens, whereas a property-owning democracy, Rawls says is sensitive to 
providing conditions of equality, reciprocity and self-respect to all citizens as much as 
possible. He differentiates between a one-sided help of the state through compassion 
versus a rights-based reciprocity among citizens:  
The least advantaged are not, if all goes well, the unfortunate and unlucky—
objects of our charity and compassion, much less our pity—but those to whom 
reciprocity is owed as a matter of political justice among those who are free and 
equal citizens along with everyone else. Although they control fewer resources, 
they are doing their full share on terms recognized by all as mutually 
advantageous and consistent with everyone’s self-respect. 216 
 
Rawls states that the aim of a property-owning democracy is to “realize in the basic 
institutions the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded 
as free and equal.”217 In order to be able to realize this goal over generations, Rawls 
argues that the basic institutions in the society must “from the outset, put in the hands of 
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citizens generally, and not only a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully 
cooperating members of society on a footing of equality.”218 
Overall, it can be argued that the economic views of Rawls, which he expresses in 
his latest book Justice as Fairness, A Restatement, is close to a strong version of social 
democracy, for he aims for widespread property-owning among the population.219 
Although Rawls proposes property-owning democracy as a possible regime type for 
nation states, a global and cosmopolitan view would require extending property-owning 
democracy to the global order.  
 
5.3 The Turkish Economy and the Issue of Social Justice in Turkey 
The Turkish economy in the last few decades significantly grew, and Turkey today has 
one of the largest economies in the world in terms of total GDP.220 Although per capita 
income has increased in recent years, there is still a significant gap between the richest 
20% and the poorest 20% in Turkey.221 The GNP per capita of Turkey has recently risen 
to $9.333 in 2007, however the distribution of this ‘average’ income among the 
population is still quite uneven. According to UN statistics, the proportion of the income 
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of the richest 10% to the 10% poorest in Turkey by year 2005 was 16.8 and the 
proportion of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% was 9.3. 222  
The Gini coefficient, which measures distribution of income, is reported to be 
0.38 for Turkey in 2005. (Technically, a ‘gini coefficient’ at the level of 0.0 (zero) 
represents “perfect equality”, whereas 1.0 (one) represents perfect inequality.) Turkey’s 
Gini coefficient in 2002 was reported to be 0.44 by the UN; it decreased to 0.38 in 
2005.223 Thus there was relative improvement between 2002-2005 in terms of wealth 
distribution; however, Turkey’s Gini coefficient is still relatively high when compared to 
some European states, especially the social democratic ones such as Sweden and 
Denmark. It is generally thought that a Gini index around 0.25-0.30 denotes a relatively 
‘just’ level, whereas a Gini coefficient greater than 0.30 denotes increasing levels of 
‘injustice’ regarding income distribution. Comparatively speaking, when relying on the 
Gini indexes of various countries, Turkey is not as unjust as Bolivia (0.60), Brazil (0.57), 
South Africa (0.57), or Zimbabwe (0.50); on the other hand, Turkey is not as just as 
Denmark (0.24), Sweden (0.25), the Czech Republic (0.25), or Germany (0.28).224  
 
 
 
Below is shown Turkey’s Gini coefficient in recent years. 
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Year Gini coeff. 
1987 0.44 
1994 0.49 
2002 0.43 
2004 0.40 
2005 0.38 
                                  
     Table 1: Turkey’s Gini coefficient during 1987-2005 225 
 
According to the above table, it can be observed that there is relative amelioration in 
recent years; however, Turkey still suffers from a middle level, if not a high level, of 
income inequality. The distribution of wealth, which is technically different from 
distribution of income, is probably in a worse condition in Turkey.  
Besides the distribution of income among individuals, it should also be mentioned 
that there is also a regional disparity in terms of distribution of income. 
 
Region 
 
Household Rate (%) Income Rate (%) 
Aegean-Marmara 42.3 52.5 
Mediterranean 12.5 11.0 
Interior Anatolia 7.9 15.4 
Black Sea 12.8 10.9 
East Anatolia 14.5 10.2 
 
  Table 2:  Income Distribution according to Regions of Turkey (1994) 226 
 
It can be seen in the above table that Aegean, Marmara, and Interior Anatolia receive 
more wealth in comparison to their population, whereas Mediterranean, Black Sea, and 
East Anatolia receive less wealth in comparison to their relative population. It can be 
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seen that among the regions, the worst off region is the East Anatolia (this issue is 
mentioned in Chapter 7). 
It can be argued that a relatively high economic gap between the regions in 
Turkey as well as the rich and poor individuals in Turkey create problems in terms of 
democratic citizenship and a possible democratic consolidation in this country. It should 
be acknowledged that most wealth and capital is owned by a relatively small minority in 
Turkey, which leads to a very disproportionate distribution of power in society. Those 
who have more resources can influence and manipulate the social and democratic 
processes in unjust and undemocratic ways (especially through mass media).  
It seems that the only way an egalitarian and substantially democratic citizenship 
can possibly be secured, would be through a better and much more widespread ownership 
of property and capital. Such widespread ownership is getting much more difficult under 
conditions of neo-liberalism; some might even argue it is becoming more utopian. 
However, defenders of economic egalitarianism today have no other choice but to put all 
their efforts into a more just distribution of the means of production and capital (real and 
human capital) in order to create a more humane and democratic society. In this regard, 
Rawls’ notions of ‘justice as fairness’ and ‘property-owning democracy’ are crucial in 
terms of securing the popular basis of democracy, globally and nationally. 
The next section is devoted to a discussion of how Rawls’ justice as fairness can 
be relevant to the Turkish economy and the formation of an overlapping consensus in this 
country on the issue of social justice. 
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5.4 Justice as Fairness and Turkish Democracy 
It can be argued that Rawls’ distributive justice has much relevance to Turkey and 
Turkish democracy. Rawls’ theoretical devices of representation, such as the veil of 
ignorance and the two principles of justice have strong moral and political relevance for 
Turkey, which, as a country, suffers from an unjust distribution of wealth. In this regard, 
Rawls’ theoretical devices can be useful to reflect upon social justice in Turkey, as well 
as thinking about a possible social contract in Turkey. It can be argued that the Turkish 
public culture is not devoid of resources that would make Rawlsian justice 
comprehensible and appealing to Turkish citizens. Especially the considered judgments 
of Turkish citizens on social justice and social state can be crucial references.227 
As to the recent situation of the ‘social state’ in Turkey, it should be noted that the 
social state and public social expenditure is generally on decline in Turkey when 
compared to past decades, which can be seen in the table below. 
       
1975    22,90% 
1980 17.83 
1985 13.57 
1990 25.25 
1995 13.98 
2000 12.32 
2001 13.40 
                              
Table 3: Public Social Expenditure in Turkey and Its Relative Share in the Consolidated 
Budget 228 
 
 
It is noted by Özdemir (2001) that although public social expenditure is increasing 
in many countries, especially continental Europe, it decreased approximately 10 percent 
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during 1975-2001 in Turkey, which is problematic in terms of the condition of the social 
state in Turkey. A general fact that needs to be acknowledged is that the state in Turkey 
has never actually been a fully developed ‘social state’ in the western sense; however, it 
has come to compensate, if only partially, the disadvantaged people’s economic and 
social conditions up to recent years. Having been influenced by the global trends of 
minimizing the state and cutting the public expenditures, the social state is becoming 
minimized in Turkey. Nowadays, it is observed that family, civil society, and 
municipalities are carrying out certain charity activities. However, it should be noted that 
charity and causal aids cannot substitute a rights-based and reciprocal notion of welfare 
for all citizens based on republican equality. 
As to the possible sources of an overlapping consensus on social justice in 
Turkey, one can argue that an overlapping consensus on social justice in Turkey can be 
grounded on the already existing values of the Turkish citizens concerning republican 
equality, social justice, and social state. The political parties and groups in Turkey can 
refer and appeal to these embedded values in order to form an overlapping consensus on 
social justice in Turkey.  
In relation to the issue of welfare state versus property-owning democracy, it can 
be argued that a property-owning democracy would be more egalitarian than a welfare 
state. However, one can see that Turkey has not been able to erect even a full welfare 
state yet. Therefore, from a realistic point of view, certain welfare programs might be 
initially and temporarily welcome towards a more egalitarian and property-owning 
democracy in Turkey. Policies for a more property-owning democracy such as 
progressive taxation, founding new cooperatives, investment trusts and the like need to be 
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made more prevalent everywhere in order to gradually strengthen the basis of property-
ownership in Turkey, which can increase the legitimacy of the democracy in Turkey in 
the eyes of the citizens and serve to the democratic consolidation in Turkey.  
The next chapter discusses another very crucial issue in contemporary Turkey, 
which is the issue of secularism and a possible overlapping consensus on this issue. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS ON 
THE ISSUE OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
“How is it possible that there can 
be a stable and just society whose 
free and equal citizens are deeply 
divided by conflicting and even 
incommensurable religious, 
philosophical, and moral 
doctrines?” 
 
 John Rawls,  
Political Liberalism, p.133 
 
 
 
6.1 Historical Background of the Secularism Issue in Turkey  
Secularism is one of the most controversial and sensitive issues in Turkish politics, and 
there is a lot of tension around this issue. The roots of the tension can be found in the fact 
that the Ottoman Empire, which was the predecessor of the Turkish Republic, was a state 
based on religion and that the political elite in Turkey have a fear of returning to what 
they perceive as theocracy. 
The Turkish Republic, which was founded after the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire, has produced a discourse that suggests a rupture from the former regime. This 
discourse situated the Ottoman State Empire as the categorical ‘other’ and has seen all 
references to Islam as a potential reference to the ancient regime. This is why today 
religion is a politically thorny and sensitive issue in Turkey. Religion in Turkey is never 
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seen only as a cultural or religious issue, but a potentially political issue. That is why 
otherwise a simple issue such as the headscarf issue turns into symbolic warfare amongst 
cultural camps that have opposing views on the role of religion in society and state.  
The political rivalry and conflict in today’s Turkey is between secularists and 
religious conservatives. While the religious conservatives favor a more direct role for 
religion in the state-society relations, most secularists, following the positivist legacy, see 
religion as an old-fashioned institution that is to be surpassed by modernity. The conflict 
between tradition and modernity can be observed as the underlying problematic behind 
the daily debates on the issue of secularism in contemporary Turkey.  
Despite the fact that the Turkish Republic defined the Ottoman Empire as 
reactionary, it did not hesitate to continue certain features of the Ottoman system such as 
promoting a state-controlled religion. In order to better understand the continuities and 
ruptures, it is necessary to examine the relations between state and religion in the 
Ottoman State. 
The Ottoman State was a Sunni state. That is to say, Sunni Islam was the official 
religion of the state, and the jurisprudence was practiced with reference to Islamic law 
(sharia) and the Şeyhülislam (head of the judiciary) had the jurisdiction over the courts in 
the Ottoman State structure and had the authority over the application of Islamic law 
(sharia)229 as well as the juridical supervision and approval of sultan’s policies through 
fetwas (legal interpretation).230  
All these being technically true, however, from a broader and political 
perspective, it needs to be noted that the office of the Şeyhülislam was under the control 
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of the Sultan, and did not have much autonomy. The Ottoman sultans had the power to 
remove the Şeyhülislam from his post if the Seyhulislam had a major disagreement with 
the Sultan and his policies. 
It could be argued that the religious authority in the Ottoman Empire was state-
controlled and did not have autonomous power to challenge the secular authority. In this 
regard, it is argued by Erdoğan (1996) that the Ottoman State was a “caesaro-papist” 
state.231 Another practical issue that had resemblance with secularism was that Sultans 
had a right to make secular laws when it was necessary (Örf-i Sultani, sovereign 
prerogatives).232 Daver pointed out that in certain periods there existed some laws in the 
penal code and inheritance laws in the Ottoman Empire that were against the basic 
principles of Islamic law.233 
It is argued by Karpat that the structure of the Ottoman State was generally 
conducive to the development of secularism over the centuries.234 It should be noted that, 
despite the general superiority of Islam within the Ottoman Empire, there was a pluralist 
system of jurisprudence within the Ottoman State. While the Muslims were subject to the 
rules of the Islamic Sharia, the Jews and Christians were subject to their own religious 
and communal laws. This communal system based on religious creed was called the 
“millet” system, and it continued up until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.235  
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Despite the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the religious authority, Islam 
as a religion was quite influential in the daily lives of the Ottomans and it retained its 
justificatory power for many centuries. However, the rise of the West and modernity 
caused changes in the relative power of tradition and religion within the Ottoman Empire.  
As the West gained superiority over the Ottomans in the wars after the 17th and 
18th century, the Ottomans started to modernize their army, bureaucracy, and education 
system. Within time, the reforms started to permeate the social and cultural life as well, 
which ended up by further secularization, especially among the elites.236  
Following the 1839 Tanzimat (Re-organization) Decree, the reforms became more 
and more comprehensive and they started to significantly change the political and social 
structure of the Ottoman Empire. During the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), the courts as 
well as the schools within the Ottoman State became dualist in nature, that is to say some 
continued the traditional and religion-based system while others functioned in a secular 
way.237 
 The duality between religious and secular institutions came to an end in favor of 
secularism in the Kemalist era, during which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the 
Turkish Republic, put radical secularist reforms into practice. The table below shows a 
chronology of Ataturk’s secularist reforms during 1922-1938. 238   
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Year Secularist Reforms in Turkey during 1923-1938  
1922 
 
Sultanate abolished (November 1). 
 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne (July 24). Republic of Turkey with capital at Ankara proclaimed (October 29). 
1924 
Caliphate abolished (March 3). 
Traditional religious schools closed, sharia courts abolished. Constitution 
adopted (April 20). 
1925 
Dervish brotherhoods outlawed. 
Fez outlawed by the Hat Law (November 25). Veiling of women discouraged; 
Western clothing for men and women encouraged. 
Western (Gregorian) calendar adopted. 
1926 
New civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models adopted. 
New civil code ended Islamic polygamy and divorce by renunciation and 
introduced civil marriage. 
Millet system ended. 
1928 New Turkish alphabet (modified Latin form) adopted. Constitutional provision 
establishing Islam as official religion deleted. 
1933 Islamic call to worship and public readings of the Quran required to be in Turkish rather than Arabic. 
1934 Women given the vote and the right to be elected to Parliament Law of Surnames adopted. 
1935 Sunday adopted as legal weekly holiday. 
1937     State declared secular (April 10) 
 
The above-mentioned reforms in the 1920s and 1930s caused some popular 
discontent among the religious periphery, which launched some religious rebellions such 
as the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Menemen Rebellion.239 However, the periphery’s 
reaction to radical secularization reforms were mostly silent and the religious discontent 
of the periphery was not represented at a political level up until Turkey made a transition 
to multi-party politics in 1946.  
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 After 1946, the DP (Democratic Party) as the opposition party to the CHP 
(Republican People’s Party) started to voice the popular discontent of the periphery on 
religious issues and sided with a more permissive version of secularism. Some religious 
groups such as the Nakşibendis, Nurcus, and Süleymancis increased their visibility in this 
period, and they supported the DP and were content with the more tolerant version of 
secularism that the DP represented, as opposed to the RPP’s more radical version of 
secularism.240 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the rise of a distinctive Islamist movement in 
Turkey. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the polarization between the political right 
and left was in its height, the religious right distinguished itself from conservative right-
wing parties such as the AP and emerged as an independent and radical political 
movement through MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi, National Order Party). 
The MNP was founded in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan, an Islamist engineer. The 
MNP under Erbakan’s leadership tried to play, as much as possible, within the rules of 
the secular system in order not to be banned. However, the political elite were not content 
with this party’s radicalizing discourse, and as a result in 1971, the Constitutional Court 
closed down this party for carrying out anti-secular activities. Soon, this party was 
replaced by the MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi, National Salvation Party).  
The grassroots of the MSP, like that of the MNP, were provincial shopkeepers, 
merchants, workers, and traditionalist people in the periphery who were mainly excluded 
from decision making mechanisms.241 The ideological discourse of the MSP revolved 
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around issues such as moral and Islamic values, social justice, anti-imperialism, and anti-
Westernism. This party joined a few times in the coalition governments during the 1970s, 
however after the 1980 coup, this party, together with other political parties, were closed 
down. 
The 1980 coup d’etat caused radical socio-political changes in the country. The 
generals of the coup favored people’s socialization into Turkish nationalism and a 
moderate form of Islam as an anti-dote to radical left. Their support of a peculiar 
synthesis between Turkish nationalism and Islam has been since called ‘Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis.’242 During the 1980s which were the heydays of the Turkish-Islam synthesis, 
many mosques, Quran courses, and religious centers were opened by civil society in 
Turkey. 
The economic and social policies of Turgut Özal as the prime minister during 
1983-1991, strengthened the basis of religiously oriented capital and led to the emergence 
of a religious middle class. During the 1990s, the power basis of religious groups and the 
RP (Welfare Party) continued to increase. In the 1995 election, the RP, to the surprise of 
many, received 21.4% of the votes and became the ruling party with its coalition partner, 
the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi: True Path Party).  
The RP’s rise to power was perceived as a threat by the Turkish military and the 
secularist parties. As RP continued to carry out religiously oriented policies in the public 
arena, the military launched a memorandum to this party during the monthly NSC 
(National Security Council) meeting on February 28, 1997. 243 
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The NSC put the government in a position to observe a list of reforms such as the 
8-year primary education (which was 5 years before), as well as some other social and 
political reforms, most of which pertained to the issue of secularism. It could be argued 
that this memorandum was put forth by the military as a precaution, in their view, to stop 
the Islamization of the state and society. Some secularist civil society organizations, trade 
unions, and newspapers supported the 28 February process, while more conservative and 
liberal organizations protested it. 
The military forced Erbakan either to implement the reforms or resign, and 
eventually Erbakan had to resign on June 30, 1997. Later, on January 1998, the 
Constitutional Court closed down the RP arguing that it violated the constitutional 
separation between state and religion.244 After this closure, the RP was replaced by FP 
(Fazilet Partisi: Virtue Party), being founded by the former RP members. However, this 
party, too, was closed down by the Constitutional Court for the same reasons that led to 
the closure of its predecessor, the RP. 
The FP was soon replaced by two new parties, the SP (Saadet Partisi: Felicity 
Party) which appealed to the hardliners within the VP and which continued the Islamist 
discourses of Erbakan’s National Outlook tradition, and on the other hand the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party) which gave up the 
radicalism of National Outlook and instead became a conservative party leaning towards 
center-right following the path of the DP and ANAP.   
The AKP was founded in 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
This party went through a comprehensive ideological change from Islamism to center-
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right conservatism, and won the 2002 election by receiving 34.2% of the votes. This 
unexpected success of the AKP, as the offshoot of an Islamist party, caused a lot of 
controversy among the public, as to whether this party still pursued political Islam like its 
predecessors, or had shifted to the center as it claims to have done. 
Some argued that the AKP has sincerely and genuinely changed and turned into a 
more centrist party, while others kept a more skeptical attitude and argued that the AKP 
is still the inheritor of Erbakan’s National Outlook and is therefore a threat to the secular 
foundations of Turkey.  The skeptics considered the changing discourse of the AKP not 
as a real change of heart but as merely ‘takiyye,’ implying that the AKP keeps a hidden 
(Islamist) agenda. The skeptics also argue that the AKP’s interest in the EU is only 
instrumental and opportunistic.245  
In response to such skeptical arguments, the AKP leadership stated that they have 
re-evaluated their position after the February 28 process and have adopted a new centrist-
democratic outlook. Erdogan argued that they took lessons from the past and “took off 
the national outlook shirt” (read political Islam) and have become ‘conservative 
democrats.’246  This claim was not devoid of empirical basis considering that the 34% 
votes the AKP received in the 2002 election came not only from religiously oriented 
voters but also from center-right and other centrist voters.247 
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After the 2002 election, the AKP found itself in a position to clarify its ideology.  
In fact, it took quite some time for the AKP to do this. In January 2003, it was announced 
by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in an international symposium on conservatism and 
democracy in Ankara, that the AKP is a “conservative democrat party.”248 The 
ideological parameters of AKP’s conservative democracy are theorized by a conservative 
academic, Yalçın Akdoğan.249 
Conservative democracy provided the AKP a chance to present itself as a 
moderate and centrist party. In the next days, the AKP administration stressed it more and 
more in the public that the AKP is the party of all Turkish people and not only of a 
certain faction or a marginal outlook.250 This emphasis was made against the background 
of the Felicity Party, which continued the Islamist discourse after the February 28 process 
and blamed the AKP for betraying its religious origins and selling out the country to the 
IMF, EU, and the West.  
The AKP, it seems, has not cared much about such criticisms coming from the SP 
and distanced itself more and more from Erbakan’s Islamist and anti-Western discourses, 
and has become more of a moderate conservative party with strong emphasis on the 
market economy and EU membership.  
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6.2 Two Basic Issues of Turkish Secularism: The Role of Religion in the State, and 
the Headscarf Issue 
 
6.2.1 Surveys in Turkey on the Role of Religion in the State 
In surveys, the proportion of the people in Turkey who prefer a government based on 
religion shows changes over the years. In the 1990s, the proportion of people favoring a 
government based on religion were significantly higher, however it relatively decreased 
in the 2000s. According to a survey done by TÜSES in 1996, 26.7% of the respondents 
preferred a government based on Islamic law (sharia), on the other hand, 58.1% were 
against a government based on sharia, and 15.2% were undecided or had no opinion. In a 
later survey done by the same research organization in 1998, pro-sharia respondents fell 
to 19.8%, while 59.9% were against and 20.2% were undecided or had no opinin. And in 
year 2002, the percentage of pro-sharia respondents was only 9.9%, while those against 
were 60.7%, and the undecided ones were 29.4%.251 Concerning these numbers, Özbudun 
notes: 
Interestingly, the sharp fall in the percentage of pro-sharia voters did not 
correspond to a similar rise among anti-sharia voters, but there was a substantial 
rise in the undecided/no opinion category. This may be due to the confusion 
resulting from the closure of the RP and FP by the Constitutional Court, and to the 
changing attitude of the AKP with regard to religion. Also it may be argued that 
not all pro-sharia voters may necessarily favor the literal application of all sharia 
rules.252 
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It should be noted that despite the relative decline of the proportion of people who 
want a religion-based state in Turkey in recent years, the proportion of people preferring 
a religion-based state along with undecided respondents is still high compared to the ratio 
of people who prefer a religion-based state in the consolidated Western democracies. In 
this regard, the AKP’s role in including the religious conservatives to the democratic 
system is quite crucial. As much as the AKP becomes a center-leaning party and 
internalizes the tenets of secularism and democracy, the religious electorate voting for 
this party might have a chance to become increasingly more loyal to the democratic and 
secular regime. In this regard, it is crucial that Erdoğan in various occasions states that 
his party accepts secularism as a basic principle. 
Concerning the relationship between state and religion, Erdogan states his party’s 
position as such: 
The AK Party attributes importance to religion as a social value, but does not 
consider conducting politics on the basis of religion, transforming the state from 
an ideological point of view or organizing the society on the basis of religious 
symbols as a right strategy.253 
 
Concerning his party’s attitude vis-à-vis believers of different religions, Erdoğan said: 
The AK Party believes that an approach that distinguishes between “us and them” 
and that attributes supremacy to a single religious denomination, ethnic group or 
religious point of view, is discriminatory and exclusive. The AK Party defines 
“secularism” as an approach according to which the state is neutral towards all 
religions and thoughts and all faiths, denominations and perceptions can live in an 
atmosphere free of conflict. Secularity should be seen as a way of keeping the 
plurality of society within a peaceful and free environment, devoid of conflicts or 
tensions.254 
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These statements denote a positive development for Turkish democracy taking into 
consideration the anti-secular attitude of Erdogan’s predecessors (and himself during the 
RP period).  Provided that Erdogan continues his emphasis on his party’s full allegiance 
to secularism, there would no doubt be more space and hope for an overlapping 
consensus in Turkey on the issue of secularism. 
An important point that should be emphasized is that the AKP, as the de-facto 
representative of the religious and conservative people in this country, is in a position to 
continue stating that they unconditionally reject fundamentalism or a religious-based state 
and fully adopt a secular state and constitution, in which they want to have basic 
freedoms including freedom of conscience.255 Such a continuous and un-ambiguous 
emphasis would be very critical to build a genuine dialogue between the secularists and 
the religiously oriented people in this country. As part of such a dialogic relationship, all 
allegations of ‘takiyye’ need to be put aside by either the CHP or other political 
organizations, since that would harm the inter-group trust that is necessary for building a 
consensus on the issues of secularism.  
 
6.2.2 The Headscarf Issue 
The headscarf issue is probably the most visible issue of secularism in Turkey and is one 
of the most divisive issues in Turkey being a symbolic area of conflict between 
secularists and the religious conservatives. The headscarf issue first appeared when some 
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students with headscarves entered the Turkish universities in the early 1980s.256 YÖK 
(Council of Higher Education in Turkey) banned the use of the headscarf in the 
universities in 1987. However, in 1989, the ANAP passed a law that would enable the 
university students to wear the Islamic headscarf, which the Constitutional Court 
annulled arguing that it was against the principle of secularism.  
Despite the official ban, there was relative freedom for the headscarf in the 1990s. 
However, starting from 2001, the headscarf ban has started to be applied more strictly, 
and this has caused some social and political tension within Turkey. Recently, the MHP 
(Nationalist Action Party) proposed to the AKP that they work together to make the 
necessary legal changes in order to lift the headscarf ban in the universities. Eventually 
the AKP and MHP came to an agreement to solve the issue. On 6 and 9 February 2008, 
the AKP with the support of the MHP and DTP parliamentarians made constitutional 
amendments in Articles 10 and 42 to allow for the wearing of the headscarf in the 
universities. As a response to this, on 27 February 2008, 118 MPs from the CHP and DSP 
applied to the Constitutional Court in order to file a case against these constitutional 
amendments. The Constitutional Court accepted the file on 6 March 2008. 
On 16 May 2008, the reporter of the Constitutional Court, regarding the 
amendments to Articles 10 and 42, stated in his report that the Constitutional Court is 
authorized to conduct only ‘procedural review’ and not ‘review of content.’ Despite this 
clear report, the Constitutional Court on 5 June 2008 decided to nullify the constitutional 
amendments allowing the headscarf and sided with the continuation of the headscarf ban 
in the universities. 
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The Constitutional Court argued that the headscarf in the universities is against 
the principle of secularism, which is an unalterable article of the constitution. In fact, it 
can be argued that the headscarf is not against secularism as applied in more liberal 
democratic countries, but it could possibly be against a particular (authoritarian) 
interpretation of secularism. In fact, it should be pointed that there is nothing within the 
text of the Constitution that would prevent allowing the headscarf; however, the 
Constitutional Court offers an illiberal interpretation of the secularism principle in the 
constitution and chooses to ban it, which is apparently against the civil liberties.257  
Related to this issue, many jurists in Turkey including Ergun Özbudun, have 
stated their conviction that the Constitutional Court, in annulling the mentioned 
amendments on headscarf, went against its limited and well-defined duty, and chose to 
review the content of the amendment rather than its procedure, which was against the 
Constitution.258  
Another controversial issue is that the Constitutional Court traditionally makes a 
distinction between public and private. The Court argues that the headscarf could be used 
in private places but not in public places such as universities. However, the distinction 
between public and private is controversial. In fact, if all places that are open to public 
are viewed as ‘public’ places as the argument goes, then why is not there any constraints 
on dressing codes in places such as hospitals and restaurants that are also apparently 
public places? This question remains to be answered. On the other hand, if a ‘public’ 
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place means an ‘official’ building, then why is not there a ban on headscarf, say in the 
courts, which are apparently official buildings. These questions remain to be answered. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Possibility of an Overlapping Consensus on the Headscarf Issue in 
Turkey 
If the headscarf issue is perceived as a ‘non-just’ practice by a significant number of 
citizens in this country, then it would not be possible to talk of an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ in this country on this issue. It should be admitted that the headscarf issue is 
primarily not a legal issue but a matter of social consensus. In this regard, it is a matter of 
mutual trust and understanding among the religious and the secular people. 
As such, religious people in Turkey are in a position to emphasize, without any 
ambiguity, that they want freedom for religious practices, not because they want a 
religion-based state but simply because they want to practice their religious beliefs freely 
in accordance with the basic rights and liberties. Put differently, religious people are in a 
position to make it clear, by word and deed that they are practicing Muslims and not anti-
secular people in their legal commitments. Such clarity would be crucial for inter-group 
trust in Turkey among the religious and secular people. 
      
6.3 A Rawlsian Perspective on Secularism in Turkey: The Possibility of an 
Overlapping Consensus 
In this part, the relevance of Rawlsian concepts for the issue of secularism in Turkey is 
mentioned, and the conditions of an overlapping consensus on religious issues is 
discussed. It would be reasonable to start the discussion with the original position, which 
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enables persons to reflect upon religion and religious issues in an ‘as objective and just as 
possible’ way. 
 
6.3.1 Original Position 
As formulated by Rawls, in the original position, no one would know what his religious 
background would be; whether he would be a Muslim, a Christian, a Jew, a Buddhist, an 
agnostic, an atheist, or whatever. Under such a veil of ignorance, citizens would be in a 
position to decide for themselves how the basic structure of the society should be 
arranged in terms of the role of religion in the state and society.  
It can be assumed that rational citizens who go under the veil of ignorance would 
come up with a tolerant and pluralist attitude about religion. Most people would come up 
with something similar to the liberty principle, 
 a-) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all. 
 
A person who would genuinely go under the veil of ignorance would realize the fact that 
one could have been in another’s position, and that person could have been in his 
position. For example, a Sunni appreciates the fact that coming from a different family, 
he could have been an Alewite; and an Alewite appreciates the fact that he could have 
been a Sunni… Such an understanding would bring mutual understanding, respect, and 
toleration. However, toleration would not mean the acceptance of the truth claims of 
each and every group (see the burdens of judgement below), but rather it would mean 
equal respect for everyone.  
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6.3.2 Burdens of Judgment 
 It needs to be admitted that religion by nature is a difficult and controversial issue and 
it’s not really possible for anyone to “prove” or “disprove” any religion, or even any 
statement that has the form of a “belief.” The existence of inherent difficulties in proving 
the truth-ness of religious or moral statements is called by Rawls as “the burdens of 
judgment.” Rawls notes that burdens of judgment include such factors as the following: 
The evidence bearing on the case is complex and conflicting; the weight to be 
attached to any give peace of evidence is contestable; our concepts are vague and 
subject to hard cases; and our judgments are imponderably but decisively and 
differently influenced by the whole course of our individual moral experience.”259  
 
In religious or moral matters, arguments may always be put forth by “owners” of a 
particular belief in order to support their belief, but those arguments will never be fully 
compelling to others having different backgrounds and experiences. Admitting this as a 
fact of the human condition, citizens need to respect other citizens’ divergent religious 
convictions without suspecting their good intention or their full capacity to reasoning.260  
It can be said that someone by reflecting upon the burdens of judgment would 
most probably become more open-minded and tolerant in religious and philosophical 
matters and would likely never force anyone to his own beliefs. Here, an important matter 
should be explained, which is, someone’s admitting the burdens of judgment and 
tolerating others would not mean that he would become indifferent to truth claims or that 
he would become an agnostic. This would not need to be the case. He could continue to 
believe in the “truth” of certain beliefs and the falsity of other beliefs, yet tolerate the 
                                                  
259
 Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.56-57 (slightly 
paraphrased by Mulhall and Swift in Mulhall, Stephen and Swift, Adam. 1996. Liberals and 
Communitarians (2nd edition). Oxford: Blackwell, p.177.  
260
 It can be observed that there are many reasonable and sincere people among different faiths, and that 
they all have their own personal reasons and justifications for believing in whatever they believe.  
 144 
owners of the beliefs that he believes to be false due to the burdens of judgment.261 He 
would recognize that it would be unreasonable to suppress and force others to his own 
beliefs. He would just tolerate their existence.262 This is probably the real meaning of 
religious toleration, which went hand in hand with liberalism in the Western countries 
during the 17th century and afterwards. Taking into consideration religious pluralism in 
Turkey, toleration is quite crucial and necessary.  
 
6.3.3 Religious Pluralism in Turkey and the Issue of Toleration 
In Turkey, a great majority of the people are Muslims (about 99%), however there is still 
an inter-Muslim and inter-religious plurality in this country (Some of the religious 
denominations in Turkey are Sunni, Alewite, Jew, Catholic, Protestant, Süryani, 
Orthodox, Gregorian, Bahai, etc.).263 There are irreconcilable doctrinal differences among 
these groups, and it seems that without suppression it is quite unlikely that these 
differences will disappear in the near future. Most probably, they will persist over time 
(‘the fact of pluralism’). In this regard, Turkish people are in a position to live peacefully 
with other faiths without trying to suppress them. 
It can be argued that in terms of religious doctrine, toleration could possibly be 
justified in various ways from within the structure of the existing comprehensive 
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doctrines in Turkey. Muslims can possibly justify it with reference to the Muslim 
principle “there is no coercion in religion,” and other religious groups can possibly justify 
it with reference to their own religious or communal values. Plural and possibly divergent 
ways of justifying religious pluralism from within different comprehensive doctrines 
would eventually serve the sustenance of peaceful religious co-existence in Turkey. 
A genuine religious tolerance and peace in Turkey would only be possible if both 
religious and the non-religious people view each other with trust. Without trust, peaceful 
interaction would be impossible. Inter-personal and inter-group trust is extremely 
important for a consensual politics to emerge in a country. Although there is some 
relative improvement on this issue in recent years, “trust,” which is an important 
component of social and political capital, is still relatively lacking among the social 
groups in Turkey.264 This is a critical issue in terms of the formation of constitutional 
consensus as well as an overlapping consensus in Turkey. 
 
6.3.4 The Issue of Neutrality of the State in Turkey 
It is stated in the Turkish Constitution that the Turkish state is a secular state and that the 
state and religion are separate. However, in practice, the state and the religion are not 
separate, but officially linked through the Religious Directorate of Turkey (Diyanet Đşleri 
Başkanlığı), which is organizationally under the Prime Ministry. This Directorate is held 
responsible for providing religious services to Muslims. The mosques in Turkey are 
under the control of the Directorate, and all Friday sermons are prepared and distributed 
by this religious body. As such, it can be argued that religion in Turkey is under the 
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control of the state. The Religious Directorate provides services to Sunni Muslims, yet 
does not provide services to the Alewite Muslims who comprise about one fifth of the 
population in Turkey who pay taxes as citizens. The Directorate does not provide support 
to the Alewites’ places of worship (cemevleri), which is apparently discriminatory.  
In terms of the relations between state and religion, the Turkish state is in no way 
neutral in religious matters. The existence of an institution such as the Religious 
Directorate under the state’s official structure is against the neutrality of the state in 
religious matters. Therefore, for the sake of neutrality of the state vis-à-vis religious 
groups, the Religious Directorate in Turkey should be either abolished or made an 
autonomous institution, and the religious issues should be left to the initiative of the civil 
society as in many democratic countries. The state could supervise the religious 
organizations; however, the state has to refrain from providing religious services to the 
citizens, which is, by nature of secularism the job of the citizens themselves. 
In terms of the relations between state and religion, the compulsory religion 
course in the Turkish schools is another issue that needs to be addressed. The religion 
course in Turkey teaches religion from the point of view of a particular branch of Islam, 
that of Sunni Islam. Considering that there are non-Sunni Muslims and also non-religious 
people in Turkey, the religion course in schools needs to be an elective one, and teach 
both Sunni and Alewite versions of Islam. This would in fact be more harmonious with 
the secularism principle in the Constitution and neutrality of the state vis-à-vis different 
religious groups.  
The elective course on religion might be structured in such a way that it informs 
the students about their own faith as well as other major faiths. Such pluralism in 
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curriculum might better equip the students in today’s global world. It is a fact that in 
today’s world, global interactions and inter-faith relations are increasing and becoming 
part of many people’s daily lives; probably more so than it was before. Therefore, an 
informative, objective, and up-to-date knowledge of world religions and cultures for 
today’s global citizens is much more relevant and necessary than it has ever been.  
In this regard, an elective religion course might teach students the basics of Islam 
and Islamic culture, and other major faiths in the world belonging to Abrahamic, 
Dharmic, and indigenous traditions by using correct and up-to-date information with 
qualified pictures and illustrations. Such a course could possibly provide a good basis for 
students to understand other people’s lives and beliefs. 
As to the relative weight of religions within the curriculum, the content of the 
classes shall reasonably give more space and importance to Islam considering that the 
great majority of the people in Turkey are Muslims. As the course would be an elective 
one, those who are not interested in the course would have an option not to take it. On the 
other hand, the students who are interested would have a chance to acquire the basic 
knowledge of Islam as well as other major religions in the world. 
To conclude, it can be argued that a liberal, mutually tolerating, and balanced 
approach in religious matters could provide a peaceful atmosphere on religious matters. It 
is a fact that today certain religion-based issues in Turkey, such as the headscarf ban and 
the disadvantaged status of the religious minorities, are perceived by many citizens in 
Turkey as unfair. Therefore, seeking democratic, egalitarian, and libertarian solutions to 
religious issues would be critically important in terms of forming an overlapping 
consensus on the issue of secularism in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS  
ON THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
7.1 The Political Background of the Kurdish Issue 
The Kurdish issue is one of the major issues of contemporary Turkish democracy, and it 
can reasonably be argued that without having an (overlapping) consensus on this issue, it 
would simply not be possible to talk of a democratic consolidation in Turkey. Therefore, 
it is critically important to reflect upon this issue with empirical and theoretical rigor and 
discuss how Turkey can reach a political consensus on this issue. In fact, many authors so 
far have written on the Kurdish issue and made their unique contributions concerning 
dfferent dimensions of the issue.265  
The Kurdish issue is a multi-faceted issue with ethnic, cultural, political, 
militaristic and international dimensions. However, this chapter does not aim to cover all 
of these dimensions, but only to discuss the issue in terms of the possibility of forming a 
democratic consensus with reference to Rawlsian political liberalism. It is argued in this 
chapter that the Kurds in Turkey have certain fundamental problems such as cultural 
recognition and that many Kurds are discontented as citizens. It can be argued that 
without their discontent being addressed and resolved, it would be impossible to talk of 
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the legitimacy of Turkish democracy, considering that there are about 15 million Kurds 
living in contemporary Turkey, who comprise about 20% of Turkey’s population.266  
Most of the Kurds today live under six nation-states. The states they are dispersed 
are Turkey (in which the most number of Kurds in the world live), Iraq, Iran, Syria, 
Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Kurds are generally considered to be ‘an ethnic group without 
a state.’ Ciment noted “since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Kurds have become the 
largest ethnic group in the world that occupies a geographically compact area and has no 
nation-state of its own.”267 The Kurds carried out various armed struggles against the 
nation-states where they live in order to gain full independence or partial autonomy. 
Although the Kurds today do not have an independent nation-state, they have a Kurdish 
autonomous region in the North Iraq, which became de facto independent in November 
1991 and was recognized as an autonomous region by Transitional Administrative Law in 
post-Saddam Iraq on January 30, 2005.268 This region today enjoys some political and 
cultural autonomy within the nation-state of Iraq. In order to render the ethnic dimension 
of the Kurdish issue more comprehensible for readers, some basic information on the 
Kurds as a people in history and their current situation in the Middle East is given below. 
The historians note that the Kurds as a people are of Mesopotamian origin and 
they have been living in the Mesopotamian region for thousands of years.269 They speak 
an Indo-European language called Kurdish, which has three major dialects: Kurmanji, 
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Sorani, and Gorani.270 For many centuries, the Kurds lived under small principalities 
(beylik) and sheikdoms in the Middle East. Between the 16th and 19th centuries, they 
lived in the Ottoman Empire and Persia without having any major political problems. In 
the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were considered  to be part of the nation of Islam 
(ummah) along with Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Bosnians, and the other Muslim subjects. 
However, with the rise of nationalism, the Kurds started to strive for nationhood and 
launched struggles for an independent nation-state. 
Historically, the Kurds started to show the first signs of ethnic consciousness 
during the 19th century, yet they stayed loyal to the Ottoman Empire due to the common 
bond of Islam between the Turks and the Kurds. After World War I however, the Kurds 
started to vying for nationhood and started to struggle for an independent nation-state.271 
During the Turkish War of Independence (1920-1923), Atatürk somehow succeeded to 
gain the support of the Kurds through diplomacy; however, after the War of 
Independence was won, the alliance with the Kurds lost some of its ground due to the 
rising ethnic Turkish (and Kurdish) nationalisms in the late 1920s and 1930s.272 
It can be argued that the historical shift  in Turkey towards ethnic Turkish 
nationalism, which needs to be differentaited from civic nationalism, caused the general 
resentment of the Kurdish people and led them to believe that they are somehow 
discriminated against on an ethnic basis and not recognized as an equal group within the 
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state’s moral constituency.273 Based on such a perception of discrimination and a 
resultant resentment, Kurds launched various revolts against the Turkish state, which 
sometimes displayed also some Islamic dimensions as in the case of the Sheikh Said 
Rebellion. Some information on the Kurdish rebellions is presented below. 
There have been many Kurdish revolts in Turkey such as the Koçkiri Rebellion 
(1920), Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), Shaikh Abdurrahman Rebellion (1927), the Ağrı 
(Ararat) Rebellion (1927-1930), and the Dersim Rebellion (1937). Among these, the 
militarily and politically most critical ones have been the Sheikh Said, Mount Ararat, and 
the Dersim rebellions. It can be argued that the PKK insurgency could be considered the 
most recent revolt.274 Following is some basic information about these revolts. 
Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925) was organized by the Azadi Kurdish organization 
which aimed for Kurdish independence and was led by the Zaza cleric Sheikh Said Piran, 
who had convinced the Hamidiye commanders to fight for Kurdish independence and 
who had the support of Britain. Said had 10,000-15,000 troops and the Turkish state 
quelled the rebellion with 50,000 soldiers being able to suppress it with success towards 
the end of March 1925. 275  
The Mount Ararat Rebellion took place in 1927 during which some Kurds 
declared independence under the leadership of Ihsan Nuri Pasha. The rebels designated a 
village near Mount Ararat as the capital of what they thought as Kurdistan. On June 11, 
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1930, the Turkish forces intervened in the region with 66,000 troops and 100 aircraft and 
captured the region on September 17, 1930.276 
The Dersim Rebellion (1937-1938) is another politically crucial Kurdish rebellion 
in Republican Turkey. It was led by the Dersim Alewites and headed by Seyit Riza, chief 
of the Abbasuşağı tribe.277 The Turkish military deployed 50,000 soldiers to suppress the 
revolt, and it was put down on 5 September 1937, and eventually Seyit Riza and 10 of his 
men were hanged.278 
The most recent Kurdish insurgency has been activated by the PKK (Kurdistan 
Workers Party), which is an outlawed Kurdish organization with Marxist-Leninist roots 
aiming for Kurdish autonomy. The organization is considered as a terrorist organization 
by the US, NATO, and the EU. The PKK was established in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan 
(commonly referred to as Apo).279 The PKK started its first terrorist activities in 1984 and 
today continues to bomb, kill, and kidnap civilians and soldiers. It is reported that it has 
caused the death of about 37,000 people.280 It should be noted that between 1984-1999, 
the terror activities of the PKK were quite intensive; however, between 1999-2004 the 
organization declared a cease-fire. In 2004, it restarted its terrorist activities and caused 
many killings and bombings especially in 2007 and 2008.281 Due to its declining 
reputation, the PKK changed its name into KADEK in 2002, and later into 
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KONGRAGEL in 2003. However, it should be noted that the Turkish state continues to 
use the name PKK while referring to the terrorist organization.  
In the political arena, there have been certain political parties that have 
represented the Kurdish identity and movement. Among these parties, the People’s 
Labour Party (HEP) was founded in 1990, which later changed its name into the 
Democracy Party (DEP)  in 1991. The DEP was banned in 1994 by the Constitutional 
Court for its allegedly ‘divisive’ and ‘seperatist’ policies, and it was substituted by the 
People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in 1994. Along with the HADEP, another party 
named Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) was founded in 1997 and it was also banned 
in 2003 like its predecessors.282  After the closure of DEHAP, the Democratic Society 
Party (DTP) was founded in 2005, and today still continues its political activities despite 
the fact that the Supreme Court opened a closure case against it in November 2007 and 
the suit is still pending. The underlying reason behind the lawsuit is that the DTP, like its 
predecessors, is charged with pursuing separatist activities and to have political 
connections with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).283 
With respect to the range of the attitudes among the Kurdish population in Turkey 
towards the PKK Kurds do not constitute a homogenous political entity and different 
segments of the Kurdish population seek diverse political alternatives ranging from 
gaining cultural rights through EU reforms to possibly federation, and from federation to 
secession.284 Both peaceful and violent methods are used by different Kurdish groups to 
reach their political ends. 
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Among the political alternatives that range from gaining rights through 
democratization to possibly secession, Kirişçi and Winrow argue that federation or 
secession is politically unrealistic considering that the Turkish state wants, at all costs, to 
keep its territorial integrity.285 Such alternatives are considered by the authors as 
unrealistic also due to the unstable character of the Middle East region where an 
independent Kurdish state would cause various instabilities and problems.286 In this 
regard, the most realistic and viable option seems like further democratization and 
providing more cultural rights for the Kurds, along with ameliorating the socio-economic 
conditions of the Kurdish populated areas in Turkey (East and Southeast Turkey). 
It can be argued that the Kurdish issue in Turkey cannot be solved by using only 
militaristic means. As the Turkish republican history has shown, approaching the issue 
merely from a militaristic point of view has not been able to solve the Kurdish issue or 
end the political violence.287 It seems that only a political/social consensus might possibly 
solve the problem in a long-lasting manner. Therefore, democratic politics is quite 
critical, and the pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey would have an important role. In 
this regard, the DTP being in the Turkish Parliament for the time being presents a 
democratic opportunity and this party has a political responsibility to put forth the 
Kurdish issue through democratic means. They are in a position to defend the rights and 
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liberties of the people in Turkey from within a democratic and rights-based discourse and 
to reject violence. 
In the coming part, Turkey’s nationalistic policies in relation to the Kurdish issue, 
which is a form of utilitarianism, is contrasted with a liberal position. 
 
7.2 The Utilitarian versus the Liberal Position on the Kurdish Issue 
Utilitarianism based on ethnic majoritarianism does not always take the rights of ethnic 
minorities seriously and might cause certain human rights violations, as has been the case 
in Turkey concerning the Kurds. 
       
7.2.1 The Traditional Utilitarian Approach of the Turkish State on the Kurdish 
Issue  
It can be argued that until recently, the Turkish state has had a utilitarian approach in its 
policies towards the Kurds, in the sense that it mostly has not seriously take into 
consideration the individual  rights of the Kurds as individuals, and has come to refer to a 
‘calculus of welfare’ among the majority of the population (most of whom are Turks). 
Such a calculus based on masses rather than individual rights or human rights cannot be 
considered politically legitimate from an individualist and rights-based approach, 
because utilitarianism, as Rawls put it, “does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons.”288 Not taking seriously the distinction between persons,  utilitarian approaches 
and policies might easily cause the violation of certain individual rights and liberties, 
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which is the case for the citizens of Kurdish origin living in Turkey, or of other 
minorities in Turkey. 
It is a fact that the Kurdish people in Turkey have been exposed to various human 
rights violations and discriminations.289 They were not even able to speak their mother 
tongues in public areas during 1983-1991.290 The recent EU reforms (harmonization 
packages) in Turkey changed the condition of the Kurds in Turkey for better. The 
constitutional amendments in 2002 and 2004 has enabled broadcasting in Kurdish as 
well as enabled education of the Kurdish language in private courses.     
The nationalist state ideology in Turkey has been directly influential on the 
relatively disadvantaged status of the Kurds in Turkey and the negative attitude of the 
Turkish state towards them. Although the Kemalist definition of ‘Turkishness’ has 
certain civic republican elements in it, it is not devoid of an ‘ethnic’ (Turkish) dimension 
as well. The word Turkish or Turk that is used in the Turkish political context seems to 
refer, in practice, not only to a civic factor but also to an ethnic Turkish dimension. 
Popular beliefs such as “Everyone living in Turkey is a Turk” or the motto “Türkiye 
Türklerindir” (Turkey belongs to Turks)291 can sometimes be used as mottos in favor of 
Turkish ethnic nationalism and political authoritarianism.292  
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It can be claimed that the Turkish state relies on authoritarianism in ethnic 
matters due to its strong fear of being divided, which dates back to the Sévres Treaty 
which was drafted but never implemented. This fear of division, which is generally 
called the Sévres Syndrome, is very strong among the Turkish state elites as well as the 
common Turkish people, and is one of the main factors that makes democratic openings 
in Turkey less likely. In fact, it is absolutely necessary that the psychology of fear be 
relieved in Turkey in order to reach a democratic solution on the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey. 
The Turkish state and its leaders have openly recognized the ‘Kurdish reality’ in 
Turkey only very recently. The attitudes of Özal, Đnönü, Demirel, and Erdoğan on the 
Kurdish issue, announcing at different time periods that they recognize “the Kurdish 
reality,” have been quite useful so far, and further initatives are necessary for continuing 
to integrate the Kurdish people into the polity through ‘constitutional citizenship.’ 
The term ‘constitutional citizenship’ was first pronounced by Demirel in 1992, 
causing many discussions and disputes in the public.293 This term implies that citizenship 
needs to be based on constitutional guarantees and not based on any ethnic or other 
discriminative criteria. It can be argued that only through constitutional citizenship can 
the allegiance of the Kurds to the Turkish state can go beyond being a ‘modus vivendi’ 
and become an ‘overlapping consensus.’ The issue of modus vivendi, constitutional 
consensus, and overlapping consensus in the context of the Kurdish issue will be dealt in 
the next section. 
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7.3 The Kurdish Issue in Relation to Constitutional Consensus and Overlapping 
Consensus  
If the Kurds’ allegiance to the Turkish state would be a matter of balance of power 
among the separatist groups and the Turkish state, then that order based on balance of 
power would be called a modus vivendi, and not an overlapping consensus. 
Regarding conditions of consensus in Turkey, it could be argued that the 
conditions of constitutional consenus, the basic political rights of Kurds, are more or less 
secured by the EU reforms. Constitutionally, the Kurds have most basic political rights 
and liberties; however, there are still problems with application. For example, it is 
normally allowed to sing in Kurdish in concerts or make cassettes in Kurdish, however 
they are sometimes censored by the Turkish authorities.294 Thus, there are still some 
problems in terms of securing basic rights and liberties. Another issue related to 
constitutional consensus is the use of public reason and being civil and tolerant. 
The use of public reason is quite critical in terms of the democratic solution of the 
Kurdish issue. When citizens in Turkey would like to suggest a certain policy, they need 
to put it in such a way that it would be justifiable to other citizens by the use of pubic 
reason. That is to say, they need to address ‘public’ (as opposed to personal or clique-
based) reasons while supporting their arguments in the political forums. They need to 
“move out of the narrower circle of their own views and to develop political conceptions 
in terms of which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public so 
as to put together a majority.”295 It can be argued that following Turkey’s EU candidacy, 
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there has been much improvement in Turkey in terms of using public reason and putting 
the Kurdish issue in a rights-based and publicly communicable language.  
Concerning moderation, the rejection of violence and the use of democratic 
procedures for the accomodation of political rivalry, there are still problems. Terror still 
dominates the Kurdish issue, and on the other hand, the DTP is under threat of closure. 
These two issues demonstrate that there is still inroads to be made on the Kurdish issue in 
order to reach a constitutional consensus. 
In terms of overlapping consensus on the Kurdish issue, Turkey is still far away 
from a possible overlapping consensus. This is because most Kurds think that the basic 
institutions in Turkey are still unjust in terms of the ethnic relations. They believe there is 
discrimination and oppression. This perception hinders an overlapping consensus on the 
issue in Turkey.  
Many citizens in Turkey who are of Kurdish origin seem not to be convinced that 
they live under just and legitimate basic institutions. That leads to a legitimacy crisis and 
problems of stability. For an overlapping consensus to emerge, ethnic groups in Turkey 
need to feel that they live under free and equal conditions, where they can freely express 
themselves in the public political forums and have equal access to all means of human 
welfare (real and symbolic). The republican values in Turkey would require building 
such equality.  This would be possible if a reflective equilibrium is sought by the citizens 
concerning their ethical attitudes on ethnic relations in light of republicanism. 
Seeking such reflective equilibrium could possibly lead to an overlapping 
consensus on the Kurdish issue, which has in fact become more likely by the EU-Turkey 
relations and reforms in Turkey.  In the next section, the relevance of Rawlsian concepts 
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for the Kurdish issue in Turkey is discussed, as is the possibility of a (liberal) overlapping 
consensus on this issue. 
 
7.4 Rawls’ Political Liberalism and the Possibility of an Overlapping Consensus on 
the Kurdish Issue in Turkey 
What would be the Rawlsian political liberalism’s position on the Kurdish issue? What 
would be the relevance of the original position, veil of ignorance, public reason, 
constitutional consensus, and overlapping consensus in relation to the Kurdish issue? It 
can be argued that all these concepts have much relevance and applicability to the 
Kurdish issue. Below is discussed the relevance of original position. 
It could be argued that the original position and veil of ignorance have direct 
relevance to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. Citizens of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic 
origin, going through the original position would be in a position to design such 
principles that they would somehow not oppose when they move out of the original 
position. They would be in a position to choose for themselves such principles that they 
believe would be ‘just’ in terms of ethnic relations in the polity. Assuming that people 
would behave rationally under the conditions of veil of ignorance, they would probably 
design such a constitution that does not violate the basic rights and liberties of any 
groups, and they would do legislations that would not lead to any unfavorable conditions 
or discrimination for any groups. 
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7.4.1 The Original Position 
Imagine that behind the veil of ignorance, one does not know whether he is a Turk, Kurd, 
or of some other ethnicity. The original position being a ‘device of representation’ 
enables a person to do a mental exercise upon the contingency of the human qualities, 
and one can enter into the original position whenever one likes to have some clarity on 
controversial issues of justice. Imagine that individuals living in Turkey were behind the 
‘veil of ignorance’ and that they were in a position to decide the basic principles that 
would apply to the basic structure of the Turkish state.  
Behind such a veil, no one would know his or her ethnicity; no one would know 
whether he or she is a Turk, Kurd, Armenian, or a Greek.296  Ethnicity would be 
completely contingent. The question is that under such conditions of contingency would 
one, as a rational individual, choose to allow any ethnic discrimination or somehow allow 
it within the polity? This would hardly be possible, because the discriminated ‘other’ 
might well be himself. No one in this case would really take that risk. Just suppose that in 
the veil of ignorance someone decides that certain ethnicities, for instance the Kurds, 
should be discriminated against, and then the person comes out from under the veil of 
ignorance and realizes that he is a Kurd, then what would his life be like? How would 
that person respond to that? Here, these questions are not rhetorical or imaginary 
questions but are about the real human condition. They rely on a certain level of 
‘abstraction,’ of course, but only to have the chance to access to the ‘hard reality’ in our 
world. 
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When one becomes aware of the very contingency of life, one might become 
more broad-minded and tolerant. On the other hand, when one thinks in ‘essentialist’ 
terms it is more likely that the person would become intolerant and suppressive towards 
others. The basic intuition in life that enables persons to understand that one could have 
been anything in terms of ethnicity, culture, religion, class, etc. makes people potentially 
open-minded. Upon deep and genuine reflection, one realizes that the other is no one but 
a potential ‘oneself.’ In this mode of comprehension, one has the sense that all persons 
share the same human condition, which brings more understanding, insight, and 
toleration. 
The Kurds and Turks are politically in a position to put themselves in the others’ 
shoes: If I were of the other ethnic origin, what would I expect the state and my fellow 
citizens to do and how would I expect them to behave? This question lies at the basis of 
civility and civic friendship. This looks like an easy exercise, but it is mostly not 
practiced by either side. Yet, it is very crucial from an inter-actional point of view.    
    
7.4.2 The Communitarian Position versus the Liberal Position 
The communitarian critics of Rawls argue that ethnicity, religion, class, etc. are not 
things added to a person but they are constitutive of one’s identity. There might be some 
validity to this argument. However, the Rawlsian intuition that lies at the basis of the veil 
of ignorance is that people are ultimately not their personalities, class position, or 
ethnicity; but merely the ‘owners’ and ‘bearers’ of these ‘contingencies.’ One’s value and 
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merit does not come or stem from contingencies, but is prior to and beyond these 
contingencies.297 
The basic intuition here is that being a Turk or German has no relevance at the 
deepest level of people’s moral existence. It only makes a difference at the less 
ontological and more contingent levels, such as culture, class, personality, etc. It is not 
that these things are unimportant. At a certain level, they might be very important, but 
their importance should not surpass or bypass deeper human qualities and the universal 
rights arising out of them. 
It is a fact that the language communitarians use is fundamentally different from, 
and even diametrically opposed to, the Rawlsian liberals. Whereas the communitarians 
identify with culture, ethnicity, etc., the liberals approach these features in a relatively 
aloof and detached way. The communitarian critics of the liberal attitude put their 
position by asserting the idea that  “some of my ends are not simply mine, but me,” and 
that, the most fundamental levels my commitments are not separable from who I am, but 
they are constitutive of my identity.’298 These are the basic premises of Sandel’s and 
Macintyre’s political philosophy.299 In order to compare and contrast Rawls with these 
communitarian thinkers, the two following statements in terms of their wider implications 
might be analyzed: 
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I am my culture. 
versus 
I have a culture. 
 
 Reflecting upon these two statements above, one could realize that they imply 
two different ‘modes’ of comprehension and two different views on who (or what) we 
are. The first statement implies that one would not exist (one would cease to exist) if one 
was devoid of his culture; whereas the second sentence implies that one is prior to his 
culture and that he would still keep his essential existence even if he somehow ceased to 
have a culture. This implies that one’s moral existence is independent of his culture (or of 
any culture in the world).300 
Whereas the liberals have some sort of a detachment regarding their identity 
elements, the communitarians take these qualities more seriously and identify with them. 
Whereas the liberals think people are mere ‘players’ of (contingent) roles; 
communitarians think that the world is not a stage and the roles are not contingent. The 
communitarians assume the world is a place where the identities are fixed and literal and 
not mere ‘roles.’301 (It seems they suppose life is no game, and therefore game theory 
would not apply here.) 
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7.4.3 Rational versus Reasonable  
It should be stated that the Kurds as an ethnic group have a right to be ‘rational,’ that is to 
say they have a right to rationally pursue certain cultural and political goals; however, 
they have an obligation to be ‘reasonable.’ In Rawlsian terms, a comprehensive doctrine 
would be reasonable if it is compatible with the essentials of civility and the democratic 
regime.302 Reasonable persons would not consider resorting to violence in order to force 
their comprehensive doctrine onto others. (This applies to Turks as well as Kurds.) In 
Rawls’ terms, reasonable persons “will think it unreasonable to use political power, 
should they possess it, to repress comprehensive doctrines that are not unreasonable, 
though different from their own.”303 In fact, to repress others due to their ethnic or 
cultural difference is nothing but racism. 
Racism, be it Turkish or Kurdish racism, is discriminatory and ‘unreasonable’ as 
much as it enforces its agenda onto others by force and repression. It is against civility. In 
fact, the ethnic Turks need not necessarily have sympathy towards the ethnic Kurds, or 
the ethnic Kurds need not necessarily have sympathy towards the ethnic Turks, however 
they need to see that they have to live together without killing each other under the 
common denominator of Turkish citizenship. This is a duty of civility and a requisite of 
citizenship. Citizenship is such that it brings people together under a common ‘political’ 
culture guaranteeing their basic rights and liberties. This gives the citizens a chance to 
relate to each other on equal terms with trust, respect, and reciprocity. 
In this regard, the Turkish state is in a position to be as neutral as possible among 
different ethnic groups, and it should not enforce a certain state ideology or an ethnic 
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nationalism on any groups. This is true for all states having a plurality of diverse groups 
and comprehensive doctrines. Using state power for repressing pluralities would be an 
unreasonable act.304 
 
7.4.4 Liberty and Equality 
The ‘liberty principle,’ ‘equality of opportunity,’ and the ‘difference principle’ of 
Rawlsian justice as fairness would no doubt primarily benefit the Turkish citizens of 
Kurdish origin, as being probably the least advantaged members of Turkish society, both 
economically, culturally, and politically.  
The liberty principle would guarantee all basic rights and liberties, such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of broadcasting, etc. for the Kurdish 
citizens. On the other hand, the ‘equality of opportunity’ and the ‘difference principle’ 
would also have some implications for the Kurdish people in Turkey. 
The difference principle would imply a better distribution of wealth in Turkey, 
which would benefit the people of Kurdish origin in Turkey. Eastern Anatolia and South 
East Anatolia are the ‘least advantaged’ parts of Turkey today, and the Kurds constitute 
the majority of the population in these two regions; therefore, one could say that the 
Kurds living in these parts are the ‘least advantaged’ members of Turkey. Thus, in 
accordance with the difference principle, one could prescribe that the differences in 
wealth could only be allowed in as much as they would increase the relative welfare of 
the Kurdish people and other poor and disadvantaged people in Turkey. It is reported that 
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East Anatolia comprises about 14.5 percent of the households in Turkey and receive only 
about 10.2 percent of the total revenue.305 
As an economic system, the property-owning democracy that Rawls favors in 
Justice as Fairness—A Restatement would especially require a more equal distribution of 
wealth in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Turkey. In these regions, the state needs 
to provide the small farmers and small producers with enough of agricultural land and 
equipment so that they can be economically productive. This can be done by providing 
them free land out of the state’s unused lands, or provide them advantaged credits. Such 
measures would give the small farmers and small producers some hope for the future and 
give them a chance to see Turkish society not as an injust system but as a fair system of 
cooperation. 
 
7.4.5 Neutrality of Aim 
Rawls says that while justice as fairness is not neutral in terms of ‘neutrality of 
procedure,’ it is neutral in the sense of ‘neutrality of aim’ which, according to him, 
practically means: 
a-) that the state is to ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any 
conception of the good they freely affirm, 
b-) that the state is not to do anything intended to favor or promote any particular 
comprehensive doctrine rather than another, or to give greater assistance to those 
who pursue it, 
c-) that the state is not to do anything that makes it more likely that individuals 
accept any particular conception rather than another unless steps are taken to 
cancel, or to compensate for, the effects of policies that do this. 306  
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In accordance with the neutrality of aim, the Turkish state needs to be as neutral 
as possible among different cultural, religious, ethnic, or other interest-based groups and 
not favor a particular group over another. For example, the state should not favor a 
particular ethnic or religious way of ‘good life’ over others in a discriminatory manner 
(as in the cases of favoring Turks over Kurds, Sunnis over Alewites, or Muslim citizens 
over non-Muslim citizens). The state should not expect its citizens to adopt a particular 
religious or ethnic life style. Plurality of values and multi-culturalism need to be observed 
and respected. In accordance with the ‘priority of the right over the good’, the protection 
of the citizens’ rights needs to be prior to any particular notion of ‘good life.’ The 
common denominator in Turkey, as argued in the previous chapters, cannot possibly be 
the sectarian or particularistic values of any single ethnic, cultural, religious or 
congregational group in Turkey, but the common denominator could only be the 
constitutional citizenship and the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Turkish 
constitution. 
In order to live together in Turkey, Turkish citizens need to have some minimum 
political grounds that they all agree on. This common ground it seems, can neither be a 
Sunni Islam (since there are many Alewites), nor a uniform Turkish or Turk-ist culture 
(since there are many Kurds). The common ground can be ‘Turkish citizenship,’ which 
principally endows the citizens with equal rights and liberties. People’s foremost 
allegiance needs to be to this ‘common denominator’ for a possible overlapping 
consensus to emerge. 
In the next chapter, Turkey’s current socio-economic and political development is 
analyzed through the perspective of modernization theory in reference to the possibility 
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of a democratic consolidation in Turkey in the coming years. As argued previously, 
Rawls’ takes a high level of development and modernity taken for granted while 
proposing his political liberalism. In this regard, Turkey’s increasing level of 
development is crucial in terms of the relevance of Rawls’ political liberalism to 
contemporary Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
REFLECTIONS UPON THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION IN TURKEY IN VIEW OF TURKEY’S 
CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
  
 
 
It can be argued that despite some negative political events on a daily basis in today’s 
Turkey, there are some very promising objective factors about the future of Turkish 
democracy in the middle or long run if we take into account Turkey’s current level of 
socio-economic and political modernization. It is observed that Turkey is getting closer to 
meeting the minimal requisites of socio-economic modernization, thus increasing its 
chances of having a sustainable democracy. Based on the World Bank, UN, and Freedom 
House criteria, Turkey today is very close to reaching the threshold of the following four: 
• “High”GNI per capita (Gross National Income per capita) 
•  Relatively lower inequality of income (possibly low-middle inequality) 
• “High” HDI (Human Development Index) 
• “Free” rating in the Freedom House report  
The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had characterized Turkey’s goal 
as attaining the level of contemporary (Western) civilization and even surpassing it.307 
Contemporary civilization in his understanding implied material, socio-cultural, and 
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political modernization, for which his reforms aimed. As of 2009, the question as to how 
close Turkey is to the goal of catching up with contemporary civilization in terms of 
development and democracy is a politically relevant and important issue that will be 
discussed in this chapter with reference to modernization theory. According to 
modernization theory, socio-economic development facilitates democratization. In this 
regard, recent improvements in Turkey’s socio-economic modernization signal a positive 
development and will be put under scrutiny in relation to democratization. Here, before 
going into the main discussion, a theoretical issue in the overall structure of this 
dissertation, the relation between Rawls’ writings and modernization, should be put into 
context, which was actually shortly mentioned in Chapter 3. 
 
8.1 Rawls and Modernization 
It needs to be noted that in terms of what sociological factors make a modern democratic 
regime become consolidated, Rawls in fact doesn't say much, either in Political 
Liberalism or elsewhere. He just states that he is writing Political Liberalism for modern 
democratic societies, and takes the background conditions of modernity for granted. And 
it is a fact that modern democratic societies have higher levels of industrialization, 
urbanization, income, literacy, etc., and these factors probably make Rawls' system of 
political liberalism possible in the first place. For example, using public reason 
effectively in public forums would require a relatively high level of education (both 
literacy and civic education) as well as mass communication. Having a 'republic' also pre-
requires some level of 'urbanism,' which is central to Lipset's modernization theory 
(Rawls' emphasis on republican values assume an urban republican setting).  
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In fact, Rawls never attempts to comprehensively problematize the sociological 
features that make democracy sustainable. And it can be argued that in the literature, this 
issue is best addressed by Lipset, Przeworski, and Diamond. Thus, in this chapter, 
modernization theory is applied to Turkish democracy, and comments are made in 
relation to the possibility of democratic consolidation in Turkey. 
 
8.2 Turkey, Modernization, and Democracy 
Regarding Turkey’s level of socio-economic and political modernization, it should firstly 
be mentioned that Turkey today is a candidate country for EU membership, and its 
economy and democracy are approaching a level of certain maturity. Turkey is the 
world’s 17th largest economy with a GDP (nominal) per capita that has surpassed 
$10,000,308 and through the recent democratization reforms and relative civilianization, 
Turkish democracy is at a point where democratic consolidation seems within reach more 
than ever before. There are, however, some factors which could hinder democracy’s 
consolidation in Turkey, such as the government’s ambivalent attitude toward 
democratization, its recently rising authoritarianism, political polarization,309 problems 
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concerning the Kurdish issue, the politicization of the judiciary, and the military’s 
continuing influence in politics, despite some relative civilianization recently. However, 
at the macro level, certain socio-political trends can be observed which signal that 
democracy in Turkey is approaching a condition in which military coups become much 
less likely. The most solid factor leading to such a positive expectation for Turkish 
democracy is that Turkey today has a relatively large and effective middle class that takes 
democratic representation seriously, resists anti-democratic attempts, and views 
democracy as the only legitimate political system.310 However, anti-democratic groups 
and parties are neither minor nor ineffective in Turkey, yet it is becoming increasingly 
more difficult for these groups to reverse democratization, thanks to the EU process in 
this country (which has recently stalled though), the existence of plurality in media, and 
the military’s relatively more moderate and pro-democratic stance recently.311  
While discussing the issue of democratic consolidation in Turkey, it would be 
appropriate to develop a more systematic and theoretical framework. First of all, it needs 
to be acknowledged that liberal democracy as a political regime does not emerge in a 
void, but mostly emerges in places where a sufficient level of capital accumulation, 
urbanization, communications technology, a relatively high literacy, and human 
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development are in place. Without the improvements in these fields and the development 
of a sufficiently large middle class, it can be argued that there would be little demand for 
democratic representation. However, if a developed middle class does exist in a country, 
it would be quite difficult for the political elite to suppress democratic demands for too 
long. In this regard, the increase in democratic demands and support for democratic 
regime in today’s Turkey could possibly be linked to the increasing level of socio-
economic development and the emergence of a larger pro-democratic middle class. The 
connection between development and democracy, in this regard, is a crucial and central 
issue that needs to be addressed, which has thus far been put forward in the literature by 
modernization theory. This chapter, therefore, applies modernization theory to Turkey 
and Turkish democracy. While doing so, this chapter presents two main contributions. 
The first one is that we apply modernization theory to Turkey using the most recent and 
updated data and information and shed light upon the relation between development and 
democratization in this country. The second contribution in this chapter is that, utilizing 
some insights of modernization theory, we make an analysis of the possible reasons for 
the fluctuations in Turkey’s democracy ratings over the last few decades (as reported by 
Freedom House) and present some comments on Turkey’s recently increased chances for 
democratic consolidation. 
The chapter has two main parts to follow. In the next part, the basic premises and 
arguments of modernization theory are explained, and the possible relationship between 
democracy and socio-economic factors such as income, income distribution, 
industrialization, urbanization, education and human development are investigated. In the 
last part, Turkey’s socio-economic and political indicators are evaluated by reference to 
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the findings of modernization theory; based on these and other relevant factors, some 
general insights are presented concerning Turkey’s chances for democratic consolidation 
in the coming years. 
 
8.3 Modernization Theory and Democratization 
Modernization theory originates from Seymour Martin Lipset’s article “Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, which 
appeared in 1959 in the journal of American Political Science Review.312 In this article, 
Lipset showed that there is a positive correlation between development and democracy. 
In a follow up study, Lipset  stated his often cited and famous argument that “democracy 
is related to the state of economic development” and that “the more well-to-do a nation, 
the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.”313 Lipset reached these 
conclusions through a research in which he took certain countries and classified them into 
two sets of countries, the first being those from Europe, North America, Australia and 
New Zealand, and the second being those from Latin America according to their regime 
types as either stable democracies, unstable democracies, unstable dictatorships and 
stable dictatorships. In order to find if there were any significant socio-economic 
differences among countries having different regime types, Lipset investigated the level 
of socio-economic development among the countries within each regional group. 
Eventually, he discovered that the more democratic countries within both groups had 
dramatically higher levels of socio-economic development, that is, they had higher levels 
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of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and literacy when compared to their less 
democratic counterparts. Lipset found that the more democratic countries had more of per 
capita income, number of persons per motor vehicle and per physician, and the number of 
radios, telephones, and newspapers per thousand persons.314  Lipset thus concluded that 
economic development is the “single most important predictor of political democracy 
when controlling for other variables.”315  This critical conclusion of Lipset constituted the 
gist of what is called modernization theory. 
As to whether the arguments of modernization theory are verified by other 
scholars, it needs to be mentioned that several others thus far have empirically 
investigated the relation between development and democracy, and they have 
consistently found a high positive correlation between the two. Some of these authors 
who found a positive correlation between development and democracy are Cutright 
(1963), Olsen (1968), Cutright and Wiley (1969), Jackman (1973), Thomas, Ramirez, 
Meyer, and Gobalet (1979), Bollen (1979, 1983), Hannan and Carroll (1981), Bollen and 
Jackman (1985), Diamond et al. (1987), Lipset, Seong, and Torres (1993), Foweraker and 
Landman (2002), and Kern (2006). On the other hand, Lipset’s modernization theory and 
its political economy was challenged by authors who put more emphasis on human 
agency and elite settlements in explaining democratization, such as Dankwart Rustow,316 
and some scholars such as world systems theorists and dependency theorists who argued 
that the ‘core countries’ had a benefit in keeping the ‘dependent countries’ undemocratic 
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and unresponsive to popular demands to keep low wages in these dependent economies 
upon which the wealth of the core countries rested. This criticism expressed by authors 
such as Samir Amin has found resonance among radical left groups.317  
Among authors who investigated the relation between macro factors and 
democratization, various scholars found supportive empirical evidence for Lipset’s 
arguments. For example, Coleman conducted a study of 75 countries in which he 
clustered them into three categories: competitive, semi-competitive, and authoritarian, 
and found that “countries with competitive regimes had the highest levels of 
development, semi-competitive countries the next highest, and authoritarian countries the 
lowest.”318 Another author, Olsen found that an index created by him consisting of 14 
socio-economic factors had a 0.83 correlation with an index of political development / 
democracy (which was again created by him), and the correlation between the socio-
economic variables and Cutright’s democracy index was 0.84.319 It can be said that such 
evidence strengthens the validity of Lipset’s arguments concerning the relation between 
development and democracy.  
Concerning the issue of how human development and socio-economic 
development lead to more democracy, it is argued by various authors that higher socio-
economic development leads to a larger middle class and increases the demands for 
further political representation, participation, contestation,320 and demand for 
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accountability of the political realm among the middle class.321 It is argued that the 
middle classes serve as a control mechanism against the authoritarian tendencies within 
the polity.322 Presence of intermediary organizations, which is probably the result of a 
certain level of wealth, is depicted as another critical factor by Lipset, since such 
organizations by increasing participation, play a counter-veiling role towards 
authoritarian tendencies.323 Evaluating and commenting on Lipset’s argument as to how 
and through which mechanisms development fosters democracy, Diamond concluded that 
a careful reading of Lipset’s arguments reveals that economic development promotes 
democracy only by “effecting changes in political culture and social structure.”324 This 
explanation seems to be sound when explaining the relation between development and 
democracy. Throughout the next pages, the relation between democracy and the relevant 
socio-economic factors will be investigated.  
 
8.3.1 Income per capita 
Lipset, as a result of his research, concluded that economic growth and increase in 
income engender a culture of democracy and provide the foundations for democratic 
institutions. As to why income is important for democracy, Lipset argued increased 
wealth reduces the overall level of objective inequality, weakening status distinctions, 
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and increasing the size of the middle class.325 Lipset also argued that in order for a 
gradualist and democratic regime type to emerge, increase in average income is crucial. 
In this regard he wrote: “A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the 
ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower class”326 Similarly, Diamond argued that “better 
socio-economic conditions generate the circumstances and skills that permit effective and 
autonomous participation…[and] when most of the population is literate, decently fed 
and sheltered, and otherwise assured of minimal material needs, class tensions and radical 
political orientations tend to diminish”.327 Diamond found in his research that liberal 
democracies are seen almost exclusively among high income and upper-middle income 
countries, while closed regimes are seen among low-income countries.328 Within the 
middle range, he observed that partially open countries are mostly seen among lower-
middle income countries and sometimes among upper-middle income countries. Overall, 
Diamond concluded that there is a high correlation between economic development and 
democracy. Diamond actually investigated the statistical relation between a country’s 
income level and democratic rating according to Freedom House. He tested the data for 
statistical significance with two forms of the chi-square test, both of which showed the 
association to be “highly significant at the 0.0001 level”329  
As to why a low level of wealth and income could hinder the necessary 
institutions for democracy, Diamond noted that in poor countries, favoritism and 
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nepotism undermine the possibility of a well-functioning bureaucracy, which is necessary 
for a democracy.330 In this regard, it can be argued that increasing levels of wealth might 
be functional for establishing a well-functioning democracy. Similarly, Barro noted that 
“increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in 
democracy” and that “democracies that arise without prior economic development tend 
not to last.”331 It seems that the positive relation between income and democracy applies 
except for cases such as Germany, India and some oil-rich Arab countries (for an 
explanation of these cases, see endnote332). 
The relation between development and democracy, Diamond noted, is not 
unilinear: 
The relationship between socio-economic development and democracy is not 
unilinear but in recent decades has more closely resembled an “N-curve”—
increasing the chances for democracy among poor and perhaps lower-middle 
income countries, neutralizing or even inverting to a negative effect at some 
middle range of development and industrialization, and then increasing again to 
the point where democracy becomes extremely likely above a certain high level 
economic development (roughly represented by a per capita income of $6000 in 
current US dollars (year 1992).333 
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Although there are a few democracies in the world such as India or Mongolia that have 
an income per capita about $1000 or 2000, it is observed that most democracies have an 
income per capita over $5000-6000. Whether there exists a certain threshold concerning 
the relation between income and democracy, Przeworski noted “no democracy ever, 
including the period before World War II, fell in a country with a per capita income 
higher than that of Argentina in 1975, $6,055.”334  
 
8.3.2 Income Distribution  
The number of studies concerning the relation between income distribution and 
democracy are limited in number; however, there are a few well-conducted and 
methodologically sound studies which indicate a positive correlation between economic 
equality and democratic survival such as Muller (1988), Arat (1991), Przeworski et al. 
(1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix and Garicano (2002), and Przeworski (2003). 
Regarding the relation between income distribution and democracy, Przeworski notes: 
…Democracies are more likely to survive when the Gini coefficient or the ratio of 
incomes of top-to-bottom-quintile are lower. Data concerning functional 
distribution are more extensive and they show the same: democracy is four times 
more likely to survive in countries in which the labour share of value added in 
manufacturing is greater than 25 percent.335 
 
Przeworski et al. conclude that “democracy is much more likely to survive in countries 
where income inequality is declining over time.”336 These authors in their study found 
that “the expected life of democracy in countries with shrinking inequality is about 84 
years, while the expected life of democracies with rising income inequality is about 22 
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years” (these numbers refer to the aggregate lifespan of democracies with rising and 
declining inequality among 135 countries over 40 years). In a similar way, Boix and 
Garicano, based on his empirical investigation, concluded “economic equality and capital 
mobility promote democracy… By contrast, at higher levels of both inequality specificity 
[of capital], authoritarian regimes prevail.”337  
Regarding the reason why better distribution of income is important for 
democracy and the flourishing of democratic attitudes, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 
wrote: 
It is only when individuals break out of poverty that they begin to demand a role 
in and provide support for democracy. Thus, the removal of mass poverty is 
essential to inculcate within the population the attitudes and behaviours that are 
supportive of democracy. Economic growth “leads to an increase in the number of 
individuals with sufficient time, education, and money to get involved in 
politics.338  
 
In regard to the importance of reducing poverty for securing democracy and democratic 
citizenship, Lipset argued that reducing poverty is critical for securing the basis of 
democracy and for equalizing the subjective perception of honour and equality of some 
citizens in the eyes of other citizens. On this issue, he wrote: 
The poorer a country, and the lower the absolute standard of living of the lower 
classes, the greater the pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower classes as 
beyond the pale of human society, as vulgar, as innately inferior, as a lower 
caste.339 
 
Chong argued the relationship between in-equality and democracy might be a 
non-monotonic relationship and argued that “poor and highly unequal countries are the 
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ones where such a link [between inequality and democracy] tends to be positive,” and 
that “relatively equal countries are the ones where such a link tends to be negative”.340 
Taking into consideration these studies together, although one needs to be cautious about 
the relationship between equality and democracy, it seems that there could be some 
positive relation between the two. The possibility of mutual causation needs to be also 
considered, since the two variables might well feed each other. 
 
8.3.3 Industrialization and Urbanization  
Industrialization can be measured by the percentage of employed people in industry 
compared to agriculture, and the per capita commercially produced “energy” being used 
in the country. Lipset noted that the average percentage of employed people working in 
agriculture and related occupations was lower for more democratic European countries 
and higher for less democratic and dictatorial Latin American countries.341 The 
differences in per capita energy employed in the country, Lipset noted, are also equally 
large. Such large differences denote differences in terms of historical development in 
terms of industrialization. In his research, Cutright found the correlation between 
industrialization and democratic stability to be 0.72.342 
         Urbanization, which is a natural result of industrialization, is also a crucial factor in 
terms of democracy. Harold J. Laski asserted that organized democracy is the product of 
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urban life.343 The argument that urbanization is directly linked to democracy is best 
depicted by Lerner, who argued that democratic participation is the end result of an 
evolutionary historical process, the initial stage of which is ‘urbanization,’ the second 
stage ‘literacy and media participation,’ and the third stage ‘political participation.’344 
Concerning this sequence of evolutionary development, Lerner put forth his argument as 
follows: 
Society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization 
comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources 
which characterise the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix 
develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases, literacy and 
media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the 
literate develop the media, which in turn spread literacy. But, historically, literacy 
performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first 
acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks 
required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate 
technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin 
to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. 
This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop 
those institutions of participation (e.g., voting) which we find in all advanced 
modern societies. For countries in transition today, these high correlation’s 
suggest that literacy and media participation may be considered as a supply-and-
demand reciprocal in a communication market whose locus, at least in its 
historical inception, can only be urban [emphasis added by the author].345 
 
A study supporting Lerner’s argument was done by Cutright, who found that the 
correlation between urbanization and democracy is 0.69.346 This shows that the relation 
between urbanization and democracy is a strong one. 
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8.3.4 Education  
James Bryce, in relation to education, argued that if education does not make people good 
citizens, it makes it at least easier for them to become so.347 Almond and Verba 
concluded that education “had the most important demographic effect on political 
attitudes.”348 On the other hand, Lipset argued “through better education, citizens come to 
value democracy more and to manifest a more tolerant, moderate, restrained, and rational 
style with respect to politics and political opposition.”349 Many authors have found that 
there is a positive correlation between education and democracy. Cutright found that the 
correlation between education and democracy is 0.74.  In terms of the relation between 
education, democracy and democratic values, Lipset noted “the most important single 
factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from others has been 
education.350 The higher one’s education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic 
values and support democratic practices.” Winham found that there is even a causal 
relationship between education, communication and democracy.351 Lipset argued that 
education leads to more moderate and democratic citizens, stating: 
Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the 
need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, 
and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices. ... The higher one's 
education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support 
democratic practices. ... If we cannot say that a 'high' level of education is a 
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sufficient condition for democracy, the available evidence suggests that it comes 
close to being a necessary one.352 
 
Concerning the issue of how education leads to further democracy, an 
intermediary mechanism, communication media, is put forth by authors. Diamond argues 
“education…stimulates the expansion of communication media, which then has a large 
effect on democratization”353 Similarly, Inkeles found that education and exposure to 
mass media create an active and participatory citizenry, which is critical for the 
emergence and well functioning of democracy.354  It can be argued that literacy is the 
most important component of education in relation to democracy. Lipset pointed out that 
according to his data set “the more democratic countries of Europe are almost entirely 
literate: “The lowest has a rate of 96 per cent, while the less democratic nations have a 
literacy rate 85 per cent. In Latin America, the difference is between an average rate of 74 
percent for the less dictatorial countries and 46 percent for the more dictatorial.”355 The 
numbers Lipset mentions concerning literacy have changed since then, however, the 
relation he points out still more or less applies today. Literacy in relatively more 
democratic countries such as Argentina (97.2%), Chile (95.2%), or Brazil (88.6%) is 
higher than Guatemala (69.1%), Honduras (80.0 %), or Bolivia (86.7%) that are less 
democratic today.356  
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8.3.5 Human Development  
Human development consists not only of economic development but also social and 
cultural development. The UN measures human development by the human development 
index (HDI), which is composed by using three main criteria: income, educational 
attainment, and life expectancy. The HDI was created in 1990 by Indian economist 
Amartya Sen and Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq, and is widely used by social 
scientists to assess a country’s level of socio-economic development. The HDI has a 
maximum rating scale of 100; a HDI of 80-100 denotes ‘high human development’, 50-
79 denotes ‘middle human development’, and HDI between 0-49 denotes ‘low human 
development’.357 The UN started a Human Development Program that aims at increasing 
human development in underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa and South Asia. It 
can be argued that the improvements in human development in these countries is 
critically important not only for the quality of life in these countries, but also for the 
sustenance of social and political institutions.  
In regard to the relation between human development and democracy, Diamond 
notes that the Human Development Index (HDI) is a better predictor of a country’s level 
of democracy than the GNP per se. He found that while there is 0.51 correlation between 
the GNP and the index of political freedom (i.e. Freedom House index), there exists a 
considerably higher correlation between the HDI and the Freedom House index, which is 
0.71.358 Thus, it is reasonable to say that a country’s human development is highly 
correlated with freedom and democracy in that country. The reason for such a high 
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positive correlation might be explained by the fact that high human development may be 
forming some basis for higher social capital and generally more civilized conditions, 
which might be more conducive for democracy.  After having explained modernization 
theory, in the second part, the findings and insights of modernization theory are applied 
to the Turkish case. 
 
8.4 Modernization Theory and the Case of Turkish Democracy 
Turkey’s recent socio-economic and political data expose a particularly interesting case. 
Different components of socio-economic modernization in this country are getting so 
close to the threshold of ‘high’ values that they lead one to think that Turkey might be on 
the verge of experiencing a leap in terms of socio-economic and democratic 
development. Although there exists no linear relationship between development and 
democracy, still from a probabilistic point of view, recent socio-economic development 
in Turkey seems to be promising in terms of democratic survival. Bringing together some 
of the pivotal developmental factors mentioned in the previous part of the chapter as well 
as the Freedom House ratings, it can be seen that Turkey is quite close to meeting the 
minimal official requisites of becoming a country with the following four: 
 
• ‘High’ GNI per capita (Gross National Income per capita) 359 
•  Relatively lower inequality of income (possibly ‘low-middle’ Gini coefficient) 360 
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• ‘High’ HDI (Human Development Index)  
• ‘Free’ rating in the Freedom House report  
These four indicators are shown on a table below. 
 
 GNP per capita Gini coefficient HDI Freedom Rating 
Threshold 
 
High ≥ $11,906 
(World Bank) 
Low ≤ 0.30 
 
High ≥  80 
   (UN) 
Free ≤  2.5 
(Freedom House) 
Turkey 
 
$9,340 (2008) 
 
0.38 (2005) 79.98 (2008) 3.0 (2008) 
 
         Table 1:  Turkey’s Recent Socio-economic and Political Ratings361 
 
The implications of the factors shown in Table 1 as well as of the other relevant socio-
economic factors are discussed throughout the next pages. Turkey’s socio-economic 
factors, parallel to the previous part in sequence, are evaluated in terms of their effect on 
democratization in Turkey. 
 
8.4.1 Income per capita  
As mentioned above with reference to Przeworski, no country that has surpassed $6,055 
has democracy ever fallen. Although it is not easy to establish a definite income level to 
be necessary or sufficient for democratic consolidation as of today, Turkey’s current 
income level today seems to be at a conducive level for democratic survival. Turkish 
GDP has recently surpassed $10,000, and Turkey could soon come to the level of ‘high 
income country’ despite decreasing growth recently. It can be argued that Turkey’s 
current income is quite an advantage for further democratization and democratic 
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consolidation when one takes into consideration that there is high correlation (0.51) 
between income and democracy, as mentioned above. Turkey’s income level today is 
close to the income level of those countries in Eastern Europe or Latin America, which 
have recently experienced democratic consolidation, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Chile, Brazil, or Argentina.362 
 
8.4.2 Income Distribution  
The Turkish Statistical Institute recently reported that there has been some improvement 
in Turkey’s income distribution recently, which was mentioned in Chapter 5 (please see 
the table there which shows Turkey’s Gini coefficient during 1987-2005). Based on that 
table, it can be said that the inequality of income in Turkey increased during 1987-1994 
and decreased during 1994-2005. Turkey’s Gini coefficient in 2005, which is 0.38, 
indicates a medium level.363  It seems that as long as the current amelioration in 
distribution of income continues for some time, Turkey’s Gini coefficient in the coming 
years might become closer to low-medium values (such as 0.30-0.35). This would be 
important in terms of achieving a larger middle class and a more substantive and popular 
democracy in Turkey. Turkey’s income distribution, although not totally satisfactory yet, 
could become better and more conducive for a more popular and participatory democracy 
if the amelioration in income distribution continues without any interruption in the 
coming years. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) which is a conservative party 
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and in government now, has a relatively limited vision of ‘social justice’ due to its neo-
liberal priorities, and it is dubious as to whether the AKP would have an intention to 
decrease Turkey’s income inequality as low as 0.30, which would be normally expected 
to be done either by a social liberal or a social democratic party.  
 
8.4.3 Industrialization and Urbanization  
Turkey started industrialization in the late 19th century and experienced a high level of 
industrialization, especially in the second half of the 20th century. As of 2009, Turkey is 
considered a NIC (newly-industrialized country) along with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, 
South Africa, China, India, Thailand, and Philippines.364 Turkey today has a relatively 
developed bourgeoisie that is predominantly pro-democratic.  It is observed that 
globalization, increasing capital and better technical education increases industrialization 
in Turkey. As a result, Turkey has become an “emerging market” in the global economy. 
It can be argued that Turkey’s relatively developed industry and market economy are 
advantages for democratization in this country.365  
Regarding the rate of urbanization in Turkey, it has been reported that 
urbanization in contemporary Turkey, parallel to increased industrialization, has been 
75% as of 2008.366 The level of urbanization in developed countries varies from 65 to 90 
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depending on geographical and demographic factors.367 It is observed that Turkey’s level 
of urbanization is roughly within the range of ‘developed’ countries, although somewhat 
lower than many of these countries. Turkey’s level of urbanism increased especially in 
the last three or four decades and continued to increase since then. The increase in the 
level of urbanism, which has been a result of migration, has created certain urban 
problems, such as poverty, crime, etc. On the other hand, increased urbanism has created 
greater opportunities for literacy and education, social mobility, and political 
representation, which altogether increase the chances for further democratization, as 
depicted by the above-mentioned empirical findings. 
 
8.4.4 Education  
A widely used index for measuring educational attainment is the UN’s education index, 
which is practically one of the three components of human development index. The 
education index is formed as a composite of two factors: literacy rate and gross enrolment 
rate. The index can be maximum of 100. In terms of the first component of the education 
index (i.e. literacy rate), Turkey has made a great deal of improvement in recent decades. 
To give a comparative idea, the rate of literacy in Turkey was approximately 9% in 1923 
when the Turkish Republic was founded, and it is 88.1% as of 2008 (and will likely 
exceed 90% in 2011 or 2012).368  On the other hand, Turkey’s gross enrolment rate has 
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recently been 71.1% as of 2006.369 The education index has recently been 82.4 in 2008, 
which is considered to be in the ‘high’ category by UN standards.370 As a result, one can 
argue, considering the high correlation between education and democracy as shown by 
various researchers, Turkey’s relatively increased rate of literacy and gross enrolment 
rate, are important assets for further democratization in Turkey. 
 
8.4.5 Human Development  
Turkey’s human development index is 79.98 as of 2008. The HDI of some countries are 
as follows: Norway 96.8, the USA 95.0, Portugal 90.0, Mexico 84.2, Brazil 80.7, 
Philippines 74.5, Honduras 71.4, South Africa 67.0, India 60.9, Pakistan 56.2, Tanzania 
50.3, Rwanda 43.5, Niger 37.0, and Sierra Leone 32.9. Turkey’s HDI according to UN 
criteria is at the verge of ‘high HDI’ (80.00) and will most likely exceed the threshold 
which will be reflected in the 2009 report (to be published in October). Turkey will thus 
be considered in the category of countries with ‘high human development.’371 Turkey’s 
being at the verge of a ‘high’ HDI in this regard is an important and promising factor for 
democratization when we consider the 0.71 correlation between HDI and Freedom House 
score of a country. In the next section, Turkey’s Freedom House scores and the chances 
for further democratization is discussed. 
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attainment, and 80-100 ‘high’ educational attainment. See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/news/title,15493,en.html. 
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 It needs to be acknowledged that despite having ‘high HDI,’ Turkey’s development still needs to be 
evaluated as ‘uneven development’ due to problems in areas such as press freedom, gender equality, and 
environmental protection. 
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8.5 Turkey’s Freedom House Ratings over the Years  
Taking into account the fact that Turkey’s level of income per capita, income 
distribution, and human development index are close to certain threshold values, further 
democratization could be expected. In fact, this expectation seems to be supported by 
both Turkey’s already meeting the Copenhagen Political Criteria and also Turkey’s 
relatively satisfactory Freedom House scores in recent years. Turkey’s Freedom House 
rating in 2008, as shown in Figure 1 is 3.0, which implies a ‘semi-free’ regime, however, 
one that is getting closer to the ‘free’ category. Some basic information about the 
Freedom House and its rating system might be useful here. Freedom House is a US-based 
non-governmental organization that publishes reports every year on the condition of 
freedom and democracy in various countries around the world and rates the countries on 
a composite score from 1 to 7. The composite score is actually constructed by two 
factors, civil liberties and political liberties. Both political and civil liberties are evaluated 
by an index from 1 to 7 (1 denotes most free, and 7 denotes most authoritarian), and 
combining these two indices, a single composite index is created by the arithmetic 
average of the two indices, and this single index is used to evaluate whether that country 
would be considered either ‘free’, ‘partly free’, or ‘non-free’. A composite index between 
1.00-2.50 is defined by the Freedom House as ‘free,’ 2.50-5.00 as ‘partly free,’ and 5.50-
7.00 as ‘non-free.’ Such numerical representations might be methodologically disputed; 
however, they can somehow offer a general idea about the comparative situation of 
freedom and democracy in a country. 
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In order to provide an account of Turkey’s scores over the years, and in order to 
be able to make comments on Turkey’s chances of democratic consolidation in the 
coming years, the yearly performance of Turkey during 1972-2008 is shown on Figure 1. 
 
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 
Free Free Free Free Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Partly 
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
Non-
Free 
                                        ←                                                       → 
                             Democratization                               Authoritarianization 
 
            
Freedom in Turkey (1972-2008)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Year
A
v
er
ag
e 
fre
ed
o
m
 
sc
o
re
 
                      
               Figure 1: Turkey’s Freedom Ratings during 1972-2008 according to Freedom  
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It is seen in Figure 1 that Turkey achieved ‘free’ ratings during the 1974-1979 period (a 
rating of 2.5) despite the fact that there was political terror in those years.373 However, it 
is observed that the 1980 coup decreased this score to ‘partly free’ (5.0). It is a generally 
admitted fact that the military junta caused a significant authoritarianization in Turkey 
during 1980-1983. However, the country made a re-transition to democracy in 1983, after 
which some relative civilianization took place in the country. During 1983-1992, Turkey 
politically experienced a significant civilianization and democratization (reaching a rating 
of 3.0 during 1986-1992). However, in the aftermath of this relatively free period, Turkey 
experienced another wave of authoritarianization during 1992-2001 and its rating 
worsened to values around 4.5. In the next section, the possible reasons for the 
fluctuations in Turkey’s freedom ratings are discussed. 
 
8.5.1 Possible Reasons for the Fluctuations in Turkey’s Freedom Ratings: Income 
Threshold, Market Development, and the EU-Turkey Relations 
As to why there have been fluctuations in Turkey’s freedom ratings over the years and 
why Turkey could not consolidate its democracy in the 1970s or in the 1990s despite 
favourable conditions, it can be argued that Turkey’s level of income per capita in those 
years was still below a certain threshold, may this be $6,055 or a bit more. Therefore, 
despite relatively high freedom ratings, democracy could not be consolidated then. 
However, it can be reasonably argued that Turkey today has surpassed a certain level of 
income and development, and therefore could be in a more advantageous position in 
                                                  
373
 It should be noted that political freedom may not necessarily, or always, guarantee peace and security 
within a country. Despite a relatively high level of political freedom in the country, there was widespread 
political terror in Turkey in the 1970s.  
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terms of democratic survival. Although this may or may not come true in the coming 
years, this argument has the advantage of relying on the evidence of all the existing 
democracies since 1975, which have survived after surpassing the threshold of $6,055, as 
mentioned by Przeworski.374 It can be argued that surpassing a certain threshold of 
income could be critical in solving many social and political problems in Turkey, 
including the Kurdish issue, which is a result of both deficiencies in Turkey’s practice of 
liberal norms as well as socio-economic underdevelopment.375  
Institutionalization is another critical issue that needs to be mentioned in terms of 
explaining the problems of liberalization and democratization in Turkey. Concerning the 
institutionalization of liberalism and the issue of why individual rights and liberties have 
not become rooted enough in Turkey, Demet Yalçın Mousseau argues that weak market 
development has been the underlying reason.376 She asserts that a mass market based on 
equality and rule of law has not been institutionalized in Turkey, and instead of this, rent 
seeking and clientelism through state mechanisms and political parties have been 
widespread. Mousseau claims that if Turkey can foster a more institutionalized market 
economy, this will lead to a more institutionalized democracy, which then would allow 
for more civil rights and liberties. Concerning this issue, she wrote:  
A liberal political culture that respects individual rights may be connected to the 
development of an economy where most are dependent on the market rather than 
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  Przeworski, Adam. 2003.  “Democracy and Economic Development,” paper written for United Nations 
Development Program, published at 
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 On this issue see Kirişçi, Kemal and Winrow, Gareth M. 1997. The Kurdish Question and Turkey. 
London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass; and Zeki Sarıgil (Forthcoming), “Curbing Kurdish Ethno-nationalism 
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 Mousseau, Demet Yalçın. 2006. “Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are 
They Related?,” Government and Opposition, 41(2), pp.298-326. 
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in-groups for their livelihood and a regulatory state that enforces the rule of law 
impartially.377 
 
Mousseau contrasts South Korea with Turkey and argues that South Korea went ahead of 
Turkey in terms of democratization by virtue of “creating regulated markets with 
egalitarian policies for the creation of a modern, broad-based mass market economy”.378 
Mousseau argues that Turkey today has a chance to follow the same path with South 
Korea for further democratization and a more liberal political regime. This liberal 
institutionalist approach may possibly be complimentary in its implications for the 
argument in this chapter: a better institutionalized market economy can lead to higher and 
more equally distributed income, which can in the longer run enhance democratic 
survival.379 It can be argued that the market economy in Turkey has started to become 
more institutionalized and better regulated following the 2001 economic crisis. Income 
distribution has also been relatively improved since then, and all these factors seem to be 
advantages for institutionalization of the market economy, as well as institutionalization 
of a more liberal and democratic regime in Turkey.      
Another critical factor that needs to be mentioned here in regard to explaining the 
failure of democratic consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s is the EU factor. Turkey being 
devoid of EU support during 1986-1992 might have been a critical factor for why Turkey 
was not able to make a leap from 3.0 (partly free) to 2.5 (free). Here, it should be 
mentioned that the EU has a two-fold effect on Turkey’s democracy, which probably 
enhance each other mutually. On the one hand, the EU exerts direct political influence on 
Turkish democratization by encouraging democratic reforms, which leads to further 
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 I thank Dr. Zeki Sarıgil for encouraging me to use Mousseau’s views as complimentary ideas for my 
main argument. 
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democratization and also liberalization.380 On the other hand, the EU-based socio-
economic reforms in Turkey leads to further socio-economic development, which 
facilitates further democratization. Regarding the EU factor in relation to Turkish 
democratization, the EU’s influence might be similar to the EU’s influence on the early 
stages of Greek, Portuguese, and Spanish democratization.  
Turkey’s EU related harmonization process, along with other facilitative factors, 
has enabled this country to sustain a rating of 3.0 during 2004-2008. This relatively 
successful rating is also in line with the fact that Turkey sufficiently met the Copenhagen 
political criteria as of December 2004. In fact, Turkey’s rating in 2008, which is 3.0, is 
merely 0.5 point away from 2.5. That is to say, taking into account the 2008 score, 
Turkey is quite close to the threshold of obtaining a ‘free’ score. Taking into account that 
Turkey has been very close to the threshold of a ‘free’ rating during 2004-2007, 
authoritarian and illiberal backlashes were an imminent possibility, which actually came 
true in 2007 and 2008 through events such as the military’s e-memorandum on 27 April 
2007 against Abdullah Gül’s presidential candidacy, and party closure cases against the 
Democratic Society Party (DTP), a pro-Kurdish party alleged to be separatist, which is 
still continuing; and against the AKP, which is alleged to be anti-secular, which 
eventually ended up by non-closure.381  
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 The AKP was not closed down by the Constitutional Court but was punished by cutting the state aid by 
half due to the AKP’s actions that the court decided to be against the principle of ‘secularism.’ 
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It can be argued that such recent anti-liberal events might be evaluated as being 
some of the transitional hurdles as Turkey is trying to make a transition from what 
Schedler calls an ‘electoral democracy’ to ‘liberal democracy,’382 or a transition from 
what O’Donnell calls a ‘democratic government’ to a ‘democratic regime.’383 In this 
transitional process to a fully democratic regime, the creation of a civil constitution 
would be especially critical. The AKP government actually attempted to bring forth a 
civil and liberal constitutional draft prepared by a commission of law professors recently, 
but has not been able to publicly legitimise it or bring it to the Parliament. However, if it 
can succeed passing such a constitution in the coming months or years by the support of 
the major opposition parties and civil societal organizations, then it will be quite critical 
for political modernization in Turkey. It can even be argued that, such a civil and more 
liberal constitution can safely move Turkey to a ‘free’ rating on the Freedom House scale 
(≤  2.5). 
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8.6 Conclusion 
It can be argued that if Turkey continues political and socio-economic modernization in 
the years ahead, especially in terms of economy, education, and human development, and 
also carry out the necessary political reforms such as passing a civil constitution, Turkey 
might possibly find itself in a position to experience further democratization and even 
consolidate its democracy. In this regard, the EU would be quite important for Turkey, 
which has a potential to enhance socio-economic modernization and political 
modernization mutually, as was elaborated above. Provided that the EU develops fairer, 
more inclusive and supportive policies throughout the next years, Turkey’s earning, and 
more importantly sustaining a democratic rating for a couple of years, might possibly 
signal the beginning of Turkey’s transcending the ‘partly-free’ authoritarian regime and 
eventually reaching a ‘free’ and genuine democracy. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study has made three basic contributions to the literature. The first one is theoretical, 
which is the comparison of Rawls’ concepts of constitutional consensus and overlapping 
consensus with the major concepts in the democratization literature. It is argued that 
Rawls’ initial stage of constitutional consensus (modus vivendi) corresponds to 
democratic transition, finalized constitutional consensus corresponds to minimalist and 
negative consolidation, and overlapping consensus corresponds to maximalist and 
positive democratic consolidation.  
The second contribution of this study is related to the relevance of constitutional 
consensus and overlapping consensus to Turkish democracy. It is argued that Turkey has 
experienced significant improvement recently in terms of meeting the three requirements 
of a constitutional consensus as outlined by Rawls. However, there are still problems 
such as deficiencies in the rule of law, continuing military influence in politics, relative 
weakness of cooperative virtues in politics as well as relative weakness of inter-group 
trust. If improvements and deficiencies are considered together, along with Turkey’s 
Freedom House scores, it can be argued that Turkey today is a ‘borderline case’ in terms 
of meeting the conditions of a constitutional consensus. 
Concerning the possibility of an overlapping consensus on issues of social justice, 
secularism, and the Kurdish issue in Turkey, it is argued that in order to be able to form a 
possible overlapping consensus on these issues, Turkish citizens need to rely on public 
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reason and the basic parameters of constitutional democracy. It is argued that for a 
possible overlapping consensus, the inherent values in the Turkish political culture such 
as cultural pluralism, tolerance, (republican) equality, and a social state, all of which have 
a relatively long history, need to be systematized and politicized within the liberalizing 
scheme of Turkish democracy. It is argued that within the liberalizing scheme of Turkish 
democracy, Rawls’ justice as fairness can be both a relevant and appealing alternative for 
Turkish democracy for which liberty and equality have been major ideals to be realized. 
In fact, after the EU-Turkey relations, these two ideals have become even more central; 
and in this regard more studies are required in order to substantiate these ideals with 
reference to concrete issues.  
The third contribution of this study focuses on the possibility of democratic 
consolidation in Turkey in light of the current socio-economic and political developments 
in Turkey. It is argued that Turkey’s current socio-economic development seems to be on 
the verge of certain threshold values. With reference to modernization theory, it is argued 
that the chance of democratic consolidation in Turkey today is practically higher than in 
the past. Thus, making political reflections on the possibility of democratic consolidation 
in Turkey today is more relevant and important than it was in the past. The author, in this 
regard, thinks that Rawls is becoming increasingly more relevant for the transforming 
and democratizing Turkey. Due to such increasing relevance, the author wishes that there 
would be further studies in the coming years that would build further connections 
between Rawls and Turkey, in which hopefully more mature findings may arise.  
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